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) _________________________ ) 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
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Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Mitchell Brown 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: merrill and merrill Receipt 
number: 0023109 Dated: 6/28/2010 Amount: 
$88.00 (Check) For: 
Plaintiff: Pocatello Hospital, LLC Attorney Mitchell Brown 
Retained Dave Robert Gallafent 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Mitchell Brown 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Beard St. 
Clair Gaffney PA Receipt number: 0023993 
Dated: 7/6/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: 
Century Park Associates, Lie, (defendant) and 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, (defendant) 
Defendants Notice of Appearance; aty Michael Mitchell Brown 
Gaffney for Defendants 
Defendant: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, 
Attorney Retained Michael D Gaffney 
Defendant: Century Park Associates, Lie, 
Attorney Retained Michael D Gaffney 
Mitchell Brown 
Mitchell Brown 
Answer and Jury Demand ; aty Michael Gaffney Mitchell Brown 
Note of Issue and request for Trial Setting; aty Mitchell Brown 
Michael Gaffney for defs 
Amended Note of issue and request for Trial 
Setting; aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Mitchell Brown 
Notice of Service- Plaintiffs First set of lnterrog. Mitchell Brown 
requests requests for PRoduction and requests 
for admission to defs: and this Notice: aty R 
William Hancock for plntf 
Order for submission of information for Mitchell Brown 
scheduling order; sf J Brown 8-20-2010 
Joint Statement of Information for Scheduling Mitchell Brown 
Conference- by PA Hawkins and DA Gaffney. 
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Mitchell Brown 
Initial Pretrial Order- jury trial set 1st setting 
5-24-11 at 9:00am, 2nd setting 10-25-11 at 9:00 
am. No pretrial conference will be held. s/Brown 
9-13-10. 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/24/2011 09:00 Mitchell Brown 
AM) 1st Setting 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/25/2011 09:00 Mitchell Brown 
AM) 2nd Setting 
uate: 2/25/2013 
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Notice of service - Defs Responses to Plntfs First Mitchell Brown 
set of Req for Admission : aty Michael Gaffney 
for def 
Notice of service - Plntfs Second set of lnterrog Mitchell Brown 
requests for production and requests for 
admission to the Defendant; aty Kent Hawkins 
for plntf 
Notice of service - Defs First set of Requests for Mitchell Brown 
Admission, lnterrog and requests for Production 
to Plntf: aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Notice of service - srvd Defs Response to Plntfs Mitchell Brown 
Second set of requests for Admission; aty 
Michael Gaffney for def 
Notice of service - Plaintiffs Responses to Defs Mitchell Brown 
First set of Requests for Admission; aty Kent 
Hawkins for plntf 
Expert and lay witness disclosure; aty Kent Mitchell Brown 
Hawkins for plntf 
Defendants Expert witness disclosures; aty Mitchell Brown 
Michael Gaffney for def 
Notice of service - Defs Responses to plntfs first Mitchell Brown 
set of lnterrog and requests for production and 
Defs Responses to plntfs Second set of lnterog 
and req for production : aty Michael Gaffney for 
def 
Motion to vacate Trial setting; aty Kent Hawkins Mitchell Brown 
for plntf 
Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion to Mitchell Brown 
vacate trial setting on 4-15-2011 @ 3pm: aty 
Kent Hawkins for p lntf 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/15/2011 03:00 Mitchell Brown 
PM) 
Defendants Lay Witness Disclosures; Michael 
Gaffney aty for dfdt 
Mitchell Brown 
Lay Witness Disclosure; Kent Hawkins aty for pltf Mitchell Brown 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/24/2011 Mitchell Brown 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 1st Setting 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/15/2011 Mitchell Brown 
03:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Minute Entry and Order; (Court GRANTED, the Mitchell Brown 
Motion to Vacate Trial setting, Jury Trial, in this 
matter is now set for 10-25-2011 @ 9am) s/ 
Judge Brown 5-5-2011 
Notice of service - Plaintiffs Responses to Defs Mitchell Brown 
First set of lnterrog. and requests for production 
to plntf: aty Dave Gallafent 
Plaintiffs motio for summary judgment; aty Kent Mitchell Brown 
Hawkins for plntf 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
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Notice of hearing; set for 8-5-2011 @ 9am; aty Mitchell Brown 
Kent Hawkins for plntf 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 08/05/2011 09:00AM) 
Mitchell Brown 
Affidavit of Don Wadle; aty Dave Gallafent for Mitchell Brown 
plntf 
Affidavit of Brad Janoush; aty Dave Gallafent for Mitchell Brown 
plntf 
Memorandum in support of plaintiffs motion for Mitchell Brown 
summary judgment; aty Dave Gallafent for plntf 
Affidavit of Greg Kelley; aty Michael Gaffney for Mitchell Brown 
defs 
Defendants Memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs motin for summary judgment; aty 
Michael Gaffney for def 
Affidavit of Brent Thompson; aty Michael 
Gaffney for def 
Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael 




Defendants motion to enlarge time to file affidavit; Mitchell Brown 
aty Michael Gaffney for def 
Notice of hearing; set for 8-5-2011 @ 9am: Mitchell Brown 
Plaintiffs reply memorandum supporting summary Mitchell Brown 
judgment motion; aty Dave Gallafent for plntf 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; Mitchell Brown 
Michael D. Gaffney, Attorney for Defendants: 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, etal 
Notice of Hearing for Defendants' Motion for Mitchell Brown 
Summary Judgment on 8-19-11 at :1:30pm. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Attorney for Dfdts. 
Defendants' Motion to Shorten Time or, in the Mitchell Brown 
Alternative to Consolidate Hearings on Motions 
for Summary Judgment: Michael D. Gaffney, Atty. 
for Dfdts. 
Order Shortening Time [Order shortening time for Mitchell Brown 
Hearing on Quail Ridge's Motion for Summary 
Judgment] - GRANTED- Motion set for August 5, 
2011@ 9 am 
/s/ J Brown 8/3/2011 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Mitchell Brown 
scheduled on 08/05/2011 09:00AM: Hearing 
Held 
Minute Entry and Order- Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment- TAKEN UNDER 
ADVISEMENT 
IS/ J Brown 8/5/2011 
Mitchell Brown 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
Page 4 of 11 
icial District Court - Bannock Cou 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie 
Date Code User 













2/1/2012 MEMO BRANDY 
2/3/2012 HRHD BRANDY 
HRVC BRANDY 
2/9/2012 CAMILLE 
3/1/2012 HRSC BRANDY 
3/13/2012 CAMILLE 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 




Available dates for Jury Trial; aty Kent Hawkins Mitchell Brown 
for plntf 
Defendants notice of available trial dates; aty 
Michael Gaffney for def 
Mitchell Brown 
Scheduling order, notice of trial setting and initial Mitchell Brown 
pretrial order; s/ Judge Brown 8-26-2011 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/20/2012 09:00 Mitchell Brown 
AM) 
Plaintiffs motion to reconsider; aty Dave Gallafent Mitchell Brown 
for plntf 
Minute entry and order; Court DENIED both 
parties motions for summary judgment; s/ 
Judge Brown 1-7-2012 
Mitchell Brown 
Notice of hearing ; on plntfs motion to reconsider Mitchell Brown 
on 2-3-2012@ 9am: 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/03/2012 09:00 Mitchell Brown 
AM) 
Notice of service- Defs Supplemental Response Mitchell Brown 
to plaintiffs first set of lnterrog : aty Michael 
Gaffney for def 
Second affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty 
Michael Gaffney for def 
Defendants supplemental Lay Witness 
disclosures; aty Michael Gaffney for def 
Defendants Memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs motion to reconsider; aty Michael 
Gaffney for def 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Reconsider; pltf aty 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 






Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Mitchell Brown 
03/20/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated; vacated 
on the record by Court will be reset after 
mediatioln in March 
Minute Entry and Order; (if Mediation is Mitchell Brown 
unsuccessful, the court will then take the matter 
under advisement; trial in this matter is hereby 
VACATED,) s/ Judge Brown 2-10-2012 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/14/2012 09:00 Mitchell Brown 
AM) 
Minute Entry and Order and order scheduling trial; Mitchell Brown 
Court GRANTED the parties and extension of 
(15) days; s/ Judge Brown 3-13-2012 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
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Order setting status conference; s/ Judge Brown Mitchell Brown 
3-13-2012 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Mitchell Brown 
03/16/2012 11:30 AM) 
Plaintiffs amended lay witness disclosure; aty Mitchell Brown 
William Hancock for plntf 
Report of Mediator; Mitchell Brown 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Mitchell Brown 
on 03/16/2012 11:30 AM: Interim Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Further Proceedings Mitchell Brown 
03/26/2012 01:30PM); order setting hearing to 
announce decision; J Brown 
Hearing result for Further Proceedings scheduled Mitchell Brown 
on 03/26/2012 01:30PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Plaintiffs second amended Lay witness 
disclosure; aty William Hancock for plntf 
Plaintiffs disclosure of rebuttal expert witness: 
aty William Hancock for plntf 
Mitchell Brown 
Mitchell Brown 
Notice of deposition of Greg Kelley on 5-4-2012 Mitchell Brown 
@ 11 am: aty Dave Gallafent for plntf 
Notice of deposition of Brent Thompson; on Mitchell Brown 
5-4-2012@ 10am: aty Dave Gallafent for plntf 
Notice of taking rule 30b6 Deposition duces Mitchell Brown 
tecum of quail ridge medical investors, LLC: aty 
Dave Gallafent for plntf 
Notice of service - Plntfs first supplemental Mitchell Brown 
responses to defs first set of interrog and 
requests for production to plaintiff; and this notice: 
aty William Hancock for plntf 
Notice of taking rule 30b6 Deposition duces Mitchell Brown 
tecum of Century park Associates, LLC: aty 
William Hancock for plntf 
Minute Entry and Order; Court DENIED, Plaintiffs Mitchell Brown 
Motion for reconsideration: s/ Judge Brown 
4-11-2012 
Notice of service - Plntfs second supplemental Mitchell Brown 
responses to defs first set of lnterrog and req for 
production to plaintiff and Notice of service aty 
William Hancock for plntf 
Plaintiffs motion to vacate May 14,2012 Jury Trial; Mitchell Brown 
aty Kent Hawkins 
Notice of hearing; on motin in limine and Motion Mitchell Brown 
to vacate May 14,2012 Jury Trial 
Plaintiffs motion in limine on 2001 Landlord Mitchell Brown 
consent and estoppel certificate; aty aty Kent 
Hawkins for plntf 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
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Plaintiffs motion in limine on defs experts; aty Mitchell Brown 
Kent Hawkins 
Plaintiffs Motion in limine on presentatjion of Mitchell Brown 
irrelevent extrinsic evidence: Oral Modification , 
Equitable arguments , any evidence unrelated to 
the intent of the parties in 1983: aty Kent 
Hawkins for plntf 
Plaintiffs motion i nlimine on speculation and Mitchell Brown 
opinion testimony: aty Kent Hawkins for plntf 
Affidavit of Sam Langston; aty Kent Hawkins for Mitchell Brown 
plntf 
Amended notice of hearing; on motions in limine Mitchell Brown 
and motion to vacate May 14,2012 Jury Trial 
Notice of telephonic Trial deposition of Everett 
Goodwin; aty William Hancock 
Mitchell Brown 
Amended notice of telephonic depsotion of Guy Mitchell Brown 
Kroesche on 5-3~2012: aty William Hancock for 
plntf 
Defendants objection to telephonic trial deposition Mitchell Brown 
of everett goodwin; aty Michael Gaffney for def 
Notice of telephonic deposition of Chris Anton; on Mitchell Brown 
Chris Anton on 5-2-2012@ 10:30; aty William 
Hancock 
Amended Notice of telephonic depositon of 
Everett Goodwin; on 5-8-2012@ 10am: aty 
William Hancock 
Defendants first motion in limine; aty Michael 
Gaffnery for def 
Mitchell Brown 
Mitchell Brown 
Defendants Memorandum in opposition to Mitchell Brown 
motions in limine; aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Defendants Memorandum in opposition to Mitchell Brown 
plaintiffs motion to vacate May 14 2012 Jury Trial; 
aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Notice of hearing; set for 4-30~2012@ 10am: Mitchell Brown 
Amended Notice of Hearing for Defendants' First Mitchell Brown 
Motion in Limine on 4-30-12 at 10:00 am. Michael 
D. Gaffney, Attorney for Dfdts. 
Motion to Shorten Time: Michael D. Gaffney, 
Attorney for Dfdts. 
Mitchell Brown 
Plaintiffs motion to enforce Jury waiver clause in Mitchell Brown 
2001 Landlord consent and estoppel certificate: 
aty William Hancock for plntf 
Notice of hearing on plaintiffs motion to enforce Mitchell Brown 
Jury waiver clause in 2001 landlord consent and 
estoppel certificate: aty William Hancock for plntf 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
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Motion to shorten time on hearihng of plaintiffs 
motion to enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001 
landlord consent and estoppel certificate: aty 
William Hancock forp lntf 
Judge 
Mitchell Brown 
Minute Entry and Order; (court shall be provided Mitchell Brown 
with a copy of the deposition as soon as possible 
to allow the ocurt to review and consider the 
objections prior to trial; s/ Judge Brown 
4-25-2012 
Order shortening time; s/ Judge Brown 
4-27-2012 
Mitchell Brown 
Order shortening time on the hearing of plaintiffs Mitchell Brown 
motion to enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001 
Landlord consent and estoppel certificate; s/ 
Judge Brown 4-27-2012 
Defendants Objection to plaintiff motion to Mitchell Brown 
enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001 Landlord 
consent and estoppel certificate: aty Michael 
Gaffney 
Affidavit of ocunsel ; aty William Hancock Mitchell Brown 
Plaintiffs reply in support of its motions in limine Mitchell Brown 
and in support of its motion to vacate: aty 
William Hancock 
Notice of service - Defs Supplemental Responses Mitchell Brown 
to Plaintiffs first rrequests for production ; aty 
Michael Gaffney 
Motion to amend complaint and notice of hearing; Mitchell Brown 
set for 5-4-2012@ 1:30pm 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/04/2012 01:30 Mitchell Brown 
PM) 
2nd Amended Notice of telephonic deposition of Mitchell Brown 
Guy P Krosesche on 5-7-2012@ 3pm: aty 
William Hancock for plntf 
Amended Notice of Telephonic Deposition of Mitchell Brown 
Chris Anton on 5-10-2012@ 10:30: aty William 
Hancock fo rplntf 
Amended Notice of Deposition of Greg Kelley on Mitchell Brown 
5-9-2012@ 11am: aty William Hancock for plntf 
Amended notice of deposition of Brent Mitchell Brown 
Thompson; set for 5-9-2012@ 10am: aty 
William Hancock fo rplntf 
Notice of telephonic deposition of Cal Northam; Mitchell Brown 
aty William Hancock for plntf 
Defendants Memorandum re: Plaintiffs Motion to Mitchell Brown 
enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001 landlord 
consent and estoppel certificate: aty Michael 
Gaffney for def 
oate: 2/25/2013 District Court - Bannock Cou User: DCANO 
Time: 12:10 PM ROAReport 
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Date Code User 
5/2/2012 DCANO 3rd Amended Notice of Telephonic Deposition of Mitchell Brown 
Guy P. Kroesche, Dave R. Gallafent, Attorney for 
Plntfs. 
5/3/2012 BRANDY Plaintiffs reply in support of its motion to enforce Mitchell Brown 
jury waiver clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and 
Estoppel Certificate; pltf aty 
AFFD BRANDY Affidavit of counsel in support of its motion to Mitchell Brown 
enforce jury waiver clause in 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate; pltf aty 
NOTC BRANDY Defendants Notice of non opposition to Plaintiffs Mitchell Brown 
motion to amend complaint; dfdt aty 
5/4/2012 HRHD BRANDY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Mitchell Brown 
05/04/2012 01:30PM: Hearing Held 
MEOR BRANDY Minute Entry and Order; hearing held 4-30-12 in Mitchell Brown 
Caribou; under advisement; J Brown 4-30-12 
NOTC BRANDY Notice to vacate deposition of Brent Thompson; Mitchell Brown 
pltf aty 
NOTC BRANDY Notice to vacate deposition of Greg Kelley; pltf aty Mitchell Brown 
5/7/2012 CAMILLE Plaintiffs Brief in support of its oral motion for a Mitchell Brown 
judicial determination of the 2001 landlord 
consent and estoppel certificate : atyWilliam 
Hancock 
BRANDY Plaintiffs Exhibit List; pltf aty Mitchell Brown 
AMCO BRANDY Amended Complaint Filed; pltf aty Mitchell Brown 
NOTC BRANDY 2nd Amended Notice of telephonic deposition of Mitchell Brown 
Everett Goodwin; pltf aty 
ANSW BRANDY Answer to Amended Complaint and Jury Mitchell Brown 
Demand; dfdt aty 
5/8/2012 NOTC BRANDY Notice of telephonic deposition of Earl Christison; Mitchell Brown 
pltf aty 
5/9/2012 MOTN BRANDY Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Demand for a Jury Mitchell Brown 
Trial; pltf aty 
MEMO BRANDY Defendants Memorandum RE: 2001 Landlort Mitchell Brown 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate; dfdt aty 
AFFD BRANDY Affidavit of John Avondet; dfdt aty Mitchell Brown 
5/10/2012 MEOR BRANDY Minute Entry and Order; hearing held 5-10-12 by Mitchell Brown 
phone in Franklin County; demand for jury trial is 
stricken; GRANTS motion for determination and 
finds certificate clear and unambiguous; J Brown 
5-10-12 
5/11/2012 BRANDY Defendants Supplemental Lay Witness Mitchell Brown 
Disclosures; dfdt aty 
5/14/2012 CTST BRANDY Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on Mitchell Brown 
05/14/2012 09:00AM: Court Trial Started 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
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Minute Entry and Order; The Court Granted Plntfs Mitchell Brown 
Motn to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Cert. and ordered 
that this matter would proceed to trail before the 
Court. The Court Denied Plntfs. Motion in Limine 
on 2001 Landfor Consent and Estoppel Cert. and 
Dfdts. First Motion in Limine. Finally the Courted 
Denied Plntfs. Motion to Vacate the Trial again 
stating the basis for decision on the record. 
s/Judge Mitchell Brown on 5-11-12. 
Defendants exhibit list; aty Michael Gaffney for Mitchell Brown 
defs 
Plaintiffs Exhibit List Mitchell Brown 
Minute Entry and Order; (plaintiff shall have 14 Mitchell Brown 
days to submit proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to the court) s/ Judge Brown 
5-15-2012 
Order; that the parties shall have until Mitchell Brown 
6-11-2012 to remit payment to Rodney Felshaw 
for the trial transcript: s/ Judge Brown 5-11-2012 
Plaintiffs closing argument; aty Kent Hawkins for Mitchell Brown 
plntf 
Plaintiffs objection to certain deposition testimony Mitchell Brown 
admitted into evidence: aty Kent Hawkins for 
plntf 
Plaintiffs proposed findings of fact and Mitchell Brown 
conclusions of law; aty Kent Hawkins for plntf 
Defendants Objection to deposition testimony; 
aty Michael Gaffney 
Defendants closing arguments; aty Michael 
Gaffney for def 
Defendants proposed findings of fact and 




Plaintiffs closing rebuttal argument; aty Dave Mitchell Brown 
Gallafent for plntf 
Minute Entry and Order; court took this matter Mitchell Brown 
under advisement: s/ Judge Brown 7-20-2012 
Findings of Fact, conclusions of law and Mitchell Brown 
memorandum decision and order; Declaratory 
Judgment consistent with the courts conclusion of 
Law on this matter;: s/ Judge Brown 10-16-2012 
Motion to correct clerical mistake in findings of Mitchell Brown 
fact conclusions of law and Memorandum 
Decision and Order; aty William Hancock for 
plntf 




Time: 12:10 PM 
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Defendants Memorandum regarding form of 
Judgment; aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Mitchell Brown 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of authorities in support of Mitchell Brown 
its request for a money judgment; aty Kent 
Hawkins 
Order on form of Judgment; s/ Judge Brown Mitchell Brown 
11-12-2012 
Declaratory Judgment; s/ Judge Brown Mitchell Brown 
11-13-2012 
Case Status Changed: Closed Mitchell Brown 
***Amended Declaratory Judgment; aty Judge Mitchell Brown 
Brown 11-26-2012 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Mitchell Brown 
Supreme Court Paid by: Michael D. Gaffney 
Receipt number: 0041053 Dated: 11/27/2012 
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Quail Ridge 
Medical Investors, Lie, (defendant) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Defendant's Notice of Appeal; Michael D. 
Gaffney, Attorney for Quail Ridge Medical 
Investors, LLC, Defendant/Appellant. 
Received check #1 04296 in the amount of 





Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal: Michael Mitchell Brown 
D. Gaffney, Attorney for Quail Ridge Medical 
Investors, LLC, Defendant/Appellant. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed Mitchell Brown 
and Mailed to SC and Counsel on 12-3-12. 
CORRECTED CLERK'S CERTIFI,CATE OF Mitchell Brown 
APPEAL MAILED TO SUPREME COURT AND 
COUNSEL ON 12-31-12. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of Mitchell Brown 
Appeal on 12-10-12. Docket Number 
#40566-2012. Clerk's Record and Reporert's 
Transcript must be filed by 3-20-13. (2-13-13 5 
weeks prior to Counsel). The following transcripts 
shall be lodged: Further Proceedings 3-26-12 
4-30-12 (No Hearing on ROA) 
Hearing 5-4-12 
Hearing 5-1 0-12 
Court Trial5-14-12 thru 5-15-12. 
NOTICE OF LODGING: received by Rodney M. Mitchell Brown 
Felshaw on 1-18-13. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Clerk's Mitchell Brown 
Cert. of Appeal. on 1-4-13. Carefully examine the 
Title and the Cert. and advise the Dist. Court 
Clerk of any corrections. The Title in the Cert. 
must appear on all document filed in this court. 
Date: 2/25/2013 
Time: 12:10 PM 
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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS: Received in Mitchell Brown 
Court Records: 
Motion to Reconsider 3-26-12 
Motions in Limine 4-30-12 
Motion to Amend Complaint held 5-4-12 
Ruling on Motion to Amend Complaint and 
Pre-Trial held 5-10-12. 
Bench Trial Vol1 held 5-14-12 
Bench Trial, Vol. 2 held 5-15-12. 
Motion to Amend Complaint 5-4-12 
CLERKS RECORD received in Court Records on Mitchell Brown 
2-25-12. 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax MITCHELL W. BROWN 
ISB # 1745, 7938 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~~:t .=~l 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 

















FEES$ 0 ~ 0 ~J 
A 
____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, 
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the 
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, complains 
and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), 
is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose 
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock 
County, Idaho 83201. 
Complaint 
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2. Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
3. Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
4. This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 
1983 ("Lease Agreement"). PMC's copy of this Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"1" and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. ("IHC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original 
lessee. 
6. The Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello, 
Bannock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal description for the 
Leased Land is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
7. On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to 
Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limited partnership 
authorized to do business in the State ofldaho, whose principal place ofbusiness is 3570 Keith 
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
8. On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their respective interests 
in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge thereby became the 
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement 
9. On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease 
Agreement to IHC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., thereby became the 
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. 
10. On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in 
the Lease Agreement to Bannock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby 
Complaint 
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became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its 
name to PortneufMedical Center. 
11. On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC (then known as Portneuf Medical Center), 
assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the successor lessor 
to the Lease Agreement. 
12. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or 
related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement. 
13. Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of 
"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land. 
14. When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27, 1983, IHC and 
Sterling, as original lessor and lessee respectively, agreed upon a basis for calculating the initial 
annual rental. Specifically, in Article 1, Section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original 
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis for calculating the initial annual rental: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(15%) ofthe value ofthe leased land. For purposes ofthefirst three (3) 
years from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be 
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) 
per acre. 
15. The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and 
unambiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased 
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 x 4.25 = $63,750; $63,750 x 15% = $9,562.50). 
16. The annual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic basis pursuant to the 
Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.3(b ), which states in relevant part: 
. . . The annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) 
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to 
below as the rent adjustment date. 
17. The above language in Article 1 of the Lease Agreement concerning when each 
rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date 
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled for January 27, 1986 and the rent was, and is, subject 
Complaint 
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to adjustment every three years thereafter until the termination of this Lease Agreement. 
18. Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent adjustment date was 
January 27, 2010. 
19. Although the Lease Agreement provides for period rent adjustment dates as 
outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive 
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the 
specified rent adjustment date. 
20. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part: 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent 
adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to 
the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined. The party 
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the 
period affected by the adjustment. 
21. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC becoming a successor 
lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither IHC, IHC Health Services, Inc., nor BRMC exercised its 
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of 
the Lease Agreement. 
22. Sometime in the summer of 2009, PMC became aware of the fact that the annual 
rental rate for the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article 1 of the 
Lease Agreement. 
23. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides the 
following clear and unambiguous formula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the 
Leased Land: 
Complaint 
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24. In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation 
("Bowman") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land on the prior three rent 
adjustment dates. 
25. On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC, 
which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007 
rent adjustment dates was $1,297,371, $1,371,507, and $1,464,176, respectively. 
26. On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants of PMC's intention 
to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of this Lease Agreement. 
27. As evidence in support ofPMC's request for an adjustment of the annual rent rate 
pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time 
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 
prior three rent adjustment periods. 
28. Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual 
rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue 
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land. 
29. Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement 
30. Based upon Bowman's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $658,879.20 in annual rents for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,686.00 in annual rents during the 
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $630,193.20 
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period. 
31. Although Bowman has not yet determined the fair market value of the Leased 
Land for the 2010 rent adjustment period, to the best ofPMC's knowledge and belief, the current 
fair market value of the Leased Land is not less than the fair market value of the Leased Land for 
the 2007 rent adjustment period. Therefore, in January of 2010, Defendants should have paid 
annual rent in an amount of not less than $219,626.40. Instead, Defendants paid $9,562.00 in 
annual rent. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $210,064.60 for unpaid 
current adjusted annual rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period. 
Complaint 
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32. Furthermore, the adjusted annual rental rate for the remaining years of the 2010 
rent adjustment period should not be in an amount less than $219,626.40 per year. 
33. To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill, 
Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 
12-120(3) and 12-123, and Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered in Plaintiffs favor and 
against the Defendants as follows: 
1. That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plaintiff for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $630,193 .20; 
n. That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for the 2010 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $210,064.40; 
111. That Defendants be ordered to pay an annual rental rate for the remaining years of 
the 201 0 rent adjustment period in an amount not less than $219,626.40 per year. 
IV. That Defendants be ordered to pay Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs associated 
with bringing this action; and 
v. For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances of this case. 
·f--.-
DATED this2YdayofJune, 2010. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
~ 




Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
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GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT 
This p;ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into. thi. s d.Z 
. day of (j{'-"1t.f~, 1983, by and bet,.een INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH 
CARE, ii}6"., a · ~h non-profit corporation, authorized to do 
business in the State of Idaho · under the name of Po<;:atello 
Regic;mal Medical Center ·(hereinafter called .. Les$c.or"}, and 
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO. , a Washington partnership au.t}1priz~.d to 
do business in the State of Idaho, (hereinafter called "'Less-.e~}. 
R E C I T A L S 
\'lHEREAS, Lessor owns certain real property located within the 
City of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho; and 
WHEREAS, Lessor wishes to lease to Les~ee approximately 4 
..-.,' 
acres, more or less; of ·said property for construct~on of a 
Psychiatric Hospital buildi'ng (the "hospital"') and to impose 
ce;r-tain restrictions on the use of such parcel. of real property 
and·· Lessee wishes to 1-t!ase said parcel of real property for such 
purpose, subject to Lessor's restrictions; and 
WHEREAS, Lessor ·and Lessee wish to enter into a written 
ground lease agre·ement setting forth the terms, conditions·· and 
restrictions under which said parcel of real property is to be 
leased: 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual 
covenants, conditions and promises contained 'herein, Lessor and 
Lessee agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
DESCRIPTION, TERM AND RENTAL 
1.1. Real ~rooert~ Leased. Lesso:- hereby leases to Lessee 
and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property described 
G.ROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1 HORI NSlliS. \'\.YHS(. f lRCt.'SOS& SlOt."'' 
Arf('llf'lo1" •HAW 
1:::V ...... S1 • lUfll ... 
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,~.-...rnP'\"t a ... .,, ... ,,clo' ......,_, 
.. 
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and hereby r:'lade a part hereof, in-
cluding all easements, right-of-way interests associated there-
with whether granted or by prescript ion, and any and a 11 . other 
interests or rights appurtenant to the property and _in adjoining 
and adjacent land, highways 1 roads, 





instailation, maintenance, operation and service of electricity, . . 
gas, sewer, telephone I water and other utility lines and. for 
driveways and approaches to and from abutting ways for the use 
• and benefl t. o~ the above described real prope;-ty, including 
improvements to be erected thereon (hereinafter· called the 
"1 eas·ed land"), situated in the County of Bannock, State of 
Idaho. 
1.2 Term. - The term of this Lease shall be for a period of 
thirty ( 30) years (hereinafter referred to as the "Term••), 
commencing on the lst day of ~/~,-~, 1983, or on or 
before thirty (30) days after a buildi:g;/perrnit i·s issued, ( 
whichever is iater, (the "Conunencernent Date ••), with one ( l) ten 
(10) year option to extend such term to be exercised as provided 
in Article 14, Paragraph 14. 1, hereof. Such option to ext-end the 
term is personal to Lessee and may not be.assigned or conveyed in 
any manner whatsoever to another party. Lessee shall be entitled 
to possession of the leased land on the Commencement Date. 
1.3 Rent and Pavment Thereof. 
(a) Rental. 
rental amount: 
Lessee shall pay the following annual 
An initial annual rental shall be ~alculated 
on the basis of fifteen percent ( 15%) of the 
value of the leased land. For purposes of 
the first three (3) years from the co~~ence­
ment Date of this Lease, the leased land 
shall be valued at the rate of Fifteen 
GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 2 
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Thot.lsand and No/100 Dollars J~:~-~).900.00) ·per 
- ,_ ................. ~ ... -··-:c: ...... , 
acre .• 
(b) Adjustments ·Jaase.d~ .. ~::m: Property Vahl~· The annual 
net rental . as. se~ forth above shall be adjusted every three 
( 3.) years beginning on the Commencemen~t Date of this Lease, 
referred to b.~low as the rent. aojustr:tent date. 
The pa,rtie.s' written ag.ree·ment within ninety (90) days 
before the applicable rent c adjustment date shall be · a 
conclusive determination between the parties of the fair 
market v..a.lue ~or the period tq :zwhieh the adjustment applies. 
If the parties have not s,o agreed .by·. the applicable ient 
adjustl'l\ent date, the deteJ:"mination sha~ll be·. made as in the 
paragraph on A~bitration in.~ticle 1.3. 
-The rent as adjusted shall be· equal to fifteen percent 
(15%) percent of the fair market value of· the leased ·land, 
ex.clusive of the improvements on the 'premises. D·etermina-
tion of fair market. value sha·l.l be based on· the highest and 
best use of the land· on the applicable rent adjustment date 
'Without taking the leasehold . ~ntc;:> ac~o.unt. The determina-
tion shall take into account t~e· part:.ie•s • agreement that the 
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied 
to a fair market . value o~ Fifteen nousano. and No/100 
Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take int_o 
account any determinations of .market value made under this 
lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding 
the applicable rent adj,qstrnent d.ate. 
If the determination of adjusted rent is mad~ a£ter the 
applicable rent adjustment. date, lessee shall continue to 
pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period 
until the adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted 
shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference 
for the period affected by the adjustment. 
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(c) Definition of Lea_~~ Yea·r. A l~e:se year is either a 
calendar year or a fiscal year, as selected by Lessee. 
1.4 NeQation of Partner$hip. · · ~othing in this Lease shall 
be construed to render the Lessor in any wa:y· or for ~ny purpose a 
partner 1 joint venturer, or associate in any relationship wit? 
Lessee· other than that of landlord · and tena'ht, nor shall this 
Lease be construed to authorize either to act as ig.ent for the 
other, except c;~.s expressly provided to t:he contrary in this 
.Lease. 
1. 5 Pla~e of Rental Payments. 
.. ... ·, 
All p·ayments of Rental 
required to be paid to Lessor under the terms of this'lease shall 
be rnade in lawful money of the United' States which at time of 
such payment shall be legal tender for the'paYJnent of public and . . 
private .... debts, free from all elaims 1 d·emands, deductions, 
abatements, set-offs, prior notices or count·erelaims of any kind 
or character against Lessor and shall be payable at'the following 
address or at such other place or places· as may be from time to 
time designated by Lessor by written n~·fi:ce given to Lessee: ( 
1.6 
T;-ust or 
Pocatello Regional t-iedical Center 
777 Hospital Wa·y 
PocatellO, Idaho 83201 
Fee, Mortqages • Lessor may 
o.t h e r s. e cur i t y in t ere s t s 
grant mortgages 1 





subordination agreement·, provided, however, that such mortgages, 
Deed.s of Trust or security interests. shall· be subject to this 
lease and further provided that Lessee deliver a copy of any such 
proposed mortga.ge, 
related note to 
Deed of Trust or other security interest and 
Le,ssor for prior examination and approval; 
provided, however, that such examination and approval shall be 
accomplished by Lessor in a dili~ent manner. 
(_ 
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ARTICLE 2 
USE OF ·LEASE:O 'l~A.Nt( AND '''tiTLE TO IMPROVEMENTS. 
2.1 Use of Leased Land. Lessee shall. use the leased land 
solely for the purpose of constructing, maintaining a_nd operating 
the hqspital for psychiatric· care and substance abuse· tre·atment: 
provided that Lessee may at any time use the leased land:: for ·any 
lawful . purpose. Lessee shall conunence . construction o~ the 
hospital within forty-fiv-e (45) days after ~~'he commencement date 
of· this Lease and the issuance of: a building .permit.. :t.·f Lessee 
is delayed in conunencing ·construction or rec~iving t..~e per·mit· by 
any cause or causes beyond.·. Lessee • s control., s,uc'h causes 
incl\lqing but not necessaril;f ·being limited to Acts of .God;·;, 
strikes, war, insurrections, and the li~e, 
. . 
day period to commence cons·truction shall 
said forty-five (45) 
be e>:tended for a 
' 
period equivalent to the time lost by reason of. any such ca\.lse or 
cause~: provided, however, that no extensions s.)lall be granted 
for any such delay which commences more than ten (10) days before 
~ . . 
Lessee notifies Lessor of· such delay. and the reasons t.heref.Qr.: 
Once constru~c.tion is begun, Lessee shall, with reasonable 
diligence, prosecute to completion all construction of i,mpro've-
ments, additions, or alterations and shall have suhsta:ntia·lly 
completed construction of the hospital within ·tf'2ic£. { J _ } years 
after date of this lease. "Substantial compl~tion" shall mean 
that. the hospital is ready for occupancy and use as a hospital as 
. . 
evidence~ by a C~ti.ficate of Occupancy or other lik.e. d9c:urnent 
issued by .an appropriate governmental authority. If Lessee is 
delayed in subs"tantial completion of the hospital by any c~use or 
causes beyond Lessee's control, such causes including but not 
necessarily being limited to Acts of God, strikes, "''ar, 
insurrections, and the like, said date for substant~~l completion 
of the hospi ta~ shall be extended for a period eq~ivalent to the 
tirne lost by reason of any such cause or causes: provided, 
however, that no e>:tensions will be c;:-anted for any such delay ·-
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which COlM\ences more t.han ten (10) days before ;Le·ssee notifies(·· 
Lessor of such delay· and the reasons therefor.. All work shall be 
performed in a good and workmanlike manner, shall substantially 
comply with plans a·nd specifications subm.itted to Lessor as 
required by this lease, and shall comply with all governmental 
permits, la'-ls, ordinances and regulations. Less:ee shall not 
. . . 
bring, cause to be brought, or permit to be brought or· kept on 
-
the leased land anything which wil~ in any way ·conflict with any 
law, ordinance, rule, or regulation, or commit or suffer to be 
• cor:unitted any waste upon the leased land,. or use or a·:tlow the 
leased land or hospital to be used for any immoral ·or· unlawful 
purpose. 
2.2 Architectural Compati'bility.. It is understood and 
agreed that the nospi tal will be architecturally compatible with 
the l-ied Center hospital. In order to insure that this be 
accomplished, Lessee shall submit its site plall,.elevations, and 
architectural plans and specifications for the hospital to the ( 
Board of Directors of the ~~ed Center hospital for approval be fore 
corn.rn.encing construction. The approval of the Board of Directors 
shall· not be unreason-ably withheld and response shall be given 
within forty-five (45) days following the submission of Le~s~e's 
plan's and specifications. 
2. 3 · · Regu.ired Parking. Lessee agrees that in designing the . 
site plans and.· the plans and specifications for construction of 
the hospital, ft will include sufficient off-street parl:ing 
spaces to accommodate the minimum required by.local codes. 
2.4 Title to Buileinqs. Title to the h6spital and 
appurtenances thereto and all other improvements and fixtures 
located on the leased land or constructe<! or placed on the ieased 
land by Lessee or 
during the Term. 
its -tenants shall be 
Lessee shall have 
and 
the 
reoain in Lessee 
right to rnake 
al te.rations, changes and repairs as provided herein. No interest 
in any buileings, perwanent improvements, or fixtures shall pass 
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to Lessor unti 1 the exp,,~r~tiOI'l of the T,erm. cOr the prior 
c··-. termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the 
'· 
( 
right to terminate this lease pursuant to krticle 10 hereof. 
Lessee covenants and agrees that upon expiration of. the Term it 
wi 11 yield up and deliver the 1 eased land with any such 
buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures upon the leased 
land at such time free and cle~r. of all liens and encumbrances of 
any 'kind, and upon such expiration title therein shall be in 
Lessor. In the event of earlier t.ermination· of· thi's lease, 
• Lessee covenants and agrees that it will yield up and deliver the 
leased land with any such buildings, permanent improvements, and 
fixtures upon the leased .land at .such time. free and clear of all 
liens and indebtedness of any kind. Provided, hcw,ever, tha·t such 
obligation to deliver the leasec;l land and improvements free and 
clear of all liens and indebtedness shall not apply to the 
or:iginal lien of first encumbrance repr.esented by· the mar·t-sage or 
Deed of Trust or other security interest referred to in Artiele 6 
hereof given to secure the· financing fer the construction of the 
ori'ginal buildings, permanent improver:1ents 1 and fixtures upon the 
leased land. Upon such earlier terminatic~m, title in ·the 
buildings 1 permanent improvements and fixtures upon the leased 
land shall be in Lessor. 
2.5 Deed at Termination. Upon termination of this lease, 
Lessee shall·, subject to the foregoing, 
satisfactory in form and content. to Lessor confirming Lesser's 
title to ~ny buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures 
therein, upon.the leased land at the time of termination. 
2.6 Additional Real Property. At such time ;,iS Lessee shall 
require additional real property for the expansion of the 
hospital, Lessee shall so notify Lessor and Lessor shall in good 
faith consider the leasing of acditional real property to Lessee 
for such purpose. 
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2.7, Grant ,.of Cost of Utilities and Easements. Upon (~~. 
requests being made, Lessor shall grant to public entities or 
other public: service corporations, for the ·-purpose of serving 
only the property, rights of way or easements on .or over the 
property for poles or conduits or both, for telephone, 
electricity, water, sanitary or storm sewers or both, and for 
other utilities and municipal or special district services. 
The cost of utilities, their installation and maintenance, 
are to be assumed, fully paid and satisfied by Lessee • 
ARTICLE 3 
CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
3.1 General Maintenance. Throughou~ the Term, Lessee 
shall, at Lessee • s sole. cost and expense, maintain the premises 
and all improvements in good condition and repair, ordinary wear 
and tear excepted, and in accordance with all applicable laws, 
rules, ordinances, orders and r~gu1ations of ( 1) federal, state, 
county, municipal, and other governmental agencies and bodies 
having or claiming jurisdiction and all their respective 
departments, bureaus, and officials: (2) the ins\)rance 
underwriting board· or insurance companies insuring all or any 
part of the premises or improvements or both; and (3) Lessor, as 
shall be in effect from time to time. Lessee shall r:tanage and 
operate the hospital and the surrounding grounds in a competent 
and professional -manner. Lessee shall maintain the sidewalks and 
roadways giving access to the. hospital free and clear of ice and 
snow. 
Except as provided below, Lessee shall promptly and 
diligently repair, restore and replace as required to maintain or 
comply as above, or to remedy all dar:lage to or destruction of all 
or any part of the improvements resulting \o."holly or in part from 
causes required by this lease to be covered by fire or extended 
coverage insurance, if the cost of the '":ork so required does not 
( 
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exceed seventy-five percent (75\) o.f ttre tf!placement.· v"alue of aoll 
of the improvements. If. the cost does exceed that percen~, 
Lessee may nevertheless repair, restore and replace as above or 
may by notice elect inst.oead to raze the improvements damaged or 
destroyed. Within thirty (30) days aftel:' such not.iee I Lessor m~y 
by notice elect to repair, restore · and replacfe as above, and 
Lessee shall not raz.e until the e.xpiration of the time for 
Lessor • s notice of election. ·Lessor shall not be required to 
furnish any services ·or facilities or to make any repairs or 
alterations of any kind in or on the premises.. Lessor's election 
to perform any obligation of Lessee 0 under this provision on 
Lessee's failure or rc;fusal to do so shall not c~nsti tute a 
•• 0 
waiver o~ ~ny _right. or remedy for Less~e • s . de.f'aul t, and Lessee, 
shall promptly reimburse, defend, and indemnify Lessor agains~ 
all liability, loss, cost, an4 expense •r~sing fro~ it. 
In determining whether Le.ssee has acted promptly as 
req•uired under the foregoing paragraph, one of the criteria to be,, 
( cons·idered is the availability of any applicable insurance 
proceeds. 
Nothing in 
mainteriance shall be 
this provision defining the duty of 
construed as limiting any right given 
e 1 sewhere in this lea.se to alter, modify·, demolish, remove, or 
replace any improvement, or as limiting provisions relating to 
condemnation or to damage or destruction during the final year or 
years 0 of the Term-. No deprivation, it;lpairin~nt• or limitation on 
use resulting fror.t any event or work cO:ntemplated by this 
paragraph shall entitle Lessee to any offset, abatecent, or 
reduction in rent nor to any te.rlt!ination or ·ext~e·nsion of the 
Term. 
3.2 Relief for Substantial.Lcss of Area. lf any damage to 
or destruction of the premises or the improvements is such that 
75% of the floor area is rendered unusable for purposes stated in 
the Lease, Lessee may, at Lessee's election, cielay the ....-ork 
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required above for ·not -to exce'ed s'l:x '(6-) ~onths. No.thing r 
contained in this paragraph shall be 
modify any provision of this 'lease 







darnaoe or ... 
3. 3 Major and Minor Dist.inc;ui s·hed. Lessor's approval is 
not required for 
additions. "f1inor" 
Less~e's minor repairs, alterations, or 
means a construction cost not exceeding Five 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($S,OOO.OO), none of which is derived 
from funds advanced on the security of an encumbrance on the 
• leasehold or t.ll.e property. "Construction cost." inclu4es all 
costs that would constitute the basis of ·a valid claim or claims 
under the mechanics' lien laws in effect at the time the wor'k is 
commenced for_ an.y demolition and aqy r!!moval of e:d.sting 
improvements or parts of improvements as well as for preparation, 
construction and . completion of all new improvements or parts of 
improvements. The dol;Lar amount stated above shall be adjusted 
by the percentage change in the index k:tovn as the United St;at•s 
Department of Corrunerce Composite Construction Cost Index as 
published in the Survey of Current Business by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, . or successor index. ·• If the index is 
discontinued and there is no successor index, the reference 
figure shall be determined by the senior officer in the closest 
office of the U.S. Department of Commerce or successor departm.E7nt 
Or ag n Y "M • .. . e c . a JOr repal.rs, 
not defined as mi-nor above. 
alterations, or additions are those 
For major repairs, alterations, or 
additions, Lessee shall receive ·Lessor's approvals of the plans 
as set forth .above in Paragraph 2. 2. 
3. 4 Go.verivnental Authorities. Lessee shall promptly comply 
with all applicable laws, regulations, ordinances, requirements 
and orders of governrnental authorities, inciucing, but not 
limited to, the making,. at its sole expense, of any insta~l.ation, 
alteration, 1":\odificat.ion, change or repair, structural or 
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appropriate judicial or admini~trati-ve proc:·ered'ings, 'Wl. thout cost 
or expense to Lessor, the validity or application of any la"", 
ordinance, order:, rule, regulations or :req.uirement (hereinafter 
called "Law .. ) that Lessee repair, maintain, alter or.' replace the 
improvements in whole or in part, and Lessee shall not be in 
default for fairing to do such wor.k until a re·asonable time 
following final determination of Lessee • s contest. If Lessor 
gives notice of request, Less;.ee sn•ll first 'furnish Lessor a 
bond., satisfactory to Lessor . i'n fo.rm1 amount. and insurer, 
• guara·nteeing compliance by Less•e .with the cor1t.ested law I and, 
indemnifying Le~sor,· agains~'· all liability that Lessor. may sus~·ain 
by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law. 
Lessor may 1 but is not required to,_ contest any such Law 
independently of Lessee. Lessor may, and on Lessee • s notice of 
request shall, join in Lessee's ~ontes~. 
3. 5 Oal':\age or Destruction Ou~ing Final· Ye·ars of Term~ In 
the event of substantial damage or dest•.ruction to the hospi ta 1 or 
any pa.rt thereof during the last five. (S·) years of the Term, 
Lessor shall have the right, exe~cisable durins the ninety ( 90) 
days follo-wing the date of su.ch damage or destruction, to 
terminate this lease. Lessor shall exerci·se such tight by 
delivering to Lessee -written notice of the date of such 
termination, which date shall not be earlier than thirty {30) 
days following the dat~ of Lessor • s notice of termination.· · Upon 
exercise of such ...right,· Lessor shall be entitled tiO reeover the 
full proceeds of any policy of insurance coverin9 any s'uc:h damage 
or des·truction except such proce~ds. as may be attributable to 
Lessee's loss' of personal property and/or to interruption of 
Lessee's business. 
If Lessor does not elect to te.rminate this lease, 
Lessee sball be responsible for the repair, rebuilding or 
replacement of the hospital or any part thereof so damaged or 
destroyed as the case r:-.a y be. All such repairs, rebuilding or 
'-
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replacements shall rest-o-re thtf ''t\6spitai to the condition it was (-
in immediately prior to the event giving rise to the worK .. 
3. 6 Last Y 4aar of Term. Anything herein to the contrary 
notwithstanding, Lessee shall not have the right during the last 
365 days of the Term to alter, remove or demolish, in. whole or in 
part, any buildings, structures or other improvements which exist 
upon the leased land 365 days prior to the end of the Term, 
except with the written consent of Lessor. This provision shall 
not impair. the right of Lessee to· remove any moveable i terns of 
• personal prQperty .. from the leased land as proviqeq i.n, A,rticl·e 3 
hereof. 
··- .... ARTICLE 4 
LE]).SEHOLD LIENS 
4.1 Riaht to Grant Lien ·on Leasehold Estate. So long as 
Lessee shall not be in de.fault under the terms of this lease, 
Lessee shall have the right to grant a lien upon or a security 
interest in its leasehold estate under this l.ease; provided, 
however, that notwithstanding any such instrucent gra-nting such 
lien or secur.ity interest, Lessor is bound. only by_ those 
obligat;ons and enjoys all rights and privile~es which are set 
forth in this lease. Any mortgage or Deed of Trust or other 
security interest executed by Lessee pursuant to this authority 
is hereinafter designated and referred to as the ";leasehold 
mortgage" and thenolder or owner of such leasehold mort.gage upon 
the leasehold estate of Lessee, including the beneficiary .of a 
Deed of Trust, if such mortgage be in the form .of a Deed of Trust 
or other s e cured party , is h ere i n a f t e r des i gnat e d as the 
"leasehold mortgagee". Any leasehold rnortsage shall not be for a 
period exceeding the Term. Lessor agrees, at any time and from 
time to timei upon receipt of not less than ten (10) cays prior 
written request therefor by Lessee or by the leasehold mortgagee, 
to execute, acknowledge and deliver to Lessee or to lease'hold 
( 
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mortgagee a statement. in writing, certifying, if such is the 
case, that this lease is then unmodified and unamended, ... that it 
is not in default, and that it is in full force and effect. If 
there have been modifications and amendments to this· lease, said 
statement shall, if such, is t:he 'Case, certify that the same is 
not then in default· and ·is in full force and effect as then 
modified and amended. Said modifications and a~endments ·shall .be 
set forth in full in said statement. Said statement shall 
further state the dates to which the basic rental or other 
• charges have been paid, and \llhether or not there is any existing 
default by Lessee with respect to a-ny covenant, promise of 
agreement on the part of Lessee provided t6 be performed under 
~his lea~e~ and also whether a notice of such default.· h.a!. been 
served by Lessor. ~f any such statement contains a claim of 
non-performance, · insofar as 
summarized in said state~ent. 
arid before delinquency of 
actually known ·by ~essor, shall be 
Lessee shall make pal~ent when due. 
all principal, interest and other 
charges for which Lessee may be or become obligated under any 
leasehold mortgage upon tbe leasehold estate. 
4.2 Foreclosure of LJen. P::-ior to com.~encirig any action to 
foreclose a leasehold mortgage, the leasehold mortgagee. or any 
assigns of such mortgage, shal.l notify Lessor in writing of the 
default by Lessee with .a statement· of the amount then due and 
offer to withhold any accelerat.io.n of maturity of the promissory 
note, payment of which is secured by the leasehold r.~ortgage. In 
the event Lessor shall, within thirty ( 30) days of the receipt of 
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrears on 
said mortgage, then upon said payment said mortgagee shall rein-
state the mortgage in all respects as if no default had occurred. 
Lessor may, at its option, ·make such payr:tents on sa.id mortgage, 
and the amounts of such payments shall be considered additional 
rental due Lessor from Lessee under this lease. ·s u"os equ ent and 
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leasehold mortgage shall be subject to the foregoing provisions 
each time any such default occurs. Lessee s~all insure that all 
provisions contained --in this lease requiring ·action by parties 
not a party hereto shal.l be inco·rporated into docur:le·nts to whi.ch 
such parties are a party and that executed copies of such 
documents be delivered to Lessor· within ten (10) days of 
execution thereof. 
ARTICLE S 
PROTECTION OF MORTGAGEE 
Lessee shall give notice to Lessor of any leasehold morta_ge 
which Lessee grants as provided for in Article 4 hereof ~nd shall 
d eliv.er along with said notice a copy of· the .~ortgage instrument. 
So long as any sum remains O\•.ring on any obligation secured by 
such a leasehold ·mortsage, Lessor and Lessee agree: 
(a) That no modification or termination of this lease o.r 
surrender of the leased la!ld r.tay be made by· tne Lessor or Less.ee 
without the prior written consent of the mortgagee: 
(b) That the Lessor will give to the mortgasee al.l notice 
of default simultaneously with any notice given to· the Lessee; 
(c) That the mortgagee will have thi=t:r ( 30) days a!ter 
notice of default delivered to. it vdthin which to cure Lessee's . 
default: provided, however 1 that said period in which default may· 
be corrected may be extended to no more than ninety (90) days in 
the event the mortgagee requires such a period as a condition for 
granting a loan to Lessee anc if ..... ·it:.hin forty {40) days after 
notice of default the r:lOrtgag ee gives notice to Lessor if it 
intends to cure Lessee's default within saic extended period: 
(d) That the Lessor will accept performance by the 
mortgagee in lieu of performance by the Lessee: 
(e) That the Lessor will not terminate the lease for those 
defaults 1 the cure of which requires that the mortgasee be in 
( 
possession provided that the said mortsagee ( i) promptly ( 
.. 
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commences foreclosure and continues its action with due 
diligence, and (ii) continues payment of rent and all other 
charges required to be paid by Lessee wl\ich have accrued and 
which become due and payable during the period· the. foreclosure 
proceeding is pen~ing: 
(f) That the Lessor shall not have the right to ter~inate 
this lease solely on account of any of the events antic.i.pa!:,ed by 
subdi vi·sion (d) of paragraph 1 of Article 10 without the wri ~ten 
consent of the 1 ease'hold mortgagee, pro;v;i:ded 'that suc;h mortg~gee 
· promptl'y commences forec::losure if it. has 'the' right to·· do so and 
', .. ~ ' 
thereafter continues its action with due diligence:· 
(g) That in the event the Lessee's intere.st under this 
lease shall be_ sold, assigneg or othervise .transferred FUrsuant 
... ... ' ' . ' 
to the exercise of any right, power or remedy of any mortgagee or 
pursuant to judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragra'pn 1 of 
Article 10, and if no rent or other c'harges shall then ·be due an 
·,. 
pay;able under this lease, and if such mortgagee shall have 
( arrancged to the reasonable satisfaction of the Lessor for the 
curi·ng of any default susceptible ·of being cured, Lessor within 
si<.xty (60) days after receiving a written request therefor and 
upon receiving payment of its expenses, incl•Jding attorneys. 
fees, incident thereto, will execute and deliver such instrument 
or instruments as may be. required to confirm such sale, 
assignment or other transf~r of Lessee's interest under the 
lease; or 
{h) That in the event a default under any leasehold 
mortgage shall have occured, the mortg.agee may exercise any 
right, po..,.,er or remedy of the mortgag.ee under the mortgage which 
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease. 
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6.1 SuQordination. The Lessor- shall, promptly after the 
notice of request of Lessee, 
of Trust or other security 
sufficient to suboroinate, 
execute and deliver a mortgage, Deed 
instrument (herein cal,~ed mortgage) 
to the lien of a fi_rst encumbrance 
represented by the mortgage, Lessor's fee title (which shall be 
considered to include fee title in the leased premis~s or -any 
part or parts of the lf:}ased premises, including all, J;"ig~ts and 
(~ 
• appurtenances) to any mortgage lender who is prepared to make a 
mortgage loan· to Le.ssee to be secured by a first mortgage or Deed 
of Trust covering sai.d Lessc)r • ·s fee interest in the demised 
premises (or s_?ch part thereof as may pe d!!signated, by Lessee) 
·~ . 




Not more than seventy-five pf:!.rcent (.75\l 
of the value of the property · to. be ( 
mortgaged as apprai~ed by any 
institutional 
or 
lender propos;L.ng -:t.o make 
as independently appraised the 
if 
loan, 
the lender be other than a.n 
. institution. An insti tution;al lender is 
a bank, insurance company, charital.ol.e 
institution, college or other institution 
of learning, retirement system, welfare 
f~nd, or any other organization or 
institution similar to any of the 
foregoing. The principal must be 
self-liquidating by periodic payments 
over the term of the rnort;age; 
Not more than thirty ( 30) years or 
alternatively not more than the period of 
the unexpired term bet\o.·een the date of ( 
the mortgage and the end of the term, 
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whichever is the shorter. The "term" 
means the original term herein or 
exerc.ise of the renewal options herein 
provided for. 
6. 2 Expenses. All expenses in connection with the making 
of said mortgage or Deed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and 
Lessor will execute any and all documents that may be required 
with respect thereto. However, Lessor shall assume no personal 
liability for the underlying indebtedness~ but the mortgage note 
• or other evidence of indebtedness shal.l be executed s~lely by the 
Lessee. The foregoing pr.ovisions of this Artic·le shall extend to 
any c6nstructiol) mortgage loan applied for by Lessee, as well as 
any perma~H~o.t rraortgage loan, and any mortgages in substitution or 
in replacement thereof, and as often as during the term .such 
loans are applied for by the Lessee. 
6.3 Non-Mortgage by Les.sor. Lessor agrees not to place any 
m"ortgage on the premises, .~r .permit the same to be encumbered in 
( any manner, without the prior written consent of the Lessee. 
6.4 Limitation on Subordination. Lessor's agreement to 
subordinate any given portion of th~ fee title to a first 
mortgage is limited to one such mortgage on the given pcrtion of 
the fee title for the purpose of enabling Lessee to obtain 
financing for the impro.vements as contemplated herein and located 
on the 9iven portion of the leased land; provided that, for this 
purpose, mortgages securing separate construction and take-out or 
permanent loans for the same work of improvement shall be 
considered to be one mortgage. Both the note and the mortgage 
securing it s h a 11 ex pre s s 1 y provide that the r e can be no 
extension of the due date, addition to the balance of the loan, 
alteration of any provision in the d·ocur.\ents, release of any 
obligor, or any refinancing of the unpaid principal balance 
without Lessor • s prior "•ri.tten approval. Nothing in this para-
graph shall orohibi t mortgagee from paying oelinquent taxes or 
... 
: -
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assessments or providi~g insurance coverage if Lessor fails to ( 
cure such de faults of Lessee. Lessor shall not be required to 
subordinate Lessor • s fee title to the lien of an encumbrance 
securing a construction or interim loan except ·on Lessee's 
presentation of evidence, delivered as provided for giving 
notices, of a firm .-and- enforceable commitment for a take-out or 
permanent loan. 
6.5 Curing of Defaults. The mortgage shall provide that 
the mortgagee or trustee ~ay not accelerate the dQe date of the 
• balance outstanding on any l.oan by reason of any default by 
Lessee without having first given Lessor vrit.ten notice of such 
default and without having permitted Les:sor thirty (30) days in 
which to cure such default or, if more .than. -t:.hirty (30) ~ays is ........... 
necessary to cure such default, without. having given Lessor 
adequate time to cure such default. The mortgage and related 
documents shall further provide that the per-formance of any and 
all obligations _of Lessee thereunder shall be accepted if. 
tendered by Lessor-. Nei the:z; Lessor • s right:. to cure any default 
nor any exercise of such a right shall constitute an assumption 
of liability under- the note or mortgage. 
6. 6 Indemnifica:tion. On request by Lessor, Le·ssee u}!all 
indemnify Lessor from any and all liability and expense caused 
Lessor as a result of any action of Lessee in connection with the 
mortgage or Deed of Trust. 
ART.ICLE 7 
INSURANCE 
7.1 Liability. and Property Damaoe. From the time when the 
Lessee commences construction on the demised premises or any part. 
thereof, the Lessee 'Will cause to be written a policy or policies 
of insurance in the form and contents generally Jo:.no""·n as public 
liability and/or owner's, landlord and tenant policies anc boiler 
--
insurance policies and elevat.or insurance policies, .,.,.hen there be ( 
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boilers and elevators i?c:l·uded in any improvements located on the 
demised premises, insuring the Lessee against any an4 all claims 
and demands made by any person or ·persons whomsoever for ·injuries 
received in connection with the operation and rnainte·nance of the 
premises, improvements, and buildings located on the demised 
premises or for any other risk insured against by such policies, 
each class of which policies shall have been written· within 
limits of not less than Five Hundre'd Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
( $500,000. 00) for damages incurred or c:la;meq by a.ny o.ne person 
·for bodily injury, or other-."ise, plus One Hundred. 'l}lousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($100, 000 .. 00) damages to property, and· for not 
less than One Million and No/'100 Dollars ($1,000,000.00) for 
~arnages ~n~~trred or claimed by more .than one per~on for '::>odily 
injury, or ·Otherwise, plus Orie Hundred Thousand and No/100 
Dollars ($100, 000.00) dai.\ages to property. All such policies 
shall name the Lessee and the Lessor I as their respective 
interests may appear 1 as !-he persons assured by such policies: 
and the original or c;Iuplicate original of each of .such policy or 
policies shall be delivered by the Lessee to the Lessor promptly 
upon the writing of such policies, together with adequate 
evidence of the fact that the prel"'!.iums are. paid. 
7.2 Fire and Wind Damaoe Insuran~e. 
{ 1) Lessee's Obliaation. The Lessee covenants and 
agrees with Lessor that from and after the time when the 




and imp.rovements upon the said premises against 
or damage by fire and 'Windstorm, and 'What is 
termed in the insurance trade as .. extended 
coverage", which said insurance ,.,.ill be maintained in an 
amount which will be sufficient to prevent any party in 
interest £rom being or becoming a co-insurer on any part of 
the risk, which amount shall not be less than eighty percent 
(80%) of the full insurable value, and all of such policies 
·-
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of insurance shall include the ·name ·of ·the ·Lessor as one of(.: 
the parties insured thereby and shall fully protect both the 
Lessor and the Lessee as their respective interest may 
appear. In the event of destruction of the said buildings 
or improvements by fire, windstorm, or other casualty for 
which insurance shall be payable and as often as such 
insurance moriey shall have been paid to the Lessor and the 
Lessee, said sums so paid shall be deposited in a joint 
account of the Lessor and the Lessee in a bank located in 
Bannock County 1 Idaho, and shall be ma.de available to the 
. - .· 
Lessee for the construetion or repair I as the case may be I 
of a:ny building or building,s damaged or destroyed by fire, 
windstorm, or other casualty for wh~ch insurance money shall 
b~ pa~iab~~ and shall be paid out by the Lessor and the 
Lessee from said joint account from time to time on the 
estimate of any reliable architect licensed in the State of 
Idaho having jurisdiction of such reconstruction and repair, (_ 
certifying that the amount of such estimate is being applied 
to the payment of the reconstruction or repair and at. a 
reasonable cost therefor: provided, however, that it. f.irst 
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Lessor that the 
total amount of money necessary to provide for the 
reconstruction or repair of any buiic!ing or buildings 
destroyed or injured, as aforesaid, according to the plans 
adopted ther.efor, has been provided by the Lessee for such 
purpose and its application for such purpose assured; and 
the Lessee covenants and agrees that in the event of the 
destruction or damage of the buildings and improvements or 
any part thereof, and as often as any buildinc; or 
improvement on said prer:tises shall be destroyed or damaged 
by fire, windstorm, or other casualty, the Lessee shall 
rebuild and repair the same in such manner that the building 
or irnprovernent so rebuilt and repairec, and the personal 
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property upon the . demised premises prior to such damage or 
destruction, and shall have the same rebuilt and ready for 
occupancy within fifte,en (15) months from the time when the 
loss or destruction oc~ur:red. The fifteen ( 15) ·month period 
for reconstruction shall be enlarged.· by delays caused 
without fault or neglect on the part of the Lessee by act of~ 
God, strikes, lockouts~ or other '~conditions beyond the 
Lesse~ 1 s c6ntrol. 
(2) Deli very Qf .Policies;. The originals Qf all such 
policies shall be ~elivered t(:) the Lessor by. the Lessee 
along with the receipted ~ills evidencibg the fact ~hat the 
premiums therefore ~re paid: but nothing herein contained 
shall .be construed as prohibiting the Lessee from fi.nancing 
the premiums where the terms of the policies are for three 
( 3) years or more a~d in such event the recei~t~ shall 
evidence it to be the fact t,hat the iristallmEmt prer.l~~m pay-
ment or payments are. paid at or before their respective 
maturities. Where, however, ·there is a mortgage on the 
premises created pursuant t.o the provisions contained in 
this lease and if, under the terms of such mortgage, it is 
obligatory upon the Lessee to cause the originals of the 
policies to be delivered to the rnortciaoee, then the Lessee - - . . . 
' 
shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate certificates of. ~uch 
policies. The policies or duplicate certificates thereof, 
as the case may be, shall be delivered by. the Lessee to the 
Lessor at 'least ten {lO).days prior to the. effective date of 
the policies. 
(3) Effect of Mo;-tcaae.Subordination. All of the pro-
visions herein contained relative to the disposition of pay-
ments from insurance companies are subject to the fact t,hat 
if any mortgagees holding a mortgage created pursuant to the 
provisions of this lease 'hereof elects, in accordance ,_.i th 
the terms of such mortgage, to require that the proceeds of 
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the insurance be paid to the mortgagee on account. of such 
mortgage, then su.ch payment shall be made, but in such 
event, it shall~ still be obligatory upon· -the····Lessee to 
create the complete f.und in the manner set forth. in this 
section to assure and c:or:tplete the payment for the work of 
reconstruction and r.epair. 
(4) Damaoes: lnsqranc:e Proceeds: Joint Bank ~~<:ount. 
it is agreed that any excess. of money received . from insur-
ance remaining in the joint bank account after the recon-
struction or repair of such building br buildi_ngs, if there 
be no default on t'he part of the Lessee in the performance 
of the covenants herein, shall 'be paid to the Lessee; and in 
case_ of the Le£see not .entering. into the reconstruction or 
repair of the building or buildings within a pex-iod ·of six 
( 6) months from the, date of· payment of the lqss., .. after 
damage or destruction occasioned by fire, windstorm, or 
other cause for which .. insurance money shall be payable, and 
prosecutipg the same thereafter with such dispatch. asr.aay be 
necessary to complete the same within fifteen ( 15) months 
after the occurrence of such damage or destruction 
OCCc sioned aS aforesaid i then the amount S(;) COllecte:d 1 Or 
the balance thereof remaining in the joint account, as the 
case may be, shall be paid. to the Lessor and it will be at 
the Lessor's option to terrlinate the lease and retain such 
amount as liquidated and a·greed upon damages resul tins . from 
the failure o~ the Lessee to promptly, within the time spec-
ified, complete such work of reconstruction and repair. The 
fift.een ( 15) month periop herein provided for reconstruction 
shall be enlarged by delays caused without fault or neglect 
on the part of th~ Lessee by act of God, strikes, lockout, 
or other condi.t.ions (other than matters of finance) beyond 
the control of Lessee. 
( 
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( 5) Di:t:ect Repayn~ent • The foregoing notwi ths.tanding, 
in the event the insurance proceeds are the sum of Twenty 
Five Thous~nd and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) or l~tss, then 
such proceeds shall be paid directly to the Lessee without 
the necessity of creating the joint bank account as 
hereinabove set forth,. and Lessee shall use such funds to 
make the replacements or repairs as required hereunder. 
7.3 Lessee • s <;qvenant t,:Q Pay Insurance Premiu.rns ~ The 
Lessee covenants and agrees wit.h Lessor that the Lessee will pay 
• premiur.as for all of the .insurance policies which the Lessee is 
obligated to carry under the ··terms of this lease, and will 
·deliver to the Lessor evidence of ·such payments be.fore the 
payment of any_ such premiums become .i.n. default, and the Lessee ...... .... . 
will cause renewals of expirin,g policies to be written and the 
policies or copies thereof, as the lease may require, to be 
delivered to Lessor at. least ten (10) days before the expiration 
date of such expiring policies. . -
7.4 Indemnification. 
(a} Defense a.nd Pavrnent of Claims. Lessee agrees to 
defend, indemnif.y and hold Lessor harmless together with all 
of its servants ~ _ag,ents, or employees, from and against all 
liability or l()~S for injuries to or deatbs of persons or 
damages to property caused by Lessee • s acts or omissions to 
act, use of, or occupancy of the leased land, or as the 
result of r;essee' s. operations on said leased land. Each 
party hereto shall give tO the other parties prompt and 
ti~ely notice of any claim or suit instituted corning to its 
knowledge which in any way, directly or indirectly, 
contingently_ or otberwise, affects or might affect another 
party, and all parties shall have the right to participate 
in the defense of the .same to the extent of each parties. 
own interest. 
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(b) Mechanic's Liens. ln tbe event any mechanic • s or ( 
other liens or orders f,or the payment of money s.ball be 
filed against the l~ased land or any building or 
improvements thereon by reason of or arising· out of any 
labor, material furnished or alleged to have been furnished, 
or to be furnished to or for Lessee on the leased land, or . 
for or by reason of any change, alteration, or addition of 
the cost or expense thereQf, or any contract relating 
thereto-~ or against the Lessor as owner thereof, Lessee 
shall, within thirty (30) days after it receives notice or 
knowledge thereof, either pay or bond the same or provi.de 
for the discharge thereof in such manner as may b.e provide-d 
by law. -Lessee shall also defend- on -'behalf of Lessor at -.. 
Lessee's sole expense, any action, suit or proceeding which 
may be brought thereon, or fo:t the enforcement of such 
liens, or orders, and Lessee shall pay 
L 
any dama9e and 
discharge any judgme~t entered therein and save harmless ( 
Lessor from any and all claims or damages resulting 
, .. ;,· 
therefrom. Lessor res.erves the right, however, to defend or 
to direct the defense of any such suit or proceedings. 
Lessee shall pay all expenses of such cafense, ipclucling 
attorney's fees, and shall pay any damage and discharge any 
judgment entered therein and save Lessor harmless from any 
and all claims or damages resulting therefrom. 
(c) Resistin~ Claims. ln the event Lessee shall 
desire to resist any mechanic's or r:laterialmen's lieps, or 
any other claim against the hereinabove described premises 
on account of building, rebuilding, repairing, reconstruc-
tion or other'lodse improving the leased land, Lessee shall 
have the right to do so. provided Lessee shall first place 
funds into escrow in an amount sufficient to pay saie claio 
or lien, ~ith said escrow directed to pay such clairn or lien 
in the event of a result adverse to Lessee. 
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7. 5 Insurer Qualified· Thf! insurer shall be C!ualified and 
authorized through the. Department of Insurance of the State of 
Idaho. 
ARTI~LE. 6 
-TAXES, :ASSESSMENTS, LIE~S. ~0 ENCUMBRANCES 
Lessee shall be responsible to pay and discha;rge all exist-
ing and future taxes and assessments which are or may become a 
lien upon or which may be levied by the State, Coun·ty or any 
other tax levying body upon the leased land or improvements 
thereon· or property ·located on the leased land. Lessee shall 
also be respo·nsible for ·'all insurance premiums, and for all 
liabilities, .cbarges, fees, obligatio.ns, liens .and encumbrances 
associated· ·vitll or relating to the existence a-nd use of the 
le~sed land including, but not limited to, all assessment 
installments due or payable after the date of this lease. All 
payments of taxes or assessments or both, exc::ept permitted 
( installment .,. payments, shall_ be _._p_r_o.z:a:t:_.e~-~-ic:rr·nased 
year and for the year in which the lease terminates. Lessee may, 
in its own name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name, 
contest in :good fai t.h by all appropri,a te proceeCii~·gs ,· the amount, 
applicability or validity of any tax, assessment or fine 
pertaining to the leased land, or to any building, structure or 
improvement upon the leased land, and in the event Les-see does in 
good faith conte..S.t the applicabiU,.ty or validity of any tax, 
·assessment or fine, Lessor will cooper..ate in such contest 
whenever possible with Lessee: provided that such contest ·will 
not subject any par·t of the leased land to forfeiture or loss, 
except that, if at any time payment of the 'Whole or any part of 
such tax, assessment or fine shall become necessary in order to 
prevent any such forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or 
cause the same to be paid in tir.:te to prevent such forfeiture or 
loss. 
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ARTICLE 9 
CONDEMNATION 
9. 1 Priority. In the event of the taking or condemnation 
by any competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or 
purpose of the whole or materially all of the. demised premises at 
any time during the term and -after any outstanding first mortgage 
indebtedness ha-s been paid and satisfied, then the rights of 
Lessor and ~essee to share in the net proceeds o:f any awards for 
land, buildings, improvements ana· damages upon ally. such taking, 
• shall be as follows and in the followin~ oraer of priority: 
(a) Lessor, at all times, regardless of when the taking 
occurs, shall be entitled to receive; with iaterest thereon, 
that portion of the a\o"ard as shall represent compensation ......... . .. . . 
for the value of the demised premises,. cc;msidered as vacant 
and unimproved land, such value _being herei.nafter referred 
to as the "land value". Lessor shall also be entitled to 
costs awarded :in the condemnation proceed,ing.proportionately ( -attributable to such larid value. 
(b) (1) During all the term herein demised, e·xcept the 
last five years of the term, Lessee shall be entitled to the 
entire balance of the award, which balance is hereir:a!:ter 
referred to as "award balance". 
( 2) If the taking or condemnation as above set 
forth shall occur at any time during the last five years of 
the term, Lessee shall be entitled to receive out of the 
award, with i.nt erest thereon, the a-..:ard balance., diminished 
by twenty percent ( 20%) of such award b.a lance for each full 
year {and .in proportion for a fraction of a year) that 
elapses from the first day of said five year period to the 
date of the vesting of title in ~he condemnor: the remaining 
award balance and iftterest thereon, as well as the a~ard for 
l~nd value and intere•t thereon, shall belong to the Lessor. 
l. 
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(,3) For. the purpose of computing the last five 
years of the term within the meaning of subparagraphs ( 1) 
and (2) above,- .j_ t -~i-s agreed that said· "last five years" 
shall mean the last five ye.ar:s of the original ·term, or if, 
at or prio-r to the date that the award or the first partial 
payment thereof (if there be such partiaf payments) becomes 
payable, the parties shall, have duly ·agreed to extend the 
term of this lt!,ase pursuant to the options to ·renew herein 
contained or by a written instrument executed 'in the manner 
required for r~c:ording, then said last five years shall be 
deemed to mean the last five (5} years of the term as so 
extended • 
... (_c;) U the values of the re~pective interests of Lessor 
and Lessee shall be determined according to the provisions 
of subdivisions {a) and. (b) of this Section in the . pro-
ceeding pursuant to which the detnl:sed P.remises shall )\ave 
been taken or condemned, the· valJJes ·so determined shall be 
conclusive upon Lessor a.nd Le:s.see. If such values shall not 
have been thus separately determined, such values shall be 
fixed by agreement be,tween the Lessor and Lessee or if they 
are unable to agree, then the controver!;'y · shall be resolved 
by arbitration under the procedure to govern in A.r);itration 
as set forth in this lease hereof under. Article 13. 
(d) In the event. of the ta'kir1g in con·demnation of less 
than the whole of tbe demised premises but materially all of 
said premises as hereinbelow defined anc the part of the 
premises that remains includes a part of the improvement 
that WaS taken 1 then aS tO the Untaken rer.iainder of the 
improvement only 1 but not any remaining Hmd I the parties 
shall endeavor to agree on the then fair ciarket value of 
such remainder of the improvement 1 and if the-y fai 1 to agree 
then the controversy shall be resolved by arbitration. The 
value so agreed upon as the then fair market value of such 
... ·-
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remainder of the improvement or as determined in arbi tra-
tion, but diminished, in the same manner as provided for in 
"(b)" above relative to an "award balance", shall be paid by 
Lessor to Lessee, and until paid shall be a charge on the 
shca,re of the award for land value to which Lessor shall be 
entitled in the condemnation proceeding. 
(e) I£ title to the whole or · mat.rially all ·of the 
demised . premises shall be taken ·or condemned, this lease 
shall cease and terminate as to the provision so taken and 
• shall terminate as to the entire parcel if in Lessee's 
judgment the taking materially and substantially affects the 
use and value of the re~ainder of the demised premises. 
'·~ ....... 
ARTICLE 10 
DEFAULT PRQVISIONS: REMEDIES: ATTOR..~EY' S FEES. 
10.1 Defaul.t. by Lessee... Each of the following shall be 
deemed an event of default by Less'ee and il breach of this lease: ( -(a) Rent o~ Other Payl'n!nts. If Lessee shall default 
in the payment of rent or other payments hereunder when due 
according to the terms of this lease and does not fully 
correct the same within thirty ( 30) days after wri "':.t.en 
notice thereof to Lessee. 
(b) Other Cove,nants or Conditions. If Lessee shall 
default in the performance or observance of any other 
covenant or co-ndition of this lease or of any note, 
mortgage, Deed of Trust, or other document relating to the 
financing of the hospital to be performed or observed by 
Lessee, whether or not Lessor is a party to any such 
documents, and does not fully correct the same within 30 
days after notice the~eof to the Lessee. 
(c) Abandonment. Abandonment of the premises. 
(d) Bankrpotcy Proceedings. If during the Term of 
this lease, Lessee shall: (_ 
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( i) Appointment of Receiver. Apply for 
or consent in writing, signed on behalf of Lessee 
or its duly authorized attorney, to the 
appointment of a receiver, trustee or liquidator 
of the Lessee or of all or a substantial part of 
Lessee's assets: or 
(ii) Voluntary Banlcruptc:y. File . a 
voluntary ,petition in bankruptcy ~r admit in 
writing its· ina·bility ·to pay its debts as they 
become due: or 
(iii) Assignment for Creditors. Make a 
general assignment for· the benefit of creditors; 
or . 
(iv) Reoraanization or Arranoement .. File 
a reorganization or arrangement with creditors to 
take advantageof any insolvency law; or 
(v} Admit Insolvency. File an answer 
admitting the material allegations of a petition 
filed against. Lessee in any bankruptcy, 
reorganization or insolvency proceeding, or 
during the Term of this lease, an order, judgment 
or decree shall be entered by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, on the application of a 
creditor, adjudicating Lessee bankrupt or 
ins.ol v-ent or approving a petition. seeking a 
reorganization o£ Lessee or appointing a 
receiver, trustee or liquidator of Lessee, or of 
all or a substantial part of its assets. 
10.2 Remedies. In the event of any breach or default of 
this lease by Lessee, then Lessor, besides other rights of 
re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of 
the hospital and use of the property upon the premises for these 
purposes. 
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Should Lessor elect to re-enter as herein provided, or 
should Le·ssor take possession pursuant to legal proceedings, or 
pursuant to any notice provided for by law, Lessor may either 
terminate this lease or Lessor may from time to t'ime, without 
terminating this lease, relet said premises or any part thereof 
for such term or terms and at such rental or rentals and upon 
such other terms and conditions as Lessor in Lessor's sole 
discretion may deem advisable, wit~ the right to make alterations 
and repa.irs to the premises. Rentals received by Lessor from 
such reletting shall be applied: first, to payment of any 
indebtedness, other than rent, due Lessor hereunder from Lessee: 
second, to the payment of rent due'and unpaid hereunder: third, 
to the payment- of -any costs of such relett"in'g; fourtrt, to the 
payment of the cost of any alterations and repairs to the 
premises made necessary by Lessee • s breach o-f the provisions of 
this lease; and the residue, if any, shall be held by Lessor and ( 
applied in payment of future rent as the same may become due and 
payable hereunder. Should such rental received from such 
reletting be less than the rental agreed to be paid that month by 
Lessee hereunder, then Lessee shall pay such deficiency to 
Lessor. Such deficiency shall be calculated. and paid monthly. 
l~o such re-entry or taking possession of the premises by Lessor 
shall be construed as an election on Lessor's part to terminate 
this lease unless a written notice of such intention is given to 
Lessee or unless the termination thereof be decreed by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. J:;otwithstanding any such reletting 
without termination, Lessor may at any time thereafter elect to 
terminate this lease for such previous breach. 
Should Lessor at any time terminate this lease for any 
breach, in addition to any other remedy Lessor may have, Lessor 
may recover from Lessee all carnages Lessor may incur by reason of 
such breach, including the costs of recovering the premises, and 
including the worth at the tir.1e of such termination of the 
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excess, if any, of the amount of rent, additional ren.t and 
charges equivalent to rent reserved 'in this lease for the 
remainder of the Term over the then reasonable rental va.l.ue of 
the premise~,. for the remainder of the Term. The remedies herein 
given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the exercise of any;:-:one 
remedy by Lessor shall not be to the exclusion of •ny ot;h·er 
... 
remedy. With previous written notice or demand, separate actions 
may be maintaineq by. Lessor again.st Lessee from tinie to time . ~o 
recover any rent or damages which, at the commencemen't:, of a·ny 
such action, ha,s be.come :dQe and payable· to Lessor without waiting 
until the end o~ thf! Term of this lease. 
10.3 At.torney's Fees. In · the event suit shall ,be bro~wlit 
.for an unl_awfu'i detainer of the said premise.s, for the recove:ry 
of anY. rent due under .the provisions of this lease, OJ;",:because··O£ 
th~ br~ach o£ a.ny o:ther covenant herein contained to b~ k~pt ·Or 
performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasona'ble 
attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee shall 
be deemed to bave accl;"ued at the commencement of such a.cticm and 
shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to 
judgment. 
ACTICLE 11 
COVENANTS ~D WARRANTIES 
·. 
Except as otherwise expressly provided l.n this lease, lessee 
agrees to take posses;sion of the leased land in an "as is" 
condition, provided ho'Wever, that Lessor covenants I represents 
and warrants as follows: 
11 . 1 Tit l. e . That Lessor has good and marketable title to 
the leased land and said title is free and unencul'tlber,e..d · 
Lessor's right, title and interest in and to the leased land, 
except for this lease and for any lien or indebtedness incui;"red 
pursuant to Arti.cle 4, .shall not ·be subordinated to any other 
clait:l or interest of Lessee or to any other claim or interest of 
.... 
: 
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any mortgagee or other.creditor in connection with the financing 
of the improvements to be constructed on the leased premises. 
11.2-- Riaht···tO Execute. That· Lessor has full right and 
power to execute and perform this lease and to gran·t the estate 
leased berein and tile rights, easements, privileges,. 
appurtenances and hereditaments belonging or pertaining ther.~to, 
including air-rights. 
11.3 Peaceful Enjozyent. That Lessee, on paying the .. refit 
herein reserved and performing the covenants and provisions 
hereof on its p·art to be per:formed, shall peacefully and quietly 
have ·and enjoy the leased land, and all such existing or ,future 
required rights, easements, pri yile·ges, appurtenances and 
~eredit(\m.e.nt.S- belonging or pertaining ·thereto, including 
air-rights, during the Term: provided, however, that Lessor does 
not warrant t'hat governmental authority tnay not at some time 
during the Term,· without the consent. or permi-ssion of·.·. Lessor, 
pass ordinances or perform acts which may be prejudicial to 
Lessee through no fault of Lessor: provided; however, that Lessor 
agrees to join with Lessee in protest or opposition to such 
ordinances or acts, t'he expenses of such opposition to be borne 
by Lessee. 
Lessee may f!Ot 
. . ~RTIC.LE 12 
ASSIGNMENT, SUBLETTINGAND SALE 
12.1 Assicnment, S~blettin~ and Sale. 
assign or sublet this lease agreement "'d thout 
consent of Lessor, which consent shall not 
the ·prior written 
be unreasonably 
( 
withheld: provided, however, that in the event Lessor gives its 
consent for the assignment or subletting .of this lease, Lessor is 
boun<3 only by such obligations and enjoys such rights and 
privileges as are set forth in this leas·e. It is expresssly 
ag··reed that Lessor may require, as a condition of such consent, 
that the officers of the Lessee corporation agree to be person- ( 
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ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants 
of Lessee's assignee ( s} or subtenant ( s) under this Lease. In the 
eve·nt Lessee shall determine to sell all or any portion of the 
hospital, and/or any additi.ons or expansions thereto or thereof, 
· . granted first right of refusal. 
Lessor shall be ~~c4/ t.o purchase tne hospital as the fair 
market value which, unless agreed upon by the parties, shall be 
determined by an M.A. I. real. estate appraiser appointed and paid 
by Less·or. If Lessee is not satisfied with the fair market value 
appraisal submitted by the· appraiser selected· .. by Lessor~ Lessee 
may, at its own expense and within twenty (20) days of the 
receipt of the appraisal, select an M.A.l. real estate appraiser 
who, together wi tb the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose 
_a third .... s~c:::h appraiser whose fees shaal be shared e·.:tually by 
Lessar and Lessee. lf Lessee fails to select· a second appraiser 
within· the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed shall be 
the sole appraiser and shall set the fair market value of the 
hospital. lf Lessee does timely act, and a majority cannot agree 
as to the fai.r market value of the hospital, the three (3) 
appraisals shall be added together and their total divided by 
three (3). The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value 
of the hospital for the purpose of this purchase option. 
ARTICLE 13 
ARI3ITRAT:t:ON: APPOINTMENT 
13.1 Arbitr~ion. Either party may require the arbitration 
of any matter arising under or in connection with this lease. 
Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice specifying 
the matter to be arbitrated. If action is already pending ·on any 
matter C::oncerni.ng which the notice is given, t.he notice is 
ineffective unless given before the expiration of thirty. (30) 
days after service of process on the person g·iving the notice· 
Except as provided. to the contrary in these provisions on 
arbitration, the arbitration shall be in conformity and subject 
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to applicable rules and procedures of the American Arbitration 
Association. The arbitrators shall be bound by this lease. 
Pleadings in any action pending on the same matter shall, if the 
arbitration is required or consented to, be deemed amended to 
l~mit the issues to those ·contemplated by the rules prescribed 
above. Each party shall pay half the cost of a.rbitration 
including arbitrator's fees. Attorneys' fees shall be awarded as 
separately provided i~ thi:s lease. 
13.2 A~pointment. Appointment shall be made in the manner 
required for the appointment of arbitrators unless expressly 
provided to the contrary in the applicable provi·sions of this 
lease. 
The ... re shall be three (3) arbitrator:s appointed as f.ollows': 
(a) Within twenty {20) days after notice requiring 
arbitration, each party shall appoint one (l) arbitrator and 
give notice of the appointment to the other party. 
(b) The two (2) arbitrators shall choose a thira 
arbitrator within thirty (30) days after appointment of the 
second. 
{c) If either party fails to appoint an arbitrator, 
or if the two (2) arbitrators fail to cheese a third, the 
appointment shall be made by the then presiding judge of the 
Superior Court for the county in which the premises are 
located, acting in his individual and nonoffic_ial capacity 
on the appli'"cation of either party and on (30} days' notice 
to the other party: provided that either party l&lay, by 
notice given before cor.unencement of the arbitration hearing, 
consent to arbitration- by the arbitrator appointed by the 
other party. In that event, no further appoint.r:lents of 
arbitrator shall be .made -and any other arbitrators 
previously appointed shall be dismissed. 
(-
( 
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ARTICLE 14 
MISCELLM~EOUS PROVISIONS 
14.1 Exercise_ of. Renewal Oction. ___ Less_eEt ~~y exercise its 
option to extend the Term granted under Article I, paragraph 1.2, 
h~reof, by giving Lessor written notice thereof not later than 
120 days prior to the expiration date of the Term. Any option so 
exercised shall extend the lease on the same terms as are in 
effect at the time of the exercise of such options; subject. to 
adjustment and notification in accordance ~erewith. 
14.2 Inspectioh by Lessor. Lessor may enter upon the 
leased land at any reasonable time for any purpose necessary, 
incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance 
of Lessee's obligations hereunder, but subject to any provisions 
.. """""' . . .. . . . . 
with respect thereto otherwise contained herein. 
14.3 Negation of Partnership. Nothing in this lease shall 
be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for any purpose a 
partner, joint venturer, or associate in a~y relationship with 
Lessee other than that of landlord and tenant, nor shall this 
lease be construed to authorize either to act as agent for the 
other except as expressly provided to the contrary in this lease. 
14.4 Controllinq Law. This 1 ease shall be deemed +;.o be 
made and shall be construed in accordance with. the laws of the 
State of Idaho. 
14.5 Surrender of Possession. Lessee agrees to yield and 
deliver to LeS""Sor possession of the demised land at the 
termination of this lease or as otherwise provided herein, in 
good condition and in accordance with the express obligations 
provided herein, except for reasonable wear and tear, and Lessee 
shall execute and deliver to Lessor a good and sufficient 
document of relinquishment, if and when requested. 
14.6 Successors. This lease shall bind and inure to the 
benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors 
or assignees of Lessee whether resulting from any merger, 
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consolidation, 
otherwise. 
reorg.aniza tion, assignment, foreclosure or 
14.7 Head.inqs. The article and paragraph headings 
contained herein are for convenience and reference· and are not 
itnended to define or lind t the scope of any provision of this 
lease. 
14.8 Notices. All notices required to be .given t.o Lessee 
under the terms of the lease shall be given by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, aadressed to Lessee as 
follows: 
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO. , a 
Washington partnership 
1906 Broad-way 
·- · · Vancouver, Washington ·98663 
with copy to: 
HOREN~TEIN, WYNNE, FERGUSON & STOUMBOS 
1220 Main Street, Suite 300 
P. o. Box 694 
Vancouver, Washington 98666 
or at such other addresses as Lessee may designate in writing 
delivered to Lessor. Similar notice shall be addressed to Lessor 
as follows: · 
with c;opy to: 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. 
Suite 2200, 36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
POCATELLO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
777 Hospital Way 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Attention: Chris Anton, Administrator 
or at such other address .as Lessor may designate . in· writing 
delivered to Lessee. Notices shall be sent in a similar manner 
to any oortgagee of Lessee at such address as may be designated 
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14.9 Amen«ament Qf .Lease .. ·' Le·ssor and Lessee shall cooperate 
( and include in this lea:se by suitable amendment from time to time 
any provision that ma¥ reasonably be requested by any proposed 
Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing ~he Mortgagee 
protection provisi9ns contained in this lease and allowing such 
mortgagee reasonable ~eans to protect or preserve the lien o£ a 
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of 
this lease. Lessor and Lessee ecich agree .to execute and deliver 
and to acknowledge if necessary for recording purposes, any 
agreement necessary to effect such amendment: provided, how~ver,· 
such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent under 
this lease nor otherwise in any respe:Qt .adversel)' .affect the 
rights of the Lessor in this lease. 
( 
14. ~0 "Recording. Lessor and Lessee agree to execute and 
have acknowledged, and Lessee agrees to deliver to Lessor, a 
memorandum of this lease in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 
.. B .. for the purpose of recording such memorandum with the County 
Recorder of Bannock County. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the P.arties ·have set their ha:nds 
the day and year first above written. 
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co • 1 a 
By __ ~~·-·-·-M-.-L-.--~---C-E_LO_S_l ____ ~--~~--~-
y . By ·. ··. 
w~- ·.· .. · 
¥~ut£/~ I . 7 . 
···~ .. 
STATE OF .~1 ) 
£) . : ss. 
County of -~ . . . 
On this 2Z;~ay of c;Z__,, ,~ . , ·190: , before me, the ( 
undersigned,' a Notary pUlf?ii(; in~·· for said State, personally 
appeared . Cltfa;A (/ fJz.::t;;;;: .:~ . . . . 
'known to me to be t}«' P~esiden~~~~?; I:=esp~y, of 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. , a Utah non-profit corporation 
au.t'!:i.:..:..·ized to de.. business in idaho, dl::.a Pocatello Regional 
Medical Center, the corporation that executed the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed 
the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my band and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of :Bannock ) 
On this ..2.'!Ehday of ___ J_a_n_u_a_r_y ____________ , 19_!!, before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary 
appeared M. L. CANCELOSI 
General Partners of 
Public in and for said State, personally 
and .nt1 R.. \"ll)!'I'SK\' , known to me to be the 
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington 
par~nership, the partnership that executed the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged to rne that such corporation executed 
the same. 
IN WI~NESS ·WHEREOF, I have hereunto set rny hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written. ·· 
.. - ............ 
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the S~ate 
of Idaho residing at Pocat:ello 
Jo -...... 
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A parcel ofland in the St:lle ofldaho, County ofBannock, }ocated in the NE Y.. of Sec. 25 T. 65., 
R. 34 E., B.M., more pankuJarJy described as fo1lows: 
Beginning at the NE Y.. of Sec. 25. Thence South 0 degrees 01' 58" East along the East line of 
Sec. 25, J 461.67 feet, thence West 509.89 to the True Pojnt ofBeginmng. Said point on the 
Wester]y right-of-way of the hospital. 
Thence, South 0 degrees OJ '50" along Westerly right-of-way] 60.64 feet to the Point of curvature 
of a 488.37 foot radius curve having a centra] angle of 33 degrees 43'35" 
Thence, Southeasterly along said curve to the left 287.47 feet 
Thence, South 88 degrees 42'58" West 488.91 feet 
Thence, North 442.14 feet 
Thence East 406.35 feet to the True Point ofBegjnning. 
Contains 4.25. acres · 
Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorney for Defendants 
li1 p~,l --? ['! ;:'; ' '/ .._ '- ·-~ ' 
''V . 
:; ~-- ~-<--'~'' ' -
DE iY CL'> 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC and CENTURY PARK 
ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF 
APPEARANCE 
Category: I. ..a::k • 
Filin Fee: $~.00 
All parties will please take notice that Michael D. Gaffney of the law firm, Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney P A, now appear as counsel of record for Defendants, Quail Ridge 
Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates, LLC, in the above captioned 
matter. Please serve all papers and pleadings on the office located at 2105 Coronado 
1 
Defendants' Notice of Appearance Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on June 30, 2010, I 
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEARANCE on 
the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Fax: 232-2499 
I 
D U.S. Mail D Hand-delivered Facsimile 
U.S. Mail D Hand-delivered D Facsimile 
Defendants' Notice of Appearance Page 2 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC 
Plaintiff, 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC and CENTURY PARK 
ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND 
The defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates, 
LLC (Quail Ridge, collectively), through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gatfney P A, 
respectfully answer the plaintiffs' complaint as follows: 
1. Admit paragraph 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7. 
2. The answering defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny 
paragraphs 4 and 5. It is admitted that PMC has attached a Lease Agreement to 
the Verified Complaint; however, the answering defendant cannot authenticate or 
otherwise admit the specifics of the Lease Agreement. The answering defendant 
does admit that a Lease Agreement was entered into a lease dated January 27, 




1983 between Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. (fHC) and Sterling Development 
Co. 
3. Deny paragraphs 8 through 33, inclusive. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its unclean hands. 
3. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
4. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
5. The plaintiffs claims are barred from recovery by the doctrine of laches. 
6. The plaintiffhas failed to mitigate its alleged damages, if any. 
7. The plaintiffs claims, some or all of them, are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations 
8. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
9. The plaintiff's claims are barred on the basis that they lack a legal basis. 
10. The plaintiffs claims are barred because they are not based in fact. 
11. The plaintiff has failed to join necessary or indispensible parties. 
12. The defendants are excused from performance by virtue ofbreach ofthe lease 
agreement on the part of the plaintiff. 
13. The plaintiff has waived, through its conduct or course of dealing, any retroactive 
or prospective claims for rent adjustments. 
14. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest. 
15. The plaintiff has failed to give required contractual or statutory notices to the 
defendants for alleged rents due. 
Answer and Jury Demand Page 2 
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16. The plaintiff has failed to perfonn a condition precedent to enforcement or 
imposition of any rental adjustment, including, but not limited to, compliance with 
section 1.3(b). 
17. Any detennination of fair market value must exclude consideration of 
improvements and the lease. Improvements include roads, utilities, buildings and 
improvements to surrounding lands that affect the value of the land in question. 
18. Any detennination of fair market value must include consideration that the initial 
value was an agreed $15,000 per acre, and all detenninations ofvalue were made, 
accepted, agreed to, or relied upon by the parties at each adjustment date since the 
inception of the lease. Thus, adjustments, if any, are limited to changes in value during 
the period since last acceptance or acquiescence of fair value by the parties. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray for the following relief from this Court: 
1. Dismissal of the plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety; 
2. Awarding the defendants their full, reasonable attorney tees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; 
3. Granting such other relief as the court deems just and proper. 
~aei p. o/fue~ I 
Be~~:~tSt. 9<lir GatTney PA ,.// 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on August 2, 2010, I 
served a true and correct copy of the ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND on the following 
by the method of delivery designated below: 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 







0' riand-delt'vered Ia{ ·.·  - . r,: Facsimile 
/ 
~I 
~I" Hand-delivered ~ Facsimile 
!/ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (}F .. T;.,~;~1f,AlfR:ff,( 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK uc1 ""' • , 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) ______________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on Friday, April15, 2011 for a hearing 
on Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Trial Setting. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent 
Hawkins. Defendant appeared telephonically by and through counsel, Michael Gaffney. No 
court reporter was available for this matter due to the retirement of the court reporter. 
Administrative Order 11-01 was issued on January 5, 2011, wherein the application ofldaho 
Administrative Rule 27, as it applies to having a certified court reporter attend all district court 
proceedings, shall be suspended until further notice. 
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. Counsel for Defendant will not 
stipulate to the continuance, however does not have a major objection to using the currently set 
second trial date of October 25, 2011. 
After hearing comment from counsel, the Court GRANTED the Motion to Vacate Trial 
Setting. Jury Trial in this matter is now set for Tuesday, October 25, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. as a 
primary setting and all cutoff dates shall be controlled by that date. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 5th, 2011. 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the{__p day of May, 2011, she caused a true and correct 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) ________________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on Friday, August 5, 2011 for a hearing 
on Plaintiff's Motion to Summary Judgment. At the outset, the Court advised that an Order to 
Shorten Time had been issued on the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and that 
both Motions would be heard for Argument today. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, 
Kent Hawkins. Defendant appeared by and through counsel, Michael Gaffney. No court reporter 
was available for this matter due to the retirement of the court reporter. Administrative Order 11-01 
was issued on January 5, 2011, wherein the application ofldaho Administrative Rule 27, as it 
applies to having a certified court reporter attend all district court proceedings, shall be suspended 
until further notice. 
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Plaintiff additionally offered 
argument on their Motion to Strike. The Court heard argument from the parties and upon 
consideration thereof, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is taken under advisement and the Court 
shall render written Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment in due course. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Jury Trial scheduled for Tuesday, October 25, 
2011, is hereby VACATED, pending the Court's decision. Counsel shall forthwith submit dates 
for trial available in the first quarter of2012 for Jury Trial. 







CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the~y of August, 2011, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in 
the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 0 Faxed 
Kent Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 0 Hand Delivered 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 y Mailed 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 0 Faxed 
Michael Gaffney 
0 Hand Delivered 2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 )6 Mailed 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) _______________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on Tuesday, December 20, 2011 for oral 
announcement of the Court's decision on pending cross motions for summary. Plaintiff appeared 
telephonically by and through counsel, Dave R. Gallafent. Defendant appeared telephonically by 
and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney. No court reporter was available for this matter due to 
the retirement of the court reporter. Administrative Order 11-01 was issued on January 5, 2011, 
wherein the application ofldaho Administrative Rule 27, as it applies to having a certified court 
reporter attend all district cowi proceedings, shall be suspended until further notice. 
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court announced its decision 
orally with respect to the parties cross motions for summary judgment. The Court DENIED both 
parties motions for summary judgment stating that there were genuine issues of material fact that 
precluded the entry of summary judgment in this action. The basis for the Court's denial of these 
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summary judgments was set forth in detail on the record. The Court ordered that this matter will 
remain on the Court's active trial calendar as presently scheduled. 
Further, the Court ordered the parties to mediation in this matter. Counsel shall select a 
mediator by the end of January 2012 and complete mediation by March 1, 2012. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January 7th, 2012. 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the J1 day of January, 2012, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in 
the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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• Mailed 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) ________________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 3rd day of February, 2012 for 
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Dave R. 
Gallafent, Kent L. Hawkins, R. William Hancock and. Defendant appeared by and through 
counsel, John M. A vondet. No court reporter was available for this matter due to the retirement of 
the court reporter. Administrative Order 11-01 was issued on January 5, 2011, wherein the 
application ofldaho Administrative Rule 27, as it applies to having a certified court reporter attend 
all district court proceedings, shall be suspended until further notice. 
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. At the outset, the Court inquired of 
counsel as to the status of mediation in this matter. The Court then ORDERED the parties to 
choose between 2 proposed mediators, retired Judge Daniel C. Hurlbutt or attorney Kevin E. 
Donohue within ten (10) days ofthis hearing. If the parties have not selected one ofthese two 
(2) individuals to conduct the mediation within ten ( 1 0) days and notified the Court of their 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I 
selection, the Court will appoint one (1) of the two (1) to act as mediator over this matter. It is 
further ORDERED that Mediation shall be completed by March 1, 2012. The mediator shall 
immediately notify the Court concerning the result of said mediation. 
The Court then heard argument from counsel with respect to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider. At the conclusion of argument, the Court encouraged the parties that this dispute 
should be resolved in the context of mediation. The Court also advised the parties that each had 
a great deal at risk and that they should mediate with a strong desire to reach a resolution of this 
matter. The Court advised that it would not take this matter under advisement until notified 
regarding the resolution of the mediation process. If mediation is unsuccessful, the Court will 
then take the matter under advisement. 
Further, the trial in this matter is hereby VACATED. Counsel shall submit new stipulated 
trial dates within two (2) weeks of this hearing. Said dates shall be approximately 60 to 90 days 
from the mediation cut-off date of March 1, 2012. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: February lOth, 2012. 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
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A 
The undersigned certifies that on thJ day of February, 2012, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in 
the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffn;!y 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) _________________________________ ) 
Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER AND 
ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL 
Pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated February 10, 2012, the Court having 
vacated the trial in the foregoing matter and having ordered the parties to mediation; the Court also 
ordered that the parties submit available trial dates approximately sixty (60) to ninety (90) from the 
date of the February 10, 2012 hearing. The parties having complied with the Court's order in this 
respect contacted the Court's clerk with a stipulated trial date of May 14, 2012 through May 18, 
2012. Therefore, the Court will schedule this matter for jury trial to commence on Monday, May 
14, 2012 at 9:00a.m. through May 18, 2012. Deadlines for filing trial briefs, jury instruction, 
motions in limine will be covered by the time lines imposed in the Court's previous Scheduling 
Order triggered from the new trial date. 
In addition, the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated February 10, 2012 required that 
the parties complete mediation on or before March 1, 2012. On February 24, 2012, the parties 
and initiated an informal status conference with the Court. This conference was conducted off 
the record. The parties advised the Court of difficulties which prevented them from completing 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I 
mediation by the Court's deadline of March 1, 2012. They requested and the Court determined 
that good cause existed that the deadline be extended by fifteen (15) days. Therefore, the Court 
GRANTED the parties and extension of fifteen (15) days to complete mediation or until March 
15,2012. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 13th, 2012. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 0 day of March, 2012, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in 
the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael Gaffney 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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BANNOCK COUNTY ID~tf).R \6 ~'to: 34 
POCATELLO HOSPTIAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 















Court ordered mediation took place on March 12,2012 at the offices of Merrill 
and Merrill, Pocatello, Idaho. 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC appeared through Norman Stephens, President/CEO and 
Don Wadle, Vice President and were represented by Dave. R. Gallafent. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC appeared through Rick McAftee, Chairman's 
Office, Life Care Centers of America, and were represented by Winston V. Beard. 
Both parties negotiated in good faith toward resolution of the issues presented in 
the instant case. Discussion centered on reaching an agreement of a leasehold rate to 
govern the leased ground which serves as the subject matter of their 1983 lease of 4.25 
acres of property in Pocatello, Idaho. 
Additional discussions were held to explore other avenues to resolve the parties' 
lawsuit. 
REPORT OF MEDIATOR PAGE 1 
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Following these discussions and the exchange of offers to settle, a final agreement 
could not be concluded. Therefore, the mediation was terminated without settlement. 
Dated: March 14, 2012 
Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr. 
Mediator 
REPORT OF MEDIATOR PAGE 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 14,2012, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing REPORT OF MEDIA TOR by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
David R. Gallafent 
Merrill & Merrill, Chtd. 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Winston V. Beard 
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffuey 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Clerk of the Court 
624 East Center, Room 211 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
PO Box 775 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
(><) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) E-mail 
( ) Fax 
09 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) E-Mail 
( ) Fax 
()0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) E-mail 
( ) Fax 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) E-Mail 
( ) Fax 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, D/B/A 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 















) _____________________________ ) 
COURT REPORTER: Rodney Felshaw 
Case No: 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
DATE: Friday, March 23, 2012 02:30PM 
TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES: Dave R. Gallafent, Plaintiffs Attorney 
Kent L. Hawkins, Plaintiffs Attorney 
Michael D. Gaffney, Defendants' Attorney 
MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Civil Hearing 
PROCEEDINGS: The above-entitled matter came before the Court as regularly scheduled for 
hearing for the Court's Decision on the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. Dave R. Gallafent and 
Kent L. Hawkins appeared telephonically on behalf of Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Plaintiff. Michael 
D. Gaffney appeared telephonically on behalf of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC. The basis 
for the Court's Decision and Order was set forth in detail on the record. 
DISPOSITION: The Court DENIED the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. 
Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order 
Revised 01/08 
74 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: this 11th day of April, 2012. 
MITCHELL W BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on April 12, 2012, I mailed/served a true copy of the Minute Entry and 
Order on the attorney( s )/person( s) listed below by mail with correct postage thereon or causing the 
same to be hand delivered. 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Dave R. Gallafent 
Kent Hawkins 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CE'·JTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) ________________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 181h day of April, 2012 for 
hearing on Defendants' Objection to Telephonic Trial Deposition. Plaintiff appeared 
telephonically by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins. Defendants appeared telephonically by 
and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney. The Court appeared by telephone from chambers in 
Soda Springs. 
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court heard argument and 
discussion from all counsel. At the conclusion of argument, the Court ordered the deposition to 
proceed as scheduled The Court further ordered that it would be a deposition for purposes of 
preserving the testimony the deponent for trial purposes. Therefore, objections shall be made 
and preserved so the Court can rule on the same. Further the Court shall be provided with a copy 
of the deposition as soon as possible to allow the Court an opportunity to review and consider the 
objections prior to trial. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 25th, 2012. 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the?i.{aay of April, 2012, she caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
21 05 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3 791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
) 




vs. ) MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
) and NOTICE OF HEARING 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 







) ______________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, 
LLC ("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, and, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 15(a) and I.R.C.P. 15(b), seeks leave of this Court to amend its Complaint to: (1) 
amend its allegation of damages based upon the Integra appraisal report that was received after 
this litigation commenced and that Plaintiff relied upon to support its rent adjustment 
calculations in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) to add an alternative count for 
Declaratory Judgment to conform the Complaint to the Plaintiff's request for this Court to 
interpret the rent adjustment language of Section 1.3(b) of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement 
("1983 Ground Lease"). Attached hereto is a true and correct copy ofPMC's proposed 
Amended Complaint. 





I.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." See I.R.C.P. 15(a). In interpreting this rule, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that 
"the twin purposes behind this rule are to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than 
technicalities, and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of 
the claim and the facts at issue." Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 
866, 871,993 P.3d 1197, 1201 (1999) (citing Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 
996 (1986)). In the present case, freely allowing Plaintiffto amend its Complaint as requested 
will serve these twin purposes. First, this case will be able to proceed on the merits of the 
dispute between the parties instead ofbeing hampered by technicalities. Secondly, because the 
alternative declaratory judgment count now being raised by the Plaintiff is based upon the same 
basic facts, documents, and claim that has already been at issue in this case and argued 
extensively by the parties over many months, the Plaintiff's amended complaint will be 
consistent with the direction that this case has taken, including the relief the Plaintiff wants this 
court to provide. 
The issue of leave to amend in the present case is similar to the case considered by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977). 
In Smith, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaints after the defendants moved for 
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to one of the defendants on 
the pleadings alone; however, the district court also allowed the plaintiffs to amend their 
complaints against the defendants including the defendant who had been granted summary 
judgment. The district court found that while the amended complaint raised a new legal theory 
of recovery- even as against the defendant granted summary judgment - there was no problem 
with such amendment "since the basic facts giving rise to a right of recovery remained 
unaltered." Such statement is true with the Plaintiff's proposed amendments to its complaint in 
the present case. 
In affirming the district court's decision to allow the plaintiffs' amendments to their 
complaints, the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith cited with approval the following language from· 
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the comparable federal rule of civil procedure: 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 
5975RWH042412 Page 2 
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded the opportunity to test his claim on the 
merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, 
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 
deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the 
leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given." 
Smith, 98 Idaho at 272, 561 P.2d at 1306 (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 
227, 230,9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) .. 
In the present case, none of the factors that cut against allowing leave to amend exist. 
The Plaintiff did not request declaratory judgment initially in this case because it was proceeding 
under the impression that the 1983 Ground Lease was unambiguous and, therefore, that 
declaratory judgment was unnecessary. Indeed, both parties to this action ultimately filed cross 
motions for summary judgment alleging that Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease was 
unambiguous and requesting the Court to grant summary judgment in their respective favor 
based upon the unambiguous language of such ground lease. This Court did not rule on the 
parties cross motions for summary judgment until December of2011. It was only at that point 
that the Court notified the parties of its determination that the "taking into account" language in 
Section 1.3 (b) was ambiguous. After that ruling, the Plaintiff timely filed a Motion to 
Reconsider with the Court. The Court withheld ruling on the Plaintiff's motion to reconsider 
until after the parties had participated in a Court ordered mediation. After such mediation was 
unsuccessful, on March 26, 2012, the Court entered its ruling denying the Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider and reaffirming its determination that the "taking into account" language of Section 
1.3(b) of the Ground Lease was ambiguous. Based upon the procedural history of this case, the 
Plaintiff was not dilatory in failing to earlier amend its Complaint to add an alternative count for 
declaratory judgment. 
Because the parties cannot agree on how fair market value for the Leased Land is to be 
determined under Section 1.3(b) of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement and because an actual 
controversy presently exists on how such is to be determined under this lease agreement, a 
declaratory judgment action is appropriate in this case. The Defendants are not prejudiced by 
the addition of this alternative count for declaratory judgment at this point in the case because 
such count is based upon the same basic facts, documents, and arguments that have been 




extensively argued by all parties to this action in previous briefings to this court. 
Similarly, the Defendants are not prejudiced by the Plaintiff amending its damages 
allegations in its complaint to be consistent with the Integra appraisal since such numbers were 
used by Plaintiff in its Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, the Plaintiff's proposed 
damages averments in its Amended Complaint under the Integra appraisal are less than the 
Plaintiffs original damages averments in its original Complaint under the Bowman appraisal. It 
is difficult to fathom any prejudice the Defendants can suffer from this Court allowing Plaintiff 
leave to amend its complaint to reduce the amount of damages it is seeking in this matter. 
I.R.C.P. 15(b) also allows for amendments to pleadings when such is necessary to 
conform to the evidence developed in the case. Under that rule, "the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation ofthe merits ofthe action 
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the 
merits." See I.R.C.P. 15(b). For the same reasons outlined in the section immediately above, 
this Court can find that Plaintiff should also be freely allowed to amend its Complaint pursuant 
to Rule 15(b) because allowing such amendments will not prejudice the Defendants' ability to 
defend this action on the merits. 
For these reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to grant its Motion for 
Leave to Amend and, in so doing, that the Court file the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint attached 
hereto. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
You are hereby notified that on the 4th day of May, 2012, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel can be heard, Plaintiff will come before the Court for oral argument and 
disposition of its Motion to Amend its Complaint in the above-referenced matter. 
s,1 
DATED this_\_ day of May, 2012. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 
5975RWH042412 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
R. William Hancock, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, R. William Hancock, Jr., the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff. in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was this 1 £1 day of May, 2012, served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Judge Mitchell Brown 
P.O. Box 4165 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
(Chambers Copy) 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 
5975RWH0424!2 
[~U.S. Mail 
[_J Hand Delivery 
[_j Overnight Mail 
rxJ Facsimile 
[~U.S. Mail 
[_j Hand Delivery 
[_j Overnight Delivery 
00 Telefax 547-2147 (IN~+- :n+.~::h'MeJ\T) 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3 791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





) Case No. CV-10-2724 
) 
) 






) ____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, 
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the 
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, complains 
and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), 
is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose 
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock 
County, Idaho 83201. 
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2. Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical.Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
3. Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), 1s a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
4. This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 
1983 ("Lease Agreement"). PMC's copy of this Lease Agreement is attached to Plaintiffs 
original Complaint as Exhibit "1" and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. ("IHC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original 
lessee. 
6. The Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello, 
Bannock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal description for the 
Leased Land is attached to Plaintiffs Original Complaint as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
7. On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to 
Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limit<;:d partnership 
authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 Keith 
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
8. On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their respective interests 
in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge thereby became the 
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement 
9. On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease 
Agreement to IHC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., thereby became the 
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. 
10. On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in 
the Lease Agreement to Bannock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby 
became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its 
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name to Portneuf Medical Center. 
11. On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC (then known as PortneufMedical Center), 
assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the successor lessor 
to the Lease Agreement. 
12. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or 
related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement. 
13. Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of 
"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
14. PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 13 above 
as if they had been set forth fully herein. 
15. When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27, 1983, IHC and 
Sterling, as original lessor and lessee respectively, agreed upon a basis for calculating the initial 
annual rental. Specifically, in Article 1, Section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original 
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis for calculating the initial annual rental: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) 
years from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be 
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) 
per acre. 
16. The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and 
unambiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased 
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 x 4.25 = $63,750; $63,750 x 15% = $9,562.50). 
17. The annual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic basis pursuant to the 
Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.3(b ), which states in relevant part: 
. . . The annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) 
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to 
below as the rent adjustment date. 
18. The above language in Article 1 of the Lease Agreement concerning when each 
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rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date 
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled for January 27, 1986 and the rent was, and is, subject 
to adjustment every three years thereafter until the termination of this Lease Agreement. 
19. Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent adjustment date was 
January 27, 2010. 
20. Although the Lease Agreement provides for period rent adjustment dates as 
outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive 
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the 
specified rent adjustment date. 
21. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part: 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent 
adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to 
the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined. The party 
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the · 
period affected by the adjustment. 
22. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC becoming a successor 
lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither IHC, IHC Health Services, Inc., nor BRMC exercised its 
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of 
the Lease Agreement. 
23. Sometime in the summer of2009, PMC became aware ofthe fact that the annual 
rental rate for the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article 1 of the 
Lease Agreement. 
24. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides the 
following clear and unambiguous formula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the 
Leased Land: 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (1 5%) of the fair 
market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the 
premises. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the 
highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date 
without taking the leasehold into account . ... 
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25. In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation 
("Bowman") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land on the prior three rent 
adjustment dates. 
26. On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC, 
which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007 
rent adjustment dates was $1 ,297 ,3 71, $1 ,3 71 ,507, and $1 ,464,17 6, respectively. 
27. On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants ofPMC's intention 
to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of this Lease Agreement. 
28. As evidence in support of PMC's request for an adjustment of the annual rent rate 
pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time 
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 
prior three rent adjustment periods. 
29. Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual 
rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue 
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land. 
30. Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement 
31. After this litigation had commenced, PMC retained Integra Realty. Resources 
("Integra") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land for the January 23, 2007 rent 
adjustment period and the January 23,2010 rent adjustment period. 
32. On or about December 15, 2010, Integra provided its appraisal report, which 
states that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2007 rent adjustmentperiod 
is $1,080,000.00 and that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2010 rent 
adjustment period is $990,000.00. 
33. Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $486,000.00 in annual rents for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the 
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $457,312.50 
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period. The 2007 rent adjustment 
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period includes the years 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
34. Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2010 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $445,500.00 in annual rents for the 2010 rent 
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the 
2010 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $416,812.50 
for unpaid adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period. The 2010 rent adjustment period 
includes the years 2010,2011, and 2012. 
COUNT II 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
35. PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 34 above 
as if they had been set forth fully herein. 
36. Defendants deny that they are obligated to pay additional rent for the 2007 and 
2010 rent adjustment periods; claiming that Plaintiff failed to apply the following language from 
Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement when Plaintiff calculated its proposed rent adjustments: 
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial 
minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of 
Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00 per acre and shall also take 
into account any determinations of market value made under this lease for the 
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. 
3 7. The court has found that the above-identified language in Section 1.3(b) of the 
Lease Agreement does create an ambiguity in the formula to adjust the rent and, therefore, a 
dispute has arose between the parties over the interpretation and construction of the rent 
adjustment language contained in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. 
38. Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides that if a dispute arises between 
the parties as to the determination of fair market value of the Leased Land for the period to which 
any rent adjustment applies, then "the determination shall be made as in the paragraph on 
Arbitration in Article 13." 
39. Although multiple attempts have been made, the parties to this action have been 
unable to reach an agreement for determining the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 
Amended Complaint Page6 
90 
2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods. 
40. Instead of arbitrating this controversy over the determination of fair market value 
under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, the parties have instead proceeded with this civil 
action in the District Court for Bannock County, Idaho. 
4 I . An interpretation of the rent adjustment language in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease 
Agreement is necessary to deciding the relative rights and obligations of the parties to this action 
under this 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. 
42. Until a determination of fair market value under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease 
Agreement is made, it is impossible for the parties to calculate an adjusted rental rate for the 
2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
43. Pursuant to Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, this Court is authorized and has 
power to enter a declaratory judgment on the construction of this written contract. 
44. An actual controversy exists between the parties to this action over the 
interpretation of the rent adjustment language in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. 
45. Entry of a declaratory judgment by the Court on how fair market value is to be 
determined under Section 1.3(b) of Lease Agreement is consistent with the original contracting 
parties' agreement that such disputes over a determination of fair market value would be 
arbitrated. 
46. Once this Court has adjudged and declared how fair market value is to be 
determined under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, this Court should further enter a 
judgment declaring the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 201 0 rent 
adjustment periods and the appropriate adjusted rent for each such period based upon the Court's 
fair market value determinations. 
4 7. Finally, the last paragraph of Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement requires the 
Defendants to "promptly after the determination [of adjusted rent], pay any difference for the 
period affected by the adjustment." 
48. PMC has not been paid an appropriate adjusted rent for the 2007 and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods and, as such, the Defendants are obligated under Section 1.3(b) of the 1983 
Ground Lease Agreement to promptly pay PMC any difference between the actual rent owed and 
Amended Complaint Page 7 
the actual rental paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods after this Court has 
determined the adjusted rent for these periods. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
49. To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill, 
Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho· Code §§ 
12-120(3) and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment· be entered in Plaintiff's favor and 
against the Defendants as follows: 
1. That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plaintiff for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $457 ,312.50; 
n. That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for the 2010 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $416,812.50; 
111. In the alternative, that the Court enter a declaratory judgment on the. fair market 
value ofthe leased for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods; 
1v. That after the fair market value of the leased land for the 2007 and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods has been determined by the court, that the Court adjust the rent for each such 
period and enter an order directing Defendants to promptly pay any difference in the .actual rent 
owed and the actual rent paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
v. That Defendants be ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associated 
with bringing this action; and 
vi. For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances of this case. 
DATED this_ day of May, 2012. 
Amended Complaint 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
By ________________________ ___ 
R. William Hancock, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, D/B/A 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
















Case No: CV-2011-0000108 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
______________________________ ) 
COURT REPORTER: Rodney M. Felshaw 
DATE: Monday, April30, 2012 09:00AM 
APPEARANCES: Kent L. Hawkins, Plaintiffs Attorney 
William R. Hancock, Plaintiffs Attorney 
John M. A vondet, Defendant Attorney 
MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Civil Hearings/Pretrial Motions 
PROCEEDINGS: The above-entitled matter came before the Court as regularly scheduled for 
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and 
Estoppel Certificate, Motion in Limine on 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate, Motion 
in Limine on Defendants' Experts, Motion in Limine on Presentation of Irrelevant Extrinsic 
Evidence, Motion in Limine on Speculation and Opinion Testimony, and Motion to Vacate Trial. 
The Court also heard argument on Defendants' First Motion in Limine. Kent L. Hawkins and 
William R. Hancock appeared on behalf of Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Plaintiff. John M. A vondet 
Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order 
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appeared on behalf of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associaties. The 
parties stated their respective positions relative to each of the motions. . 
DISPOSITION: The Court will take these motions under advisement and issue an oral decision 
on Friday, May 4, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. at the Bannock County Courthouse. The Plaintiff will have 
until Tuesday, May 1, 2012 to file a Motion to Amend Complaint with Proposed Amended 
Complaint attached. The Defendant will have until Thursday, May 3, 2012 by 5:00p.m. to file a 
response. The Plaintiff's reply, if any shall be provided to the Court on May 4, 2012 prior to 
hearing. This motion will be set for oral argument on Motion to Amend on Friday, May 4, 2012 
at 1:30 p.m. 
Additionally, the Court allowed, Defendants until Wednesday, May 2, 2012 at 5:00p.m. 
to file a Brief in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in the 2001 
Estoppel Agreement. Plaintiff will submit written reply by Thursday, May 3, 2012 at noon. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: this 30th day of April, 2012. 
Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order 
Revised 01/08 
MITCHELL W BROWN 
District Judge 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on Friday, March 23, 2012, I mailed/served a true copy of the Minute 
Entry and Order on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage thereon or 
causing the same to be hand delivered. 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Dave R. Gallafent 
Kent Hawkins 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order 
Revised 01/08 
By: Sharon J UJef~ 
For Brandi Peck 
Deputy Clerk 
D U.S. Mail 
DE-Mail 
D Courthouse Box 
rgj Fax: (208) 232-2499 
D U.S. Mail 
DE-Mail 
D Courthouse Box 
rgj Fax: (208) 529-9732 
3 
FAX NO. p, 
Dave R. GaUaf-ent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hnwkins (lSB # 3791) 
.:r:~L 
R. William Haneook (JSB # 7938) 
MERRfLL & MUUULL, CHARTERED 
1 09 North Arthur - Sth Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocarelto. ID 832.0+0991 
(208) 232·2286 
(208) 232~2499 Telefa."( 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH ICDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF lDAHO, IN A"I\TD FOR THE COL'NTY OF BANNOCI{ 
POCATELLO HOSP'ITAL, LLC dlb/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAl CE.,'TER. LLC, 
Plaintiff; 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL il\'VESTORS, 




) Cast No. CV·H)-2724 
) 
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) _________________ ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff. Pocatello Hospital. U.C dlb/a Portneuf Medical C'...enter, 
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill. Ch.artc:n:d. and for its action apinst the 
Defendant<;, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates. LLC, complain$ 
and allegei as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dlbla Portneuf Medical Center. LLC ("PMC"), 
is a Delaware limiltd liability company ~ to do business in the State of Idaho. whose 
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatdlo. Bannock 
County. Idaho 83201. 
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2 FR! 04:45 Pti MERRILL &o MERRlLL FA:~ NO. P. 
2. Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company aut.hori.ud to do business in the State of Idaho. whose principal pla.ce 
of business is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland. Tennessee 37312. 
3. Defendant, Cenwry Park Assuciale&, LLC ("Century Park"'), Ui a Tennessee 
limited liability company aumorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal piac.o 
ofbus.iness i~> 3570 Keith Stroot~W. Cleveland. Tennessee 37312. 
4. This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agr~m dated Jammry 27. 
19&3 (~r...eue Agreement"). PMC's oopy of this Lca$c A~oot is~ to Plaintiff"s 
ori.@.inal Complaint as E.lhibit "1" and is incorporated herein by this refcrmcc. 
5. The Lease A~ent was oripll)' entered into between Intermountain Health 
c.a.re. Inc. ("lHC"). as original lessor. and Sterling Development Co. {"Sterling"), as origin.U 
lessee. 
6. Tbe Lease Agreement concerns real property~ within the City of Pocatello. 
Bannoa::k County, idaho ("Lased Land"). A trUe and correct copy of the legal description fO'f the 
Leased Land is atw:hed to Plaintiff's Original Complaint as Exhibit ··2•· and is inC{)tpOJ'llted 
herein by lhls reference.. 
7. On or about January 1. 1996, Sterling subleased its inten:st in the lAascd Land to 
Pocatello Medical Investors Limited 'Partnenhip ("PMiu}, a Tennessee limited partuenhip 
a.udwriz~d to do business in the State ofldabo, whose principal place ofb~ is 3570 Keith 
Street l'li'W, Cleveland, Temessee 37312. 
&. On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMl assigned their ~tive interests 
in the Leased Land and l..eae Agreement hl Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge ti:tereby bccmne the 
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement 
9. On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease 
Agreement to tHe Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Ser\.ica, Inc .• thereby bee.ame the 
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. 
tO. On or about October 1 , 2002, lHC Health Services, t~ .• assigned its interest in 
the Least Agreement to Bannock Re&ional Medieai Center eBDfC') and BR.\'lC thereby 
became the sueeessor lessor tiJ the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC cbanFd its 
httn://1 0.1 00.51.87:3080/nub/uo.c!Ii?cmd=uinBoxEn9T&Rec=rOOOOOd4f&nrint=l 
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name to Portneuf Med:ieal Center. 
ll. On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC {men known as Portncuf Medical Center), 
assisncd its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the NtX:CSsor t~r 
to the Lease Agretment. 
12. To the best of PMC's knowledse aru:i belief. Century Parle is an affiliate of, or 
related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the I....case ~ent. 
13. Quail Ridge or Centuly Park or ooth operate a senior living mcility by the name of 
"Quail Ridge'" which facility is sit'Wlred on the L~e Land .. 
COUNT I 
BUACll OF CONTRACT 
14. PMC reallr:gcs and incorpon.tcs the allegations in Paragraph 1 thfo:~ lJ a.oove 
as. if they bad been set forth fully herein. 
15. When this Lease Agreement was fU"St entered into on January 27. l9S3. IHC and 
Ste.rHng.liiS original lessor and lessee respectively, agrt:ed upon a ba$is: fur cakulating the initial 
annual rental. Speci;fi¢ally, in Article 1, Sectiot• Ll(a) of the ~ Agreement the original 
lessor and lessee agreed as follows u the bais !of calculating the initial annual rental: 
An initial annual rental slwll be c.alcukzted on the basis a/fifteen percent 
(1 5%) of the value of the leased land_ For pw"'JJJ&# of the first thrMt {3) 
years from the Colll11'Umcement Da~e of lhis [AWe, the Jea.wl lam:i sllaJJ be 
valued at the rate o:f Fifteen 11umsand and Noli()() Dolhlrs ($15,000.00) 
par acre. 
16. The leased Larld is 4.25 acrti w, therefore, based upon the above clear and 
unambipu$ langwge, the original ieuat and lessee set the initial mnual rental fur this Leased 
Land as $9,$62.50 (SIS,OOO x 4.25 = S63,7SO; S63,750 x l5'Yt~"" $9,562.50). 
17. The annual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic ~ pursuant to the 
LeMe A~t, Article 1, Section l.l{b), which st:ntes in relevant part: 
0.1 I. 
. . • 1'118 annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) 
years beginning em the Commenc:i!:ment Dati! of this I...eose. re/m"6d to 
below as the rent adjustment date. 
0 
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rent adjt1stmMt date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date 
1.111der this lease Agreement was scheduled for January 21. 1986 and the rem was, and is. subject 
to adjU!Itmetlt evet}' three years thcmaftcr until the termination of this Leue Agreement. 
19. Pursuant to the foregoing schedule~ the most recent nmt adjustment date was 
January 27, 2010. 
20. Although the !..ease Agreement provides tbr period rent adjustment dates as 
outlined above, this !..ease A~ent also clearly and unambiguously allows fur :retroactive 
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the 
s:pecified rent adjustment clute. 
21. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant pan: 
if the determination qf o.cjjusted rent ts matk <ifter the applicabitl rent 
adj:otme:nt diM, lessee shall continue Ia pay nm at the rate appltt:abie to 
the preceding period rmrU the tuljusted rate is derermined. ~ party 
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, 'fJlJY any di/forence for the 
pertod affected hy the adjustment. 
22. To the best of PMC's knowleda,e and beUcf. prior to PMC beooming a S\1CCeSSar 
lessor to the 1Aase Asreement. neither IHC, IHC Health SctvlC$, lru::., nor BRM.C exercised its 
right as le$SOr under this Lease Agreement to !ldjust the annual rental ratt:: pui'SI.IM' to Article l of 
the Lease Agreement 
23. Sometime in the snmmer of 2009, PMC became aware of the fa.::.t thtt !he annWll 
rental rate for the leased Land bad not been previously adjusted as outlillOO In Article 1 of the 
Lease Agreement. 
24. Sp«:ifically, Article I, Section L3(b} of the Lease Agreement provid:es the 
following clear and Ul'lambiguous fomuda fur e.alculating the adjll.St.Cd w:mual rental tate for the 
Leased Lan<i: 
The rent ra atljusttld shall be etpUil to fifteen pt!I'Cmt (1 5~ of tlut fatr 
markel value of the leased land, exclusive of the impro~nts on the 
pre.ntis'ts. DetermiMii.on of fair tm:rk:et value shall be based .on the 
highest and best use of tile l4nd em she applicable rem atfjtl$tment date 
without taking the kasehold into accmmt. . . . 
0 
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25. In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation 
("Bowman") to determine the fair m~t value of the Leased Land on the prior three rem 
adjustment dates. 
26. On or about October 5, 2009, Bo~man provided its appraisal report to P!YIC, 
which states that the fair market values of the icaJed land fur each of the 200 l, 2004, and 2001 
rent adjustment dates was $1.297,371, .$1,.371,507, and $1,464,116, ~vely. 
27. On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defen.dams ofPMC's intention 
to adjust the annual rental mte pursuant to Article 1 of this tease Agreement. 
2.8. As evidence in support of PMC's request for.an adjustment of the annu:~d rem rate 
pursuant to Article ! of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time 
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market v.Uue of tbe Le:ued Laud for the 
prior three rent adjustment periods. 
29. A.lthou~ PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual 
rental rate pursuant to Article l of the Lease Agreement. Defendants have refused, and continue 
to refust'!, ro pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land. 
30. Defendants are in brcacll of the Lease Agreement 
31. After this litigation had commenced. PMC retained Intcara Realty ~ 
("Integra'') t<.l determine the fair market value of the ~ Land for the January 23, 2007 rent 
adjustment period and tbe Janutuy 23, 2010 rent adjustment period. 
32. On or about December 1.5. 2010. Integra provided its ~ report, which 
states that the fm market value of the leased hmd for the January 23. 2007 rent adjust:mMt period 
is S:l,OSO,OOO.OO and dun the fair market value of the leased bmd for the Januazy 2.3, 2010 mn 
adjustment period is $990,000.00 . 
. 13. Based upon .Intep's valuation. of the Lcasc:d Land for the 2007 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $486,000.00 in annual rents for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period. Instead. Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the 
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not Jess than $451.312.50 
for unpaid adjusted annuat rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period. The 2007 rent adjustment 
1.87 :3080/pub/up.cgi?cmd=uinBoxEr 10_0&Rec=r00000d4 f&print= 1 
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period includes the years 2007,2008. and 2009. 
34. Based upon integra's va!Wlrion of tile~ Land tb:r the 2010 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should haw paid a ootal of $445,500.00 in annual rents fur the 2010 renl 
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.$0 in annual rents during the 
2010 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants n'W-e PMC a sum of not less than $416,812.51} 
for unpaid adjusted rents for th¢ 20 l 0 rent adjustment period. The 201 0 rent adjustment period 
includes the years 20Hl, 2011, and 2012. 
COUJ\III 
IN THE ALTER.'\iATJ'VE, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
35. PMC realleges !Uld incorporates the allegations in Paragraph l through 34 above 
as if they had been set forth fully herein. 
36. Ddcudmts dct:l)' that they arc: obligated to pay additional rent for the 2007 and 
20 l 0 rent adjustment periods; cl.aimin~ that Plaintiff thlled to apply the fotrowms llmguag:e from 
Section l .3(b) of the Lease Agreement when Plaintiff calculated its proposed rent adjustments: 
The determino:rton shall take tntc accoW'tt the parties ' agr;umumt that the inttial 
minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair 1'1'141'/ret vt~lue of 
Fifteen. Thomcmd and NolJOO Dollars ($15,()(J().()()_per acre and slu:dl also rake 
into accounl tmy de.termmations of market value rnatk nm'l4r tAis lease for rAe 
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the «ppitc4ble relll adjustment dat~t. 
37. The court bas found that the above-identified langooge in Section i .J(b) of the 
Lease Agrccment docs create an ambiguity in the: fmmubt to adjust the rem and, therefore, a 
dispute has arose between the parties over the intcrp:(ltation and coMtruction or the rent 
adju~l':m.Ont language contained in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease A~ooment. 
38. Section l.3(b) of tbe Leue Agreement provides thai if a dispute arises between 
the parties as to the determinalion of fhlt mark« value of the Leased Land far the period to whiclt 
any rent adjustment applies, then ';the determination shall be made as in the paragraph on 
Arbitration in Article 13." 
39. Although multiple a.tternpts halr'e boon ntadc, the patties to this action ha .. -e been 
unable to reach an agreement for determining the fair market value of the Leaso.i Land for the 
http:/ I 1 0. 1 00. 51.8 7:3 080/pub/up.cgi ?cmd=ulnBoxEr101&Rec=rOOOOOd4 f&print= 1 
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2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
40. Instead of arbitrating this controversy over the deter:mination of fair market value 
under Section 1.3{b) of the Lease Agreement, the parties have instead proceeded with this civil 
action in the District Court tor Bannock C'.ounty, Idaho. 
4!. An interpretation of the rent adjlllltment language in Section 1.3(0) of the Lease 
Agreement is nccc:mlry to deciding the relative rights and obligations of the partie.$ to this action 
under tl1is 198.3 Ground l..ease Agreement. 
42. Until a der:ermin.ation of fail' market value under Seetion 1.3(b) of the Leue 
Agreement is made, it is impossible fo;r the parties to cal~tdate an adjusted rental rate fur the 
2007 and 20 I 0 rent adjustment periods. 
43. Pursuant to tdabo Code Title 10. Chapter 12, this Collrt is authori2:ed and has 
power tl) enter It declaratory judgment on the construction of this written cont:ract. 
44. An actual controversy exists between the partie& to this action over the 
interpretation of the rent adjustrnent ianguage in Section l.3{b) of the Lease ~ment. 
45. Entry of a declaratory jw:lgment by the Court on how mr market value is to be 
determined under Section J .3(b) of t.ease ~ is consistent with the orip! cont.t'OOt.ing 
parties' n~ent that .~uch disputes over a determination of fair rmn'ket value would be 
arbitrated. 
46, Once dris Court has adjudged and declared bow fair market value is to be 
detemlined under Section L3(b) of the Lease Agreement, this Court should further enter a 
judgment declaring the fair market value of the Leased Land tbr the 2007 and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods and the appropriate adjusted nmt for each such period based upon the Court•s 
fair market nlue detmninatioll$, 
47, Finally, the last ~ph of Section i.l(b) of the Lease Agreement tequitell the 
Defendants to ''promptly after tht: dctcrmiMtion [of adjusted rent]. pay any difference fur the 
period affected by the adjustment!' 
48. PMC has not been paid an appropriate adjusted rent far the 2007 and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods and, as such, the Defendants. are obligated onder Section l.J(b) of the 1983 
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the actual rental paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment peri_{lds after this Court h~ 
determined the adjusted rent for these periods. 
A TIORNEYS FEES 
49. To bring this suit, Plitintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill, 
Chartered. and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fee6 and costs pursuant to tdalto Code §§ 
12-120(3) and 12~123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREfORE. the Plaintiff prays. that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor and 
against the Defendants as follows; 
'· ThM Defendants be ordered to pay b$ck rents to the Plaintiff for the 2001 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $451,312.50; 
iL That D~ be cm:tered to pay unpaid cum:nt annual rent fur the 2010 rent 
adjl.lStment perioo in a $urn of not less than $416,812.50; 
iii. In the alternative, that the Court enter a declMatoty judtpnent on the fair market 
value of the leased for tbe 2007 and 20 l 0 rent adjustment periods; 
iv. Tbar after the fair market value of the leased land for t.b1il 2007 and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods has been determined by the oourt. that the Court adjust the rent for each sm:h 
period and enter an order directing Defendants to promptly pay any difference in the actual root 
owed and the actual rent paid fot the 2007 and 20 l 0 nmt adjustment periods. 
v. That Oefendam:s be ordered to pay Plaintiffs~· fees md oosts associated 
with bringing this action; and 
vi. For sucll other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the 
cin::umstancea of this casr 
DATED th1s ~}'of May, 2012. 
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CEBJlFIC,A]J; OF SERVICE 
/)d~~l~~r 
J...~i~Jil Ja:., the undersigned, 0110 of me attorneys fur the Plaintiff, in the 
abo\.'C'-reterenced maner~ hereby certify that a tn.le, fuU and oonect copy of the foregoing 
document was this L day of May, 2012, served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael 0. Gaffuey 
BEARO ST. CLAJR OAf'fNEY PA 
21 OS C'..oronado Street 
Idaho Fails, Idaho 8.HD4 
Judge Mitchell Brown 
P.O. &x4165 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
(Chambers Copy) 
uu.s. Mail 
U Hand DeliV!ila)' 
U Overnight Mail 
[,;(Facsimile 5!;..1- "J 13;J-. 
U V~S. MJlil 
U Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Delivery 
~eSefax 547-2147 
I. 87 :3080/pub/up.cgi ?crnd=uinBoxEn11~4~Rec=rOOOOOd4 f&print= 1 517/2012 
0.1 
Michael D. Claffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CL.AJR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
ldaho F'alls. Idaho 83404 
Telephone: {208) 52.3-Sni 
Facsimile: (208) 529-97:32 
Emaii: gaffney@beardstdai.r.com 
A~tomey for Defendants 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC dlhia 
PORTNflJf MEDICAL CENtERS, LLC, Case No.: CV-10-2724 0(' 
r>laintiff, 
vs. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND JURY DEMAND 
QUA!L RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC and CENTURY PARK 
ASSOCIATES, LLC. 
Defendants. 
The d{lfendants. Quail Ridge Medical Investors. LLC and Centu.ry Park 
Associates, LLC (Quail Ridge collectively). through counsel of rttOrd. Beard St. Clair 
I . Admit p.am.gmph l, 2, 3. 6 and 7. 
2. The answering defendants ha\•e insufficient infonnation to admit or deny 
cannot authenticate or otherwise admit the specifics oft~ Lease Agreement. The 
Answer to Amended Complain( and Jury l'kmand Page l 
1.87:3080/oub/uo.c~Zi?cmd=uinBoxEI105&Rec=r00000clSfi&nrint=1 C:,/7/')01 ') 
answering defendants do admit that a Lease Agreement was entered into a lease 
dated January 21, 1983 between h:uermounwn Uealthcare, Inc. (lHC) and 
Sterling Oc:veiopmcnl Co. 
3. Deny paragraphs & through 49. inclu..<o;ive. 
AffiRMATIVE DEFtN~ES 
t, The plaintiff taiis to state a claim upon whit:b relief can be granled. 
2. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its own unclttan hands. 
3. The plaintiff's claims are ba.rred by the doctrin~ of res judicata 
4, The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
S. The plaintiff's claims are barred from recovery by the doctrine of laches, 
6. 'I he plaintiff has failed to mitigate its alleged damages, if any. 
7. The plaintiff's claims, some <"lt' all of them. are batted by the applicable statute of 
limitations 
8. The plaintitr s claims are barred by the doctrine of collateraJ estoppel 
9. The plaintiff's: claims are barred on t~ basis that they lack a legal ba..<>is. 
lO, The plaintiff's claims are barred becaU:Se they are not based in fact 
II. The plaintiff has failed to join nt.>eC!SMrY or indispensibte parries. 
l2. The defendants are exct~S~.-d from perthrmancc by virtue of breach of the tease 
agreement on the part of the plaintifl: 
13. The plaintiff has waivett throu!Jh its condud or course of dealing, any n."troa<:tive 
tlr prospective dllims tor n."llt adj~ments.. 
14. The plaintiff is oot the rem party in i.nterest 
t 5. 1'he plaintiff has failed to give required cuntractual or statutory notice~ to the 
defendants for alleged rents due. 
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16. The plaintiff has t'IDJed to perform a oondition precedent to enforcemenr or 
imposition of any rental adjustrnet1t, including, but not limited to,. compliance with 
section U(b). 
17. Any determination of fair market value must exclude consideration of 
improvements and the lease. Improvements include roads. utilities, buildings and 
improvements to surrounding lands that affect the value of the land in question. 
Any detef1llifmtion of fair market value must include consideration lhat the initial 1t'ldue 
\'VaS an agreed $15,000 per acre. and aU determinatiom of value were made, accepted, 
agreed to, or relied upoo by tbe parties at each adjustmc.'ftt date since the inception of the 
lease. Thus. adjustments. if any, are limited to chauges in val.ue during the period since 
lut accc.-pt.ancc or acquiescen>~.:e of fair value by the pwties. 
llt The plaintiff's claims are bllm.'d because the contract was modified in a 
subsequent trnnsaction in 2001 ami eliminated the abifity ofthe plaintitf to adjus.t rent 
l9. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its cours¢ of &.•ling. 
20. The plaintiffs claims are barred because there has been no breach of ctlntract 
21. The plaintiff's claims are barn:d ~'CI1USC it lacks privity of~ with one or 
both of the defimdants. 
22. Th~ pbit.inaitl'"'s claims are barred by its own subsequent c,onduct in 2002 affirming 
that rent was to be a set amount and not a variable amount" 
23. 11\e plaintiff's claims are barred because it has oo damages. 
24. The plaintitf's clajms are barred bcc!Ul!ie the <kfendanl'l' conduct 'IAt't\SilOt the 
proximate cause of the pl&nliff s harms, if any. 
WHEREfORH, the defendants pray for the tbllowing relief from this CAurt: 
Answer to Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page J 
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! . Dismissal of !he pi.Unmr s. complaint in its entirety with prejudice; 
2. A warding the defendants their attorney fees and costs pursuant 10 ldahu C.ode §§ 
11-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules ofCi'ftil Procedl.lnll. 
3. Granting any other such rei ief <tS deemed proper and Just 1..IJlder the circumstance.<:~. 
JURY DEMAND 
Deteadaab demud trial by jury pursuant to Idaho Rule of CivU ~un 38 
DATED: May 7, 2Q i 2 
CERTJFJCATE OF SERVICE 
I certify l am a licensed attome)' in the !Mte of Idaho and oo May 1, 2012. l 
served a true and correct copy of the ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
.rtJRY DEMAND on the following by the method of d~iivery designated below: 
Dave R Gallafenr 0 0 ~ 
R. WiHiam Hancook. U.S. Mail Hand-delivered facsimile 
Merrill & Merril.l 
PO Btlx 991 
Poontello. lD 83204-0991 
fax: 232-:2499 
Fhmnook County Coonhouse 0 0 
~-
624 E. Center U.S. Mail Hand--delivered l'acsimile 
Pocatello, rD 8320! 
Fax: (208) 236.-7012 
Honorable Mitchell Bro .. -..n 0 0 ~Uniie Caribou County Courwruse U.S. Mall Hand--deli,ered 
POBox77S 
Soda Springs.lD 83276 
Fax: (208) 547-2l47 
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IN ".tHE DISTIUCT COtTRT OF THE SIXTH ,JUDICJAI, DIBTRJCI' OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..~D FOR THE COt.J'!\"TY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL. LLC, D/B/A ) 




VS ) MINt!TE ENTRY Al'ID ORDER 
) 
Qt:AIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) 
LLC AND CENTURY P A.ftK ) 
ASStlCM. TES, LLC, 
On May 10, 2012, this rn.atter came before the Court for anno~ of the Court's 
decision on a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Denumd fur Jury Truu and Oral Motion in Linli.ue 
fb:r a Judicial Determination of the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. Kem L. 
Ha:wk:i:ns and R William Hanoock appeared telephonically for and on behalf of the Plaintitf and 
,\{tehael D. Gaftbey, Win.••ton V. Bear~ and John M. A'll'mldet appeared telephm:licaUy fur and 
on behalf of the D~ts. Rodney ~t Felshaw acted a~ oourt reporter. 
~ Court shall STR.IK.l! Defendant's Quail Ridge Medicallnvestot~ Ammded An~ 
to the extent that it demands a jury trial. The Court stated the bam for the ruling on the record. 
Further, the Court shall O~'JT Plai:nti:frs Motion fur ~on and hereby :finds 
rlmt the Estoppel Ce:tritlcate is clear and unambiguous, and therefun: the Court will oot hear 
e~iMic e"idenee at trial on the 2001 Landi<ud and Estoppel Cet.1ificate. The ·l:nuris fur this 
nding "'"'s al~o set forth on the reoord. 
This matter is curtently set fur trial on Monday, May 14, 4012 at ?:00 a.m. and the Court 
w'iU allow the parties fifteen (15) minutes fo-r any openiug ~ents. 
MINllTI'. ENTRY AND ORDrul • l 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
CERTIFICATE OF MARJNGJSERVICE 
I h~by cmify that oo the lOth day of May, 2012, I mailed/served a true Cop}' ofthe Mhlute 
Entry a..."ld Order oo ~ attamey(~)lpen>oll(s) listed below by mail v.ith correct postage thereon or 
causing the same to be hand deli~d. 
Pl.AIN'TIJ!'li ATTOIDI.'EY: 
Dave R. Ga!J.afent 
Kent l'Jawk:ins 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
D£F:ENDAJ."ST ATTORNEY: 
Michael 0. Gatmey 
2105 Coronado Streel 
Idaho falls, ID 83404 
QURMail 
DE-Mail 
0 Cot:ttthome Box 
rE;i Fax: (208) 2:32-2499 
0US.l\4ail 
DE-Mail 
0 Comtlwusc Box 
~ Fax: (108) 529-9732 
J 
rage: .::. Ul L. 
c 11 f\l""'f\14 
Michael D. Ciaffiley, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. Cl ,AIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney(il}beardstclair.com 
Attorney lt)r the Defendants 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
POR'fNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC 
Plaintifl: 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC and CENTURY PARK 
ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, by and through counsel of record, hereby submit the following list of 
exhibits that may be offered as evidence at the trial of this matter. Defendants reserve the 
right to supplement this list and to utilize any exhibits identified by Plaintiff. 
201. Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 1983 
202. February 28, 1983 Memorandum of Ground Lease 
203. December 15, 1983 Deed of Trust Note 
204. January 15, 1996 letter from Jade Millington to Mark Hall 
205. February 9, 1996 Guaranty 
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 1 
206. February 27, 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate 
207. February 29, 1996 letter to Forrest Preston from Sterling Development Co. 
20X. First Interstate Loan Coupons 
209. March 5, 1996 letter from Forrest Preston to Jade Millington 
210. Subordination and Amendment Agreement, November 1996 
21 I. 1996 Estoppel Certificate 
2 I 2. Sublease Agreement with Purchase Option dated January 1, I 996 
2 I3. Leasehold Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement, June 
26,1996 
214. Promissory Note, June 26, 1996 
215. February 17, 1998 letter from Richard Stem to Victor Lund 
216. February 27, 1998 letter from John Yuditsky to Richard Stern 
217. January 26, 2001 letter from Richard Faulkner to Tracy Farnsworth 
218. Bi II of Sale and Assignment from Sterling Development Group to Pa1tners 
dated January 31, 200 l 
219. Bill of Sale and Assignment dated January 31,2001 
220. Sale and Assumption Agreement and Agreement for Substitution of Liability 
dated January 31, 200 I 
221. January 31, 2001 Notice of exercising option by John Yuditsky to IHC Health 
Services, Inc. 
222. Base Rent and Refinancings 
223. First Amendment to Leasehold Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rents and 
Security Agreement, January 31, 2001 
224. Amended and Restated Sublease Agreement dated February 1, 2001 
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 2 
225. r:ehruary 26, 200 I letter fi·om Richard Faulkner to Guy Kroesche 
226. April 10,2001 letter from Guy Krocschc to Richard Faulkner 
227. June I, 200 I letter from Rich Faulkner to Guy Kroesche 
228. Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate dated June 1, 2001 
229. Amendment to Subordination and Amendment Agreement dated June 1, 200 I 
230. June 21, 200 I letter from Guy Krocsche to Richard Faulkner 
231. Redline draft of Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate dated June 21, 
2001 
232. July 25, 2001 letter from Richard Faulkner to David Jensen 
233. July 26, 2001 email from Guy Kroesche to Richard Faulkner 
234. August 2, 2001 email from Guy Kroesche to Richard Faulkner 
235. September 5, 2001 letter from Richard Faulkner to Guy Kroesche 
236. Amendment to Subordination and Amendment Agreement dated December 
18,2001 
237. September 19, 2002 letter from Nile Eatmon to Forrest Preston 
238. October 1, 2002 Assignment and Assumption Agreement 
239. October 1, 2002 Assignment of Leases and Contracts 
240. October I, 2002 Notice of Lease Assignment 
241. Unsigned October 1, 2002 Consent and Estoppel Certificate 
242. Guarantee of Payment and Performance dated June 1, 200 I 
243. May 7, 2003 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge 
244. January 5, 2004 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge 
245. January I, 1996 Sub Lease Agreement 
246. February 2, 2005 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge 
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 3 
247. January 4, 2006 letter IJ·om Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge 
248. January 18, 2007 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge 
249. h~bruary 5, 2007 letter th)Jn Cal Northam to Forrest Preston 
250. .January 27, 2009 emails between Laura Adcox and Naomi Fahsholz 
251. January 29, 2009 Special Warranty Deed 
252. General Summary of Complete Appraisal Report by Bowman Appraisal, 
September 24, 2009 
253. Integra Realty Resources Appraisal of Real Property, December 15,2010 
254. Reserved 
255. Reserved 
256. Portneuf Medical Center Invoices 
257. Check No. 8496 from Pocatello Medical Investors to PortneufMedical Center 
in amount of$9,562.50 and receipt 
258. June I, 2007 letter from Davis Partnership Architects to Quail Ridge 
259. Wells Fargo Bank Payoff Worksheet dated August 15,2007 
260. August 27, 2009 Memorandum regarding Quail Ridge-PortneufLand 
Valuations 
261. August 27, 2009 Memorandum regarding Quail Ridge Land Rental Charge 
262. October 26, 2009 letter from Don Wadle to Jodi Thomas 
263. February l, 2010 letter from Norman Stephens to Jodi Thomas 
264. March 29, 2010 letter from Dave Gallafent to Quail Ridge 
265. April I, 2010 letter from Forrest Preston to Norman Stephens 
266. April 1, 2010 letter from Forrest Preston to Dave Gallafent 
267. Email correspondence by and to Jodi Thomas 
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 4 
268. Email correspondence by and to Don Wadle 
269. April I 3, 20 I 0 letter th>m Forrest Preston to Norman Stephens 
270. April 13, 2010 letter from Forrest Preston to Dave Gal latent 
271. April 26, 20 I 0 letter from Winston Beard to Dave Galla tent 
272. May 21, 2010 letter from Dave Gallatcnt to Winston Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
273. May 26, 20 I 0 letter from Winston Beard to Dave Gallafent 
274. September 9, 2010 Integra Realty Resourses letter to Kent Hawkins 
275. Undated letter evidencing agreement of Pocatello Medical Investors' 
agreement with Sterling Development regarding Sublease Agreement and Purchase 
Option 
276. July 22, 20 ll Affidavit of Brent Thompson 
277. July 22, 201 I Affidavit of Greg Kelley 
278. Deposition of Jodi Thomas 
279. Deposition of Richard Faulkner 
280. Deposition of Forrest Preston 
/ 
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I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on May 7, 2012, 1 
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST on the following 
by the method of delivery designated below: // 
Dave R. Gallalent 0 r::::t 
R. William Hancock U.S. Mail~ Hand-delivered 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Fax: 232-2499 
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Pocatello Hospital LLC CASE: 
vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, et al 
NO DESCRIPTION DATE 
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201 Ground Leas Agreement 1/27/1983 
202 Memorandum of Ground Leas 2/28/1983 
203 Deed of Trust Note 12/15/1983 
204 Letter fr. Millington to Hall 1/15/96 
205 Guaranty 2/9/96 
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206 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Cert. 2/27/96 
207 Letter to Preston from Sterling 
208 First Interstate Loan Coupons 
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210 Subordination and Amendment Agmt 
211 Estoppel Certificate 
212 Sublease Agreement with Purchase 
Option 
213 Leasehold Deed of Trust 
214 Promissory Note 
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215 Letter from Stern to Lund 
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217 Letter from Faulkner to Farnsworth 
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222 Base Rent and Refinancings 
223 First Amendment to Leashold Deed 
224 Amended and Restated Sublease 
225 Letter from Faulkner to Kroesche 
226 Letter from Kroesche to Faulkner 
227 Letter from Faulkner to Kroesche 
228 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Cert 
229 Amendment to Subordination and 
Amendment agreement 
230 Letter from Kroesche to Faulkner 
231 Redline draft of Landlord Consent 
232 Letter from Faulkner to Jensen 
233 Email from Kroesche to Faulkner 
234 Email from Kroesche to Faulkner 
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235 Letter from Faulkner to Kroesche 9.5.01 
236 Amendment to Subordination and 
Amendment Agreement 12/18/01 
237 Letter from Eatmon to Preston 9/19/02 
238 Assignment and Assumption Agmt 10/1/02 
239 Assigment of Leases and Contracts 10/1/02 
240 Notice of Lease Assigment 10/1/02 
241 Consent and Estoppel Certificate 10/1/02 
242 Guarantee of Payment and Performance 6/1/01 
243 Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge 
244 Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge 
245 Sub Lease Agreement 
246 Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge 
247 Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge 
248 Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge 
249 Letter from Northam to Preston 
250 Emails between Adcox and Fahsholz 
251 Special Warranty Deed 
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254 Reserved 
255 Reserved 
256 Portneuf Medical Center Invoices 
257 Check No. 8496, $9,562.50 
258 Letter from Davis Partnership to QR 6/1/07 
259 Wells Fargo Payff Worksheet 8/15/07 
260 Memo regarding QR/Portmeuf Valuatio fl 8/27/09 
261 Memo regarding QR Land Rental Charg ~ 8/27/09 
262 Letter from Wadle to Thomas 10/26/09 
263 Letter from Stephens to Thomas 2/1/10 
264 Letter from Gallafent to Quail 3/29/10 
265 :etter from Preston to Stephens 4/1/10 
266 Letter from Preston to Gallafent 4/1/10 
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269 Letter from Preston to Stephens 
-
270 Letter from Preston to Gallafent 
271 Letter from Beard to Gallafent 
272 Letter from Gallafent to Beard 
273 Letter from Beard to Gallafent 
274 Integra letter to Hawkins 
275 Letter evidencing agreement with 
I OMI and Sterling Dev. 
276 Affidavit of Brent Thompson 
277 Affidavit of Greg Kelley 
278 Deposition of Jodi Thomas 
279 Deposition of Richard Faulkner 
280 Deposition of Forrest Preston 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) ________________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 4th day of May, 2012 for 
announcement of the Court's decision on the motions heard Friday, Apri130, 2012 in Caribou 
County. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins, R. William Hancock, and 
Tyler H. Neal. Defendants appeared telephonically by and through counsel, Winston V. Beard 
and John M. Avondet. Rodney Felshaw was the Court Reporter. 
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court GRANTED Plaintiff's 
Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and 
ordered that this matter would proceed to trial before the Court. The Court announced its 
decision DENYING Plaintiffs Motion in Limine on 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certificate and Defendants' First Motion in Limine. The basis for this determination was also set 
forth on the record. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER -I 
With respect to the Plaintiff's Motion in Limine on Defendants' Experts, Motion in 
Limine on Presentation of Irrelevant Extrinsic Evidence and Motion in Limine on Speculative 
and Opinion Testimony, the Court declined to rule on these motions, instead deferring rulings to 
individual objections as they may arise at the time of trial. 
Finally, the Court DENIED Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Trial again stating the basis 
for decision on the record. 
Counsel discussed with the Court this issue of ambiguity as to the 2001 Landlord Consent 
and Estoppel Certificate and requested the Court make a ruling as to this. After hearing from 
counsel, the Court gave Plaintiff until Monday, May 7, 2012 at 5:00p.m. to file briefing on the 
issue. Defendant shall then have until Wednesday, May 9, 2012 at 5:00p.m. to respond. The 
Court will issue an oral decision on Thursday, May 10, 2012 at 12:00 p.m. by telephone from 
Franklin County. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 11th 2012. 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
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PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
MTNUTE ENTRY AND ORDER - 3 
0 Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
0 Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
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MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CASE NAME: POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC 
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102 January 1, 1996: Sublease 
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Lease Assignment dJ£J 
107 February 24, 2003: Articles of 
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111 October 26, 2009: Letter from 
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112 February 1, 2010: Letter from 
Norman Stephens to Jodi 
Thomas 
113 April 9, 2012: Appraisal Review 
Statement from Langston & 
Associates ..... I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 




The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 141h day of May, 2012 for Court 
Trial. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins, and R. William Hancock. 
Defendants appeared by and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney and John M. Avondet. 
Rodney M. Felshaw was the Court Reporter. 
At the outset, counsel for the Plaintiff placed a stipulation on the record as to several of 
Plaintiff's exhibits. Pursuant to the stipulation, Plaintiff's Exhibits #101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 
108, and 115 were admitted by the Court. Exhibit # 107 is withdrawn at this time. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Kent L. Hawkins gave an opening statement, followed by Defendants' 
counsel, Michael D. Gaffney. 
Plaintiff called Don Wadle who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hawkins 
conducted direct examination of the witness. Mr. Gaffney cross examined the witness. 
Plaintiff called Brad Janoesh who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hancock 
conducted direct examination. The Court took its morning recess at 10:50 a.m. Upon 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I 
reconvening at 11: I 0 a.m., Mr. Gaffney conducted cross examination of the witness. Brief re-
direct examination was conducted and the witness was excused. Plaintiff advised that it had no 
further witnesses for today and the Court adjourned at 11:40 a.m. for the day. 
Trial reconvened at 9:00a.m. on Tuesday, May 15,2012. At the outset, counsel for the 
Plaintiff informed the Court they were resting their case. Mr. Gaffney then made a number of 
oral motions to the Court. A Motion for Directed Verdict as to the breach of contract claim of 
the Complaint was made and stipulated to by Plaintiffs counsel. The Court GRANTED the 
Motion for Directed Verdict as it related to Count I of the Complaint. Mr. Gaffney moved to 
dismiss Defendant Century Park Associates, LLC from this litigation. Again, Plaintiff stipulated 
to this motion and the Court GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss Century Park Associates, LLC 
from this litigation. 
The Court heard further argument from counsel as to Defendants Motion to Strike the 
Testimony of Mr. Janoesh and Motion for Directed Verdict as to the declaratory relief claim of 
the Amended Complaint paragraphs 46, 47, and 48. Additionally, Mr. Gaffney made an oral 
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court recessed to give counsel time to confer with clients before offering additional 
argument to the Court. 
Upon reconvening, the Court ruled on the pending Motions as follows: Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Testimony of Mr. Janoesh is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Directed 
Verdict as to paragraphs 46, 47, and 48 of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. The Court stated on the 
record the basis for denying each of these motions. . 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2 
Defendant's counsel then called its first witness, Earl Christison whose deposition was 
published and accepted by the Court. Mr. Gaffney then called Richard Faulkner, who was 
administered an oath and testified. Direct examination was conducted by Mr. Gaffney. 
Defendant's Exhibits #256, #257, and #211 were offered and admitted without objection. Exhibit 
#228 (pages 1-8) were offered, objected to and admitted over objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #218 
through #224 were offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Exhibit #227 was also 
offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Plaintiff Exhibit #242 was offered, objected 
to and admitted over objection. The Court took an afternoon recess at 1 :05 p.m. 
Court reconvened at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff counsel had no cross examination of Mr. 
Faulkner and the witness was excused. Defendant's counsel then called Brent Thompson who 
was administered an oath and testified. At the outset, Plaintiff's counsel renewed their Motion in 
Limine as to this Mr. Thompson's testimony and the Court again DENIED the motion. Direct 
exam was conducted by Mr. A vondet. No cross examination was conducted and the witness was 
excused. Defendants then rested their case. 
The Court took a brief recess waiting on the arrival of Plaintiff's rebuttal witness. The 
Court reconvened with Plaintiff rebuttal witness Tracy Farnsworth who was administered an oath 
and testified. Direct examination of the witness was handled by Mr. Hawkins. Cross examination 
was conducted by Mr. Gaffney. The witness was excused and evidence was closed. 
The Court and counsel then discussed preparation of the trial transcript in this matter and 
submission of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel would like the 
transcript prepared prior to the submission and agreed the costs associated with the preparation 
of the transcript shall be shared by the parties. Upon receipt of the transcript, the Plaintiff shall 
have 14 days to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court with a 
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separate document containing closing arguments. Defendant will then have 14 days to submit 
the same. Counsel for Plaintiff shall then have 7 days for any reply argument (but no additional 
findings of fact or conclusions of law) they may wish to submit. At that time the matter will be 
taken under advisement by the Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 15,2012. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the{l day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 4 
0 Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
0 Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
em~ 
Brandy Peck, Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 





QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) _________________________________ ) 
The Court has now been notified by the Court Reporter, Rodney M. Felshaw that the 
transcript of the court trial conducted on May 14 and 15,2012 is complete. At the conclusion of 
this court trial the parties agreed to share equally the cost associated with preparation of a transcript 
of the trial proceedings to aid the parties in preparation of their proposed findings of fact, conclusion 
of law and closing arguments. 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
parties shall have until June 11, 2012 to remit payment to Rodney M. Felshaw for the trial 
transcript. Upon receipt of the same, Mr. Felshaw will provide each party with a copy of the trial 
transcript. Mr. Felshaw shall notify the Court and the parties of the date upon which the trial 
transcript sent to the parties. The briefing schedule set forth in the Court's Minute Entry and Order 
dated May 15, 2012 will then be controlled from the date of mailing to the parties. 
ORDER -I 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 11 1h 2012. 
MITCHELL BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
21 05 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
ORDER -2 
)<'Faxed 2-244{ 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
)(Jaxed 529 _ql?J2 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 




) Case No. CV-10-2724 
) 
vs. 
) PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 








) ______________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC, 
("PMC") by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its Closing 
Argument respectfully states: 
Introduction 
In its Amended Complaint, PMC formally requested this court to declare the rights and 
obligations of the parties under Section 1.3(b) of the January 27, 1983 Ground Lease Agreement 
("Lease Agreement"). 
Finding the "taking into account" language found in Section 1.3(b) of the lease to be 
ambiguous, this court directed that this matter proceed to trial so that the parties could present the 
Plaintifrs Closing Argument Page 1 
court with relevant extrinsic evidence so as to assist the court, as the trier of fact, in interpreting 
this ambiguous language. The trial has now been completed and the parties have presented the 
court with the best evidence available on this ambiguous language. 
Yet, in truth, no relevant extrinsic evidence was presented at trial by either party explaining 
why the original parties to this ground lease included this "taking into account" language in 
Section 1.3(b) and how they intended such language to be applied for rent adjustment purposes. 
PMC contends that this evidence was not presented because it does not exist. Further, no 
evidence was presented at trial revealing that any of the parties to this lease had every engaged in 
the rent adjustment process as outlined in Section 1.3(b) ofthis Lease Agreement. As such, there 
is no history to guide this court in the application of the "taking into account" language at issue in 
this case. 
Regardless, as will be discussed more thoroughly below, there was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to enable this court to interpret this ambiguous "taking into account" language in 
such a way as to reasonably give meaning to all the other unambiguous provisions of this Lease 
Agreement and, in so doing, to declare the rights and obligations of the current parties to this lease. 
Furthermore, because the Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, has failed to establish 
its affirmative defenses in this matter, this court is able to grant the declaratory judgment being 
sought by Quail Ridge for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
Argument 
I. PMC is Entitled to Declaratory Judgment in Its Favor: 
The parties stipulated prior to trial that PMC and Quail Ridge are the current parties to the 
1983 Ground Lease Agreement, which was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit 101. It is 
undisputed in this case that PMC acquired the Leased Land and the rights of the lessor under the 
Lease Agreement from Bannock County in 2009 and that Bannock County became the successor 
in interest to IHC with respect to the Leased Land and the Lease Agreement in 2002. · PMC is the 
current owner of the subject 4.25 acre parcel of real property at issue in this action ("Leased 
Land") and is the current lessor under the Lease Agreement. Quail Ridge acquired its interest as 
lessee under the Lease Agreement from the original lessee, Sterling Development Co. Subject to 
the terms of the Lease Agreement, Quail Ridge is also the current owner of the building that its 
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predecessor in interest, Sterling Development Co., constructed on the Leased Land. Quail Ridge 
operates its assisted living facility out of that building. 
It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement is the 
only agreement that controls the rights and obligations ofPMC and Quail Ridge with regard to the 
Leased Land. It is also plainly apparent from the evidence presented and the arguments rriade at 
trial that an actual controversy exists between PMC and Quail Ridge on how to interpret the rent 
adjustment provisions of Section 1.3(b) of this Ground Lease Agreement. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, the Court is authorized and has power to enter 
a declaratory judgment on the construction of a written agreement when an actual controversy 
exists between the parties to the agreement. From the numerous pleadings filed by both parties to 
this action and from the trial record, there can be no doubt to the court that such actual controversy 
exists in this case. Through its earlier motion for summary judgment and as later formally pled in 
its amended complaint, PMC is asking this court to enter a declaratory judgment that interprets the 
ambiguous language of Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, that determines the fair market 
value as required by the contract for the adjustment periods of 2007 and 2010, that calculates the 
rent due pursuant to the terms of the contract for the years within those adjustment periods, and 
that clarifies the process for determining fair market value for adjustment periods after 2010. 
Actually, it is not all of Section 1.3(b) that requires judicial interpretation but only 
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ). This court has made clear that none of the other paragraphs in 
Section 1.3(b) of this lease are in dispute between the parties. Even within Paragraph 3 of Section 
1.3(b ), the only language that really appears to be in dispute between the parties is the "taking into 
account" language, which this court has previously found to be ambiguous. 
Because this "taking into account" language cannot be read and understood in isolation, it 
is important for this court to initially step back and see how the other undisputed language of 
Section 1.3(b ), directs the interpretation of the disputed "taking into account" language. For 
instance, the first paragraph of Section 1.3(b) clearly provides that the annual rent for the Leased 
Land shall be adjusted "every three (3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this 
Lease." The lease identifies each of these every three year dates as a "rent adjustment date." 
The Lease Agreement is dated January 27, 1983, which means that the first rent adjustment date 
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was January 27, 1986 and that subsequent rent adjustment dates occurred every three years 
thereafter until the most recent rent adjustment date of January 27, 2010 and, before that, January 
27,2007. 
A review of the next full paragraph under Section 1.3(b) reveals that there are two 
approaches available to the parties for arriving at an adjusted annual rent: (1) the parties may 
reach a "written agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable rent adjust date" and, if 
such a "written agreement" is reached, it "shall be a conclusive determination between the parties 
of the fair market value for the period to which the adjustment applies"; or, (2) if a written 
agreement is not reached between the parties within this 90-day window of opportunity before 
each respective rent adjustment date, then determination of fair market value for a rent adjustment 
period "shall be made as in the paragraph on Arbitration in Article 13." 
There can be no doubt or confusion that, under the above-identified plain language of this 
lease, the only way an agreement between the parties could become a "conclusive determination" 
of fair market value is for such an agreement to be in writing. Notably, no such written 
agreements were offered into evidence at the trial of this matter. No doubt, if any such written 
agreement existed, it would have been a key piece of evidence at trial. Yet, the testimony at trial 
makes clear that the parties to this lease never engaged in this possible approach to rent adjustment 
recognized under Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b ). 
Not only did the lessee and lessor never negotiate a written fair market value agreement in 
advance of a rent adjustment date, they also never, until now, seek to have the fair market value of 
the Leased Land established pursuant to Article 13 of the lease. Furthermore, but for the 
self-admitted speculative testimony from Earl Christison, no reliable evidence was presented at 
trial as to why the parties never engaged in this "written agreement" approach to rent adjustment or 
why, prior to 2010, neither Quail Ridge of PMC or their predecessors in interest ever sought to 
have the fair market value of the Leased Land determined by arbitration or through court 
proceeding. 
In any case, with respect to the 2007 and 2010 adjustment periods that are now ~he focus of 
this action, it is undisputed that Quail Ridge and PMC did not enter into a written fair market value 
agreement for either adjustment period; however, in 2010 PMC filed this law suit to .ask the court 
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to make that determination for those particular adjustment periods. As noted above, when the 
parties do not enter into a timely written agreement on value, then the determination of the fair 
market value of the Leased Land "shall be made as in the paragraph on Arbitration in Article 13 ." 
This court has already determined that although paragraph 2 appears to make arbitration 
mandatory in the rent adjustment context, this mandatory provision had been waived when PMC 
filed its action in district court and Quail Ridge failed to request that the matter be resolved by 
arbitration as required by Article 13. Because this issue has already been resolved by the court, it 
need not be further argued here. 
What the court should recognize from the provision in Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b) 
calling for arbitration when a written fair market value agreement is not reached is the fact that this 
Lease Agreement contemplates the reality that the parties to the lease may fail for any number of 
reasons, whether by conscious choice or otherwise, to timely enter into a "written agreement" 
before the respective rent adjustment dates. This failure to enter into a written agreement does not 
preclude a later determination of the appropriate adjusted rental rate for each such rent adjustment 
date. Rather, the Lease Agreement simply provides that when the parties have failed to timely 
reach a "written agreement" a different mechanism must be employed for determining the fair 
market value of the Lease Land for rent adjustment purposes. 
As further support of the fact that this lease contemplates and allows for later determined 
rent adjustments, the court simply needs to look at Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b ). This paragraph 
states: "If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, 
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted 
rate is determined." (emphasis added). Indeed, not only does this lease contemplate that 
adjustments can be made after any applicable rent adjustment date, but it also details what the 
lessee's obligations are until such later rent adjustment is made. 
In this case, Quail Ridge has attempted to make much ado of the fact that it or its 
predecessor has paid the same rental rate of$9,562.50 since this lease was entered into in January 
of 1983. In light of Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b ), there is nothing significant about the lessee 
making those rent payments other than the fact that Quail Ridge and its predecessors were simply 
doing what they were obligated to do under this lease until a rent adjustment is determined by a 
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subsequent written agreement or by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the court). It further stands to 
reason that, if Quail Ridge and its predecessors in interest were obligated under the lease to pay 
that annual amount until a rent adjustment is determined by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the 
court), then PMC's or its predecessors' acceptance of payments in that amount did not constitute a 
waiver of the lessor's rights under the lease or a modification by course of performance. PMC 
and its predecessor's acceptance of payment in that amount cannot constitute a waiver or 
modification by course of performance because, under Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b ), they were 
obligated to accept payments in that amount until a later rent adjustment is determined by either a 
written fair market value agreement or by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the court). In fact, it was 
because of this language in Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b) that PMC chose to not further pursue its 
breach of contract claim and, therefore, stipulated at trial to the dismissal of its breach of contract 
claim. PMC acknowledges that, under Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b ), there could be no breach of 
this ground lease until a determination of adjusted rent is made by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the 
court) and, thereafter, the lessee does not "promptly ... pay any difference for the period affected 
by the adjustment." The obligation to pay the increased annual rental amounts for the 2007 and 
2010 rent adjustment periods has not been triggered in this case because a determination has not 
yet been made by the court on the fair market value of the Leased Land for those rent adjustment 
periods. 
Because the parties to this action did not timely reach a "written agreement" of fair market 
value of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods as contemplated in the 
first sentence of Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b ), this court is now charged with making that fair 
market value determination through PMC's declaratory judgment action. 
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) guides this court on how this determination of fair market 
value is to be made. It states: 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent 
[sic] of the fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the 
improvements on the premises. Determination of fair market value shall 
be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent 
adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The 
determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial 
minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value 
of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall 
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also take into account any determinations of market value made under this 
lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable . 
rent adjustment date. 
The first sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) is that paragraph's topic sentence. A 
clear reading of this sentence reveals that the court's principal function is to determine for the rent 
adjustment period in question the "fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the 
improvements on the premises" and to set the rent at fifteen percent (15%) of that determined fair 
market value amount. This court has previously found that, standing alone, this first sentence of 
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) is clear and unambiguous. 
The subsequent sentences in Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) only provide guidance to help 
the court reach the goal of determining the fair market value of the leased land exclusive of 
improvements. Specifically, the second sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) provides that 
the determination of fair market value must "be based on the highest and best use of the land on the 
applicable rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account." The court has 
previously found that this sentence, standing alone, is also clear and unambiguous. 
The so-called problems only arise with the third sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ), 
which sentence is often referred to as the "taking into account" language." This third sentence 
states: 
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the 
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to afair market 
value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and 
shall also take into account any determinations of market value made under 
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the 
applicable rent adjustment date. (Emphasis added). 
Although there was no relevant evidence presented at trial as to the original parties' intent 
for including this "taking into account" language in the Lease Agreement, or how they anticipated 
it would be applied for rent adjustment purposes, there was sufficient relevant evidence presented 
at trial to assist this court in understanding how it should handle this "taking into account" 
language in interpreting the rent adjustment provision of this ground lease. This is especially true 
when the court applies the well recognized principles of contract interpretation to the evidence 
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presented at trial. That is, this court must: 
( 1) construe the contract as a whole including all of the circumstances giving rise to 
it, while giving consistent meaning to every part of the contract; (2) give the 
language in the contract its ordinary meaning unless there is evidence indicating 
that a special meaning was intended; (3) consider any communications, conduct or 
dealings between the parties showing how they intended and how they construed 
the ambiguous language, provided that such evidence does. not completely change 
the agreement and provided that one term is not construed inconsistently with the 
remainder of the terms; and (4) construe the contract in a manner that avoids any 
contradiction or absurdities. IDJI 6.08.1. 
In applying the above principles of contract interpretation to the ambiguous "taking into 
account" language at issue in this case, the court must find as a preliminary matter that no evidence 
was presented at trial demonstrating that the original parties to this lease intended a special 
meaning to be given the phrase "take into account." This phrase certainly has no special legal 
significance. As such, this court must give these words their ordinary meaning. One of the 
dictionary meanings of the word "account" is "consideration." See Merriam-Webster On-Line 
Dictionary, available at www.meriam-webster.com. Thus, to "take into account" as used within 
the third sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ), simply means that the court should "consider" 
those outlined factors. 
Considering these factors in reaching a determination of fair market value in this context 
should be no different than a trier of fact considering the various factors outlined in Idaho Jury 
Instruction 7.07 for determining fair market value. That instruction states: 
In determining the fair market value of property, [the trier of fact] 
should consider not only the opinions of the various witnesses who 
testified as to market value, but also all other evidence in the case 
which may aid in determining market value, such as location of the 
property, the surroundings and general environment, any peculiar 
suitability of the property for particular uses, and the reasonable 
probabilities as to future potential uses, if any, for which the 
property is or would be suitable or physically adaptable, all as 
shown by the evidence in the case ... 
While Idaho Jury Instruction 7.07lists factors a trier of fact may consider (if those factors 
are supported by the evidence) in reaching a determination of fair market value, the trier of the 
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fact's consideration of those factors does not ultimately change the fact that court or jury is trying 
to reach a determination of fair market value, which is a term that has legal meaning. Black's 
Law Dictionary, 1587 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., gth ed., West 2004) defines fair market value as "The 
price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market in an arm's 
length transaction; the point at which supply and demand intersect." Indeed, Idaho Jury 
Instruction 7.09 gives a similar definition of"fair market value." That instruction states: 
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a wiling 
seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an 
open marketplace free of restraints, taking into account the highest and most 
profitable use of the property. 
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no 
compulsion to do so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no 
compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable and 
aware of all relevant market conditions and of the highest and best use 
potential of the property, and are basing their decisions accordingly. 
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the 
subject property has been exposed to the market for a reasonable time. 
Similarly, although the court may "consider" (or, ''take into account"}, as supported by the 
evidence, the factors outlined in the third sentence ofParagraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) in reaching its 
determination of fair market value, such consideration does not change the fact that the court is 
ultimately trying to reach a determination of the fair market value, as that term is legally defined, 
of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods. The mere fact that thes~ items 
may be considered does not alter or undo the legal meaning of the term "fair market value" 
especially since no evidence was presented at trial indicating that any separate or special 
meaning was to be given that term as used within this Lease Agreement. 
Although Quail Ridge called its appraiser, Brent Thompson, to offer an opinion on the 
interpretation of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ), the most that Mr. Thompson testified to in this 
regard is: 
As far as an increase goes, it apparently is supposed- it says that they are 
to take into account any determinations of market value made under this 
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lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable 
rent adjustment date. So, as far as this section goes, all I could say is that 
it's - a mathematical calculation by the stipulated rent rate, or stipulated 
market value. 
Ultimately, the most that Mr. Thompson could do is recite a portion of the "taking into account" 
language at issue and then baselessly opine that there was to be a "mathematical calculation by the 
stipulated rent rate, or stipulated market value." Although, Mr. Thompson suggests that there is 
to be a "mathematical calculation," he notably never testified what this "mathematical calculation" 
was to be. As a result, Mr. Thompson's trial testimony gives the court absolutely no assistance in 
understanding what to do with the ambiguous "taking into account" language. There was simply 
no testimony offered at trial by either Mr. Thompson or any other witness of any stipulated rental 
rate or stipulated market value ever being reached between the parties to this Lease Agreement. 
Indeed, under Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b ), the only way any such stipulation could be conclusive 
evidence of the fair market value of the lease land for a rent adjustment period is if such agreement 
was in writing. There was no such evidence presented at trial and, as a result, Mr. Thompson's 
testimony in this regard is of no substantive value to this court in interpreting the rent adjustment 
provisions of this ground lease. 
The better approach for this court to follow is to recognize that it is unclear from the 
evidence presented at trial how the original parties to the Lease Agreement wanted the court to 
"take into account" any previous fair market value determinations for purposes of rent adjustment. 
The court should find, however, that this "taking into account" language cannot be interpreted in a 
way that would diminish the ultimate requirement for the court to determine the "fair market 
value" of the Leased Land, exclusive of improvements and at its highest and best use because such 
an interpretation would lead to an impermissible contradiction within this lease, or worse, an 
absurdity. 
This court should find that there are ways for the court to interpret this "taking into 
account" language that would not contradict the court's ultimate responsibility of finding the "fair 
market value" of the Leased Land. For example, the third sentence in Paragraph 3 of Section 
1.3(b) may simply mean that the court is to consider any prior determination of fair market value 
(i.e. either those made by the parties in writing or those made by an earlier arbitrator or court) as a 
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starting point for determining the current fair market value of the Leased Land. Or, this sentence 
can be reasonably be construed as a direction to the court or arbitrator to use the previous 
determination(s) of fair market value as a floor below which the current fair market value cannot 
fall. This latter interpretation is certainly consistent with the first clause of the third sentence of 
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ), which states that the determination of fair market value " ... shall 
take into account the parties ' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above ·stated 
percentage applied to a {Qir market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($15,000.00) .... " (Emphasis added). Because the court is to consider this initial rent as a 
"minimum rent" it should recognize that the earlier determination of fair market value became a 
floor below which the current determination of fair market value cannot drop. 
How the original parties to the lease decided that $15,000 per acre was the 1983 fair market 
value of the Leased Land is irrelevant to the court's duty to find fair market value of the land for 
the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment period. The important point to be taken from parties' 1983 
agreement on market value is that they, as lessee and lessor, dealing at arm's length, agreed upon a 
value. In other words whatever approach the parties would have taken in 1983 to decide on that 
value would have been perfectly consistent with the legal definition of fair market value as "the 
price that a seller (or in this matter the lessor) is willing to accept and a buyer (or in this case the 
lessee) is willing to pay on the open market in an arm's length transaction." (Black Law 
Dictionary, Infra.) From IHC's perspective the $15,000 per acre value was certainly consistent 
with what it thought the property was worth in 1983. Chris Anton, the IHC Hospital 
Administrator in 1983, was the only witness presented at trial who was present when this lease was 
entered into in 1983. Mr. Anton testified to the following concerning the initial agreed to amount 
of $15,000.00 per acre: 
2 A. Well, I think we had-- the hospital was 
3 relatively new -- like a year old or so -- something in 
4 that neighborhood. So at that time we would have had a 
5 pretty good idea of what the land value was or the cost 
6 involved in that land. 
7 Again, I would assume that the percentage 
8 equated to a value that seemed reasonable. 
See Anton Deposition at 12:2. 
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After considering the third sentence of Section 1.3(b) in light of this language and that the 
two parties to the Lease Agreement ultimately agreed that $15,000 per acre was fair market value 
of the Leased Land, this court is able to conclude that the original value was the fair market value 
of the Leased Land as that term is traditionally and legally defined. Therefore, the rental rate for 
the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods should also be based upon the fair market value of the 
leased land as that term is traditionally and legally defined. 
The court may also simply find that by determining the fair market value of the leased land 
in 2007 or in 201 0 is higher than the land's 1983 fair market value, it has considered taking into 
account that 1983 value. That is, the court will have determined that the "minimum rent" 
requirement of the taking into account language has been satisfied. Additionally, since there was 
no evidence presented to the court of any written agreement ever being reached between the parties 
on the fair market value for any previous rent adjustment period after 1983, there is nothing else 
for the court to take into account or consider. In other words without any written agreement, there 
is nothing for this court to consider (or, "take into account") with respect to the second clause of 
the third sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ). 
After considering (that is, taking into account) the 1983 value and finding that there has 
been no other subsequent determination of fair market value, this court should conclude t}:lat the 
Lease Agreement ultimately requires the court to find the "fair market value" of the leased land as 
that term is traditionally used and legally defined. Interpreting Section 1.3(b) of the Lease 
Agreement in this manner avoids any contradictions within the contract and also avoids the court 
reaching an absurd result. The court should then find that the only evidence that was presented to 
the court at trial on the fair market value of the Leased Land as that term is traditionally used and 
legally defined, is the trial testimony ofPMC's expert witness, Brad Janoush. It was established 
at trial that Mr. J anoush is a qualified, independent appraiser and that he performed a fair market 
analysis of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. It was further 
established at trial that Mr. Janoush's appraisals did not take into account the improvements on the 
Leased Land and his fair market value appraisal was based upon the highest and best use of the 
Leased Land, as required by Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b ). 
Ultimately, Mr. Janoush testified that the fair market value of the Leased Land, exclusive 
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of improvements, and considering the highest and best used of the land, was $1,080.00 on January 
27, 2007 and was $990,000.00 on January 27,2010. Because Mr. Janoush was competent t? offer 
this testimony and because this is the only evidence this court has of fair market value of the 
Leased Land for these respective rent adjustment periods, these are the numbers the court should 
use in calculating the adjusted rent for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
Applying Mr. Janoush's testimony to the undisputed facts of this case, Quail Ridge should 
have paid a total of$486,000.00 in annual rents for the 2007 adjustment period, which includes the 
years 2007, 2008, and 2009. Instead, Quail Ridge paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents for 
the 2007 rent adjustment period. Therefore, Quail Ridge is obligated to pay PMC the sum of 
$457,312.50 for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment-period. 
Similarly, Quail Ridge should have paid a total of $445,500.00 in annual rents for the 2010 
rent adjustment period, which includes the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. Instead, Quail Ridge paid 
a total of$28,687.00.50 in annual rents during the 2010 rentadjustment period. Therefore, Quail 
Ridge is obligated to pay PMC the sum of$416,812.50 for unpaid adjustedrents for the 2010 rent 
adjustment period. 
Finally, under Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b ), Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay the 
above-identified differences for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods once the Court declares 
the fair market value of the Leased Land for these respective rent adjustment periods. 
II. Quail Ridge Has Failed to Establish Its Affirmative Defenses: 
Although Quail Ridge pled nine affirmative defenses to PMC's Amended Complaint, 
Quail Ridge made clear in its opening argument on the first day of trial that it was only pursuing 
three affirmative defenses at trial: (1) laches; (2) waiver; and (3) modification through course of 
conduct. Quail Ridge bore the burden of proof on these affirmative defenses and ultimately failed 
to offer evidence at trial sufficient to establish these defenses. 
In order to prevail on its defense of laches, Quail Ridge had to present evidence in support 
of the following four elements: (1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in 
asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) 
lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and ( 4) injury or 
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be 
Plaintiffs Closing Argument Page 13 
barred. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002) 
(citations omitted). 
Importantly, under Idaho law, a lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether laches 
applies. !d. Yet, a review of Quail Ridge's counsel's opening arguments at trial demonstrates 
that the only thing Quail Ridge is relying on in support of its defense oflaches is the lapse of time 
on which rent had not been adjusted. 
Quail Ridge certainly had the opportunity at trial to put on its case and establish the other 
elements of this defense and it failed to do so. For instance, there was no evidence presented at 
trial that Quail Ridge or its predecessors in interest had ever invaded the rights of PMC or its 
predecessors in interest. Instead, the evidence at trial established that this ground lease has never 
been breached because no determination of fair market value for any rent adjustment period has 
ever been made as allowed under Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b ). Because no determinations of 
fair market value have been made, Quail Ridge and its predecessors were within their rights to 
continue to pay an annual amount of $9,562.50 until an adjusted rental rate was or is estabFshed. 
Additionally, PMC and its predecessors in interest were obligated to accept payment in that 
amount until an adjusted rental rate was or is established. The mere fact that these payments 
continued unaltered does not establish laches because, for the reasons stated immediately above, 
there was no breach of contract (or, in other words, an invasion of the Plaintiffs rights) by 
continuing to make payments in this amount until a determination of fair market value is made by 
an arbitrator or court for a respective rent adjustment period. 
Similarly, Quail Ridge failed to offer proof at trial in support of its affirmative defense of 
waiver. Under Idaho law, waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be 
evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence. IDJI 6.24.1. The party asserting the 
waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon the waiver and reasonably altered his position 
to his detriment. Dennett v. Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 936 P .2d 219 (1997) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). In fact, "waiver is foremost a question of intent." Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011) citing Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 
735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.1987). "A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver 
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shall be established." Knipe Land Co. citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 
256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Quail Ridge offered no evidence that PMC or its predecessors in interest ever 
intentionally or knowingly waived their rights to adjust rent under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease 
Agreement. Quail Ridge bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that PMC or its predecessors in 
interest had a clear intention to waive their rights. As with laches, the only thing that Quail Ridge 
points to in support of its defense of waiver is the fact that rent had never been adjusted from 1983 
until PMC sought to adjust rent sometime in 2009. As was· outlined in the first section of this 
closing argument, while this Lease Agreement certainly allowed the parties to adjust the rent every 
three years, it did not require that the rent be adjusted. Indeed, various language earlier cited in 
Section 1.3(b) of this ground lease demonstrates that the original parties to the lease contemplated 
and recognized the fact that rent may not be adjusted at the rent adjustment dates for any variety of 
reasons. As such, the original parties to this lease set-up a mechanism whereby the fair market 
value of the leased land could be determined after the fact and applied to a preceding rent 
adjustment period. 
Because this lease contemplates that rent may not be adjusted by the parties, the mere fact 
alone that the rent was never adjusted does not constitute a waiver of the lessor's rights to adjust 
rent under Section 1.3(b) of the ground lease. Quail Ridge has pointed to no other evidence 
demonstrating that PMC or its predecessors intentionally or knowingly waived their right to adjust 
rent. 
Indeed, the evidence presented at trial establishes quite the opposite. For instance, the 
1996 Landlord's Consent and Estoppel Certificate stated that the rent adjustment clause was still in 
effect. Furthermore, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate clearly and unambiguously states that the 
terms of the Lease Agreement remain in full force and effect. There can be no doubt from these 
certificates that the lessor, IHC, was not waiving its right to adjust rent under the provisions of 
Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. Therefore, even if Quail Ridge or its predecessors argue 
that they believed that the lessor had waived its right to adjust rent under section 1.3(b) of the lease 
and altered its position based upon this belief, this court should find that it was not "reasonable" for 
Quail Ridge to alter its position when the plain language ofthe above-cited documents reveals that 
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all of the terms of the 1983 Ground Lease remained in full force and effect at the time these 
estoppel certificates were issued. 
Finally, Quail Ridge failed at trial to offer proof in support of its affirmative defense of 
modification by course of performance. Modification is essentially a contract in itself, requiring 
offer, acceptance, and consideration. See, e.g., Scwinder v. Austin Bank of Chicago, 348 
Ill.App.3d 461, 809 N.E.2d 180, 188 (1st Dist. 2004). Further, modification by conduct or 
otherwise requires a meeting of the minds. Ore-Ida Potato· Products, Inc. v. Larsen, 83 Idaho 
290,296,362 P.2d 384, 387 (1961). Conduct is merely evidence of the meeting ofthe minds, as 
opposed to explicit consent. /d. 
In this case, modification by course of conduct as raised by Quail Ridge violates the Statute 
of Frauds as outlined in Idaho Code§ 9-505. This statute requires that contracts for the lease of 
real property for than one year must be in writing. This same rule applies to any new contract or 
contract modification for the lease of real property for more than one year. Furthermore, the 
doctrine of partial performance does not apply to a contract subject to the statute of frauds if the 
contract cannot be performed within one year. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialties, 
P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,489,20 P.3d 21,25 (2001) (citation omitted). 
Regardless, Quail Ridge has failed to establish modification by course of conduct in this 
case because it presented no evidence that there was ever a meeting of the minds on any proposed 
modification of the rent adjustment provisions of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. Although 
Quail Ridge's corporate representative, Richard Faulkner, testified that he believed that the 2001 
Estoppel Certificate modified the rent adjustment provisions of the 1983 Ground Lease, this court 
need only look at the deposition testimony ofiHC's legal counsel at the time of the 2001 Estoppel 
Certificate, Guy Kroesche, to easily see that there was never a meeting of the minds for any 
proposed modification of the rent adjustment provisions in the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. Mr. 
Kroesche's deposition testimony was admitted at the end of trial. Mr. Kroesche plainly testifies 
that he knows that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate did not modify any provisions of the 1983 Ground 
Lease Agreement because he would have never agreed to include a contract modification in an 
estoppel certificate. Mr. Kroesche further testified that if there had been an agreement to modify 
the 1983 Ground Lease, any such modifications would have been in a separate document and 
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would have been clearly identified as a modification. Finally, Mr. Kroesche testified that he had 
never been directed by any representative of IHC to modify the rent adjustment provisions of the 
1983 Ground Lease. 
Similarly, Tracy Farnsworth, who was the CEO of the Pocatello Hospital from March of 
2000 to October of 2002, testified that as the senior officer of the hospital he would have been 
made aware of any modifications of the 1983 Ground Lease and that he had no knowledge or 
memory of any of the terms of that lease agreement being modified during his tenure at the 
hospital. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, it is clear that there was never a meeting of the minds 
between the parties for any alleged modification of the rent adjustment provisions of the 1983 
Ground Lease. Because there was no meeting of the mirids, there could be no modification by 
course of conduct. Indeed, the most that can be assumed from the totality of the evidence 
presented at trial is that Quail Ridge attempted to slip a contract modification into the 2001 
Estoppel Certificate by leaving out certain language in Paragraph 5 of that agreement without 
making IHC aware of its intentions to modify the ground ·lease by this estoppel certificate. Not 
only does this attempted modification fail because there was never a meeting of the minds nor 
consideration given for this alleged modification, such attempted modification fails because the 
plain language of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate demonstrates that the 1983 Ground Lease 
remained in full force and effect. In signing the estoppel certificate IHC did not waive or alter any 
of its rights under the Lease Agreement. This court has previously held that the 2001 estoppel 
certificate is clear and unambiguous and that it does not modify the rent adjustment provisions of 
the 1983 Ground Lease. 
Ultimately, Quail Ridge failed to establish any of its affirmative defenses at trial. As a 
result, this Court should provide PMC the declaratory judgment sought in this action. 
DATED this day of June, 2012. 
Submitted by: 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
By .%Y:l..~ 
Kent L. Hawkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
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Ck•sing ArgumeniS for consideration by the Court. 
modified the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement in 2001. ThOUGh the plaintiff' (hereafter 
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2001 transaction involved many changes to the parties' relationship and busine&'> 
dealings. One chan@e in particular involved a personal guarmttee by forrest Preston. 
Quail Ridge's principal and o\liner. Such a personal guarantee had never existed before 
and was a new item added during 2001. (n addition, the 2001l:r!m:S3.ctionjolned 
P'<Jeatdlo Medical investors Limited Pru'tneti>hip, the subtenant, as a plllty to the Ground 
lease and added a cross-detault between dre sublease and tbe CJI'Oimd Lease. Each of 
these material modifications were made by the imor. Rich faulkner testified that one of 
the primary pu~ of the 200! Landlord Consent and Esroppel Certificate wu to 
tighten down the amount of rent to be paid in order to justifY tbe personal guarantee and 
to m<."tnorialize the parties' coUTSe of conduct since the start of the 1983 Ground lease. 
Clearly. the parties intended to modi!}:. and did modify. the Ground l.ea.<re 112 a part of the 
200 l restructure l:f'llnS.aCtioo. 
111e second issue that PRMC has to deal with. and it cannot effectively do so, is 
the significant and prejudicial passage of ti.me. 'The equitable defense of laches is ve:ry 
applicable iu this situation because there bad never previ<n.l!lly been any indication that 
!.he rent would e\rer be adjusted. The parties had over twenty years of course of dealing 
behind them before PJU\<fC decided that it should attempt to raise the rent. Though the 
passage of time is. not dispositive in the Jachel\ defense. it is one 1.lf tile prom.im.>nt 
elcrru:nts. 
Third, the Court ha.<J to consider whether PRMC a.ffumati•tely waived the rent 
adjustnwnt provision in 200L 'The evidence establishes that PRMC affirmatively entered 
into the 2001 transaction and requested several changes in the term.~ of the parties' 
arr.mgement. The cllangc to ParagraphS oftbe lOOt cslt.)flpel certificate from the 1996 
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estoppel certificate were evident from th-e start. Guy Krocsche. the anomey for n IC. 
PRMC's predecessor in interest, saw the change, knew about the change. and men IHC 
executed and fonnatly delivered the 200 l estoppel certificate with a clear change to 
Parag.raph S. 
Alternatively, the CtJurt should consider the evidence of an impiioo in fact 
agreement every ~.btu y(,"3fS since commer~ee.ment of the 1983 Ground Lease that the rent 
would remain the same. Such an agreement is evidenced by the patties' course of 
conduct Thus. any adjustment to the rent woufd t.lnly be allowed for 2010 since there 
was no evidence of any ch<Ulge in land .. ·aJues fn.1m 2004 to 2007. The rent should just 
!ita)' the same fOt' the 2007 period. The 20 l 0 adjustmmt. however, should take into 
account the facl tbat land va!lle:S decreased from 2007. This would lead to an adjustment 
in the rent l~s than the $9,562.50. 
I. Modifil'!ation 
Quail Ridge asserts modification a~ a conclusive defense to PRMC's claim. Quai! 
Ridge has previously briefed the modification l.i'k.'Ory for the Court; however, now that the 
record hus been fully developed. the Court !>hould find dun the 191B Ground ~ 
Agreement had been modit1ed. The dereme is based on the 2001 Sale and Assumption 
Agreement and Assignmcmt of Liability, b; v.1Uch me consented in 200 I. In the 200 I 
Sale and Asswnptioo Agreement and Assignme:nt ot' Liability, Sterling J.kvelopmcnt 
Group expressly rcvreserm:d the rent to he $9,562.50, and IHC expressly consented to 
this agreement. Moreover, IHC signed the 2001 Landlord Consent and f::Stoppel 
Certitic.ate consenting to the terms of the 2001 restructuring. and Paragraph 5 ofthe 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate clearly sets forth tbe rent under tbe Ground 
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LetL.;e as being $9,562.50. The Consent and Estoppel C.ertificate c1.nuains similar 
represc::ntations that l'1n.: unambiguot.1s as to the amount of rent due from the tcnmt to the 
landlord. 
The evidence supporting the modification detense is undisputed in the record, 
There was a long course of dealing by the parties to ncv<rr aft1rmadve•y meet and a4just 
the rent. In fact, Earl Christison testified that it was a conscious decision by the hospital 
to not adjust the rent while lie worked for IHC. Thus, for well over t\\renty )'CllrS the 
parties acted as if the rent was to remain at $9,562.50. 
The evidence shows that in 2001 !HC consented to the resti'UI:tun: of the subl~ 
arrangement. The entire ~of the 2001 restrU(;ture was to facilitate Quail Ridge's 
involn~ment and buy out Sterling Development group. However, the lessor astcd for 
changes to sublease and the changes v;ere made. The existing agreements were rewritten, 
ll.Ccording to K.rocsche, and tHC rt."quested that Forrest Preston personally gwmmtee the 
rent payments. This \\1\S a new condition imposed by me on Quail Ridge given in 
oonsidemtion of altering and revising the existing agreem~:nts. llo"'-ever, as Rich 
Faulkner testified if Mr. Pn.'!lton "'a~ going to personally guaranrtee the rent then 
everyone n«'ldcd to agree on what the rent ·would be. Conscqucndy, the adjusttnenl 
language was removed from the 200 I estoppel certificate and the Sale and Asslllliption 
Agreement and Agreement for Substi1ution. of f.iabili~y. Quail Ridge then relied on the 
ta<t that the rent had been ··pinned Jow1f' by paying oft' miUions of dollars in liability on 
the I'ERSIIoan and also invesring more than t>ne rniiHon dollars in renovating the 
facility. fhi.s wouid nor have been done except the parties had moditied the rent 
adjustment provision. 
Detlmdants· Closing Arguments ~c 4 
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The bottom line is that the parties modi.ficd the deal. The course of d~ing is 
strong e\·idencc of modification~ The 200 l ~icn is evidence of rnoditi~. The 
panies• conduct after th(! 2001 transaction only~ the argument 1hat the 2.001 
tra.n~'ticn modified the rent adjustment provision. 
II. Laebes 
The Court should not allow PRMC to adjust the rent based oo its equitable powers 
and the afi~tive defense of laches. There is no question that a '')~ of rime" C!<.i:sts in 
this case from when the right to adjust the rent came into e1<istence and til¢ bospltat tiM 
attempted to assert that right There is over twenty years of oourse of dealings where the 
parties nc'lter affirmatively tnet and adjusted the rent. Quail Ridge reasonabl)' attempted 
to pin 00\\<'11 the amoiUit c>f rent m"'ed un.der the J 983 Ground Lease Agreement in 200 l. 
Quail Ridge relied on the elimination of the adjustment provision to (a) pay off the 
mortgage fmancing on the building and (b) invest OV\.'f a million dollars in renovating the 
Quail Ridge facility. PRMC' s attempt to now as..'li«t the right to adjust the rent is 
extremely prejudicial to Quail RidgcL There is a personal guarantee that never would 
have bc."en provided had the rent adjustment provision remained in the parties' asreemcnt. 
Further, Quail Rid~e never wouid have invested the substantial resources that it did if the 
rent could still be adjusted. 
The 1enns of the Gtt.mnd Lease entered in 1983 gave the lessor the right to invoke 
the rent adjustment provisions of Section 1.3(b). \'lilich it \\'88 estopped from doing under 
the terms of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. This is sufficient to satisfy MY reqmrement 
that the ddbndant invade the plaintiffs right~~;. 
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All of the elements of laches exist in this case. PRMC and its ~sors 
allowed a signitlcant lapse of time to ()C(:Uf before attempting to assert a right to adjust 
the rent. Quail Ridge: has reasonably relied on PRMC and its pred«essoffl' wltm: to 
ad.iw.1 the rent and actually took~ to affi.nnativcly identity the amount of rent to paid. 
It would be ine,quirable for the Court to allow l,RMC to a.djw.t the rent under the 1983 
Ground Lease Agreement, Tb: Court should bar PRMC's claim ba5ed on laches. 
IU. Waiver 
The evidence of waiver is quite simpte based on the ctitirc re\:ord developed at 
trial. There can be no question that PRMC Md its pred~ \\lliYed the right to adjust 
!he rent by. at a minimum. acquiescing to the rent remaining at $9.562.50. This is course 
of condoct. h is an undisputed fact mat the n:nt was nev«..-r adjusted from 190 until the 
request by PRMC directly leading to tbjs suit. In fact. on three separate()((:~ the 
parties agreed that the rent was fi"ed at $9,562.50, The parties knowingly and 
voluntarily agreed to~ agreements that the rent would be a fe<ed mte, without a 
subsequent adjustment 
Waiver can also be sh<>wn by acqcie~ence. And :it is cica.r that at the ''eTY least 
PRMC and it<> pn,'tk.~essors acquiesced to the rent not being adjusted lor tlver twenty 
years since tbe creation of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement Such conduct constitutes a 
waiver as a matter of law. 
IV. PRMC did not meet its burdea at triaL 
PR.\1C failed to meet its burden during triaL PRMC never presented any 
evidence that addressed how the Court should adjw.'t the rent. PRMC's only att.."mpt at 
meeting its burden was the testimony of Brad Janoush, an appmill4."1', wtlo by bis own 
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admission never reviewed the 1983 Orouoo lease Asreement Janoush, of necessity, 
iadu:d the requisite foundation to offer any te$timony that could be of assistance t(l the 
Court in adjusting the rent based on the cm1tract language. Instead, PRMC would 
interlincate a textbook definition of fair market value into the 1983 Ground tease 
Agreement and excise the .. taking into account" verbiage. 11tis is obviously 
irmppropriate. 
that ignores the Ground tease requirements to take inro account (a} prior agreements 
way dmt the Court should rely on PRMC•s approach as it pertains to construing the 
remotely assists the Court in construing the language or in applying tlu:tllild evidence of 
value under the terms of lhe Ground (.ease. 
V. AJternatwely, if the Court ia indiaed to adjut the ftai it mut be deae buft 
on tlte origiaat. value and the mcnmeatat ehaap in valae trom Dt1 to 2010. 
facts of this case, PRMC should nat be awarded the full !«:ope of reiief' that it is asking 
ftw in this case. The 1983 Ground f..ease Agreement uses the variations of the t<.'t'ln 
"a<ijust" in :>cctiun 1 .3(b). At no point in time does the wotd ''incre.ll!ie" appear in tha:t 
section. 'The rent is to be adjusted by (a) taking into account prior adjustments and (b) 
that the initial rent was applied to a market value of$15,000.00 per acre. Since the Court 
is being asked to con:strue and dcchve rights arising under the oontracL the C;0urt should 
1 00.51.87 :3080/pub/up.cgi?cmd=uinBoxEJ159&Rec=r00000f93&nrint= 1 7/1 ~non 
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'The word ''adjust" is defined as "to settle or ammge; to tree from differences or 
discrepancies; to bring to satist'aetory state so that parties are agreed. as to adjust amount 
ofloss by fire." Bt.i\CI<:"S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (4th Ed. 1968}.1 The tlnm'S defmition 
discrepancies must be resolved. 
Quail Ridg:e submits that I)RMC" s adjustment ofthe rent is flawed and lhat the 
adjusted rent has been miscalculated by PRMC. PAA1C wants to just run f~ and usc 
current values without taking into acrount the parties· COUI'SJC of dealing,<> and the initial 
period. The value that has been used by all parties si nee the inception of the 1983 
Ground L~ has been $15,000.00/acre. PRMC would ignore that past course of 
colldw:t and simply use a c!U't"ent apprai~ value for decided bow the rent should be 
deafly contemplates that the rent liihoWd not be adju~ted In a vacuum and with abject 
disregard to the provisions of st."\:tlon 1.3(b }. Although the Court admitted Brad 
Janou.<dt' s tl;:Stimuny. it should now find that Jruwush' s logic: is fatally and give it no 
probative value. He never reviewed the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement and never 
' There illfil! Qtber rofmmces in dtl:' deffnleioo. of"l)dj!tit" but thil.t i5 ~raity lht' Willy that !be IJil:m i5 used 
ihrougb aH ather aspects of the <kfinitioo. They are simp!)' dit'f'm:nt appficuaiorn!; of !he prime OOflnitioo. 
Oef~rnianu.' Closing Arguments Page 8 
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vacuum. This is simply not btlpful to the resolution of this case given the oontmctual 
language at issue. 
Quaii Ridge submits that the parties' course of dealing wammts a finding that 
there was an implled in fact contract betw-een the parties for the entire dumtron of the 
1983 Ground Lease Aareement that the market value continued to be S I 5,000.00/acre. 
The Court should take that into account when adjusting the rent This bears directly on 
the equities and fairness of PR.MC ~ request to iDCn."<''Se the rent in such a dramatic 
fashion tor .2007 and 2010. PRMC simply advocates for the Court to t:rea.le a new 
contract and not apply tbe actuallanguqe in I.J(b}. The Coort should reject PRMCs 
position in that regard as being meritless. 
Quail Ridge's position is simply that if the rent is to be adju.<~ted then it should be 
the incremental change in land values for tbe adjustment period11 at issue in this case. No 
party submitted evidence about how market val~ of land changed from the adjustment 
period prior to 2007. PRMC ~ted evidence of land \tW'I.IeS in 2{)07 but there was no 
evidence of how the 2007 value differed from 2004. 'fbere is no evidentiary basis for the 
Court to make any informed adjustment to the rent to be paid during the 2007 adjU$tmellt 
period. Quail Ridge submits that in the absence of such infonn"tion the Court should 
main•ain the rent a.t the level that if had been prior fl.) 2007: $9.562.5\i per <mnum. 
for 2{}1 o. the issue i:1; different because botb J~BKtush and Brent Thompson 
ccstitied that there was a decrease in land vul ues from 2007 to 20 Ht The de~rense in land 
values was -8.33%. If the Court is to adjust the K"'lt, tuk:ing all factors id~dfied in 
section l.J(bl into account. then should adj!JS't the rent based on the -8.33% decrease in 
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the market value of land in Pocatello. This results in a reduction of the rent to be paid 
under the 1983 Ground Lease A~t and would entitle Quail Ridge to a refund. 
mandates that the prior value be raken into consideration. Adopting PRMC' s approach of 
u.,-.ing the objective market value tbr tbe property. i.e., the Janou~d1 value of$990,000, 
ignores the prior agreement of the parties. It docs not lake that agreement into account. 
periods was $15 ,000.00/a<:re. Thus, when adjusting the rent. the only way t!mt the Court 
resulting in a reduction of the rem. 
For all ofthe foregoing reasons, this Court should find that PRMC's remaining 
claim faits and should declare the Ground L~ rent fixed at $9,562,50. Alternatively, if 
DATED: July 11, 2012 
I D.Gaffuey 
St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE-STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC 




) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
) 
) 





) _______________________________ ) 
The Court's post trial briefing order set out in the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated 
5-15-12 having been complied with, the Court now takes this matter under advisement. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 20,2012. 
District Judge 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on th~ay of July, 2012, she caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
21 05 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2 
0 Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
0 Faxed 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRI2f!/ ~;~):t~~~}~'r 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BA~ CK />!Aft?: So 
****** 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba ) 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, ) 




) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM 





This action came before the Court for a two (2) day court trial commencing on May 14 
and continuing through May 15, 2012. The Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC (PMC) was represented at trial by counsel, Kent L. Hawkins and R. 
William Hancock. Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century 
Park Associates, LLC (Century Park) were represented by Michael D. Gaffney and John M. 
A vondet. At the conclusion of trial, the Court set forth a post-trial briefmg schedule. The parties 
agreed to share the cost associated with the preparation of a transcript of the trial in advance of post-
trial briefing. See Minute Entry and Order entered on May 17, 2012. The Court entered an order 
regarding remitting payment to the Court Reporter and preparation of the transcript of the trial. See 
Order entered on June 5, 2012. The parties were instructed to submit post-trial arguments along 
with their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. There were four (4) depositions which 
were submitted to the Court for its review as part of the trial record. Pursuant to stipulation of the 
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parties, the Court allowed the parties to submit their respective objections to the deposition 
testimony and corresponding exhibits in separate post-trial submissions. The Court will rule on 
these objections as part of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Memorandum Decision and 
Order. 1 
The parties submitted the requested post-trial filings in accordance with the Court's order 
and the Court took this matter under advisement. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF CASE 
This litigation involves a Ground Lease Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into 
between Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co. (Sterling).2 The 
parties' lease agreement was reduced to writing and entered into by the parties on January 27, 
1983. Although this is a lengthy and detailed agreement, the parties' dispute revolves around 
Article I of the Lease Agreement and the provisions concerning how, if at all, rent will be 
adjusted going forward. 
PMC originally filed its Verified Complaint asserting that Quail Ridge was in breach of 
contract with respect to the parties' Lease Agreement. At the summary judgment stage of this 
proceeding, PMC requested that the Court find, as a matter of law, that Quail Ridge was in 
breach of the Lease Agreement due to its failure to cooperate in the rent adjustment 
1The record should reflect that the Court was presented with the sealed original deposition of each of these witnesses: (1) Earl 
Leone Christison; (2) Guy P. Kroesche; (3) Everett N. Goodwin; (4) Christian Joseph Anton. The Court has opened and read 
these depositions and, to the extent the Court has not sustained an objection interposed by one party or the other, has relied upon 
the same in its determination of the issues before the Court. The Court should also note that as the Court commenced reading the 
Christison deposition, it inadvertently began marking up this deposition, forgetting that this was the original. The Court 
immediately discontinued this practice. However, the markings on the original deposition of Christison at page five (5) are the 
Courts. 
2PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreement. PMC is the successor in interest to the original 
"Lessor" IHC and Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to the original "Lessee" Sterling. 
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process contemplated by the Lease Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 3. PMC also requested that the Court enter summary judgment in its 
favor and declare that Quail Ridge owed PMC back rent for the years 2007 through 2011 in the 
amount of $735,187.50 and rent in the sum of $148,500.00 for 2012. Id at p. 5. PMC argued 
that this result was justified under the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' Lease 
Agreement. Quail Ridge also filed a counter-motion for summary judgment. Quail Ridge 
argued that the Court should deny PMC's motion for summary judgment and grant summary 
judgment on its behalf. Quail Ridge argued that in 2001, "the ability to adjust rent was removed 
from the parties' agreement." Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. The Court 
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment finding that the parties' Lease Agreement 
contained ambiguities that would require extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' intent, 
specifically as it related to Article I, section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. 
Numerous pre-trial motions were filed in anticipation of trial. Two (2) of these are 
procedurally significant. The first was PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint and the second was 
PMC's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certificate. PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted without objection by Quail Ridge. 
See Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. The 
Court likewise granted PMC's Motion to Enforce the Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate. 3 
PMC's Amended Complaint sought damages that were not requested in the original 
Complaint, based upon an updated appraisal. The Amended Complaint also asserted a claim for 
3Quail Ridge, in its initial Answer, demanded a jury trial as required by Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It also 
made a jury demand in its Answer to the Amended Complaint. PMC's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver was granted by the Court 
on grounds different than argued by PMC, but was nonetheless granted and the Court ordered that the trial would proceed to the 
Court rather than the jury. The basis for this determination was set forth in detail on the record on May 4, 2012. 
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declaratory relief pursuant to I.C. §10-1201 et. seq., specifically PMC sought a declaration of the 
parties' rights under Article I, section 1.3(b ). 
At the conclusion of PMC's case in chief, Century Park made a motion to be dismissed 
from these proceedings. PMC stipulated to this requested dismissal. Therefore, the Court 
granted Century Park's motion and dismissed it from this proceeding. Quail Ridge moved to 
dismiss PMC's breach of contract count. Again, PMC did not oppose this motion and the Court 
granted Quail Ridge's motion dismissing Count I of PMC's Amended Complaint. As such, the 
only remaining issue for the Court's determination is PMC's Declaratory Judgment claim against 
Quail Ridge. 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
The Court will first address the deposition testimony and the parties' respective 
objections. 
1. Deposition Testimony- Earl Leone Christison, III. 
Quail Ridge's first witness with respect to its case in chief was Earl Leone Christison, III 
(Christison). His testimony was submitted by way of deposition. PMC interposed no objection 
to any of the deposition testimony of Christison. See Plaintiff's Objections to Certain Deposition 
Testimony Admitted into Evidence (Objections to Deposition Testimony), p. I. Likewise, Quail 
Ridge made no objections to any of PMC's cross-examination. As such, the entirety of 
Christison's deposition testimony will be ADMITTED. 
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2. Deposition Testimony- Guy P. Kroescbe.4 
PMC submitted the deposition of Guy P. Kroesche (Kroesche) as part of its case 
on rebuttal. PMC submitted the following with regard to Kroesche's testimony: (1) 
During Quail Ridge's cross-examination ofKroesche the following question was asked: 
Okay. But you would agree that that language could have been easily inserted in 
the 200 1 and 2002 estoppel certificates as it had been in the 1996 certificate, right. 
Depo. Kroesche, p. 34, LL.ll-14. The propounded question does require a yes or no response. 
Further, Kroesche's response is non-responsive. Instead, he explains that typically estoppel 
certificates are not identical from transaction to transaction. However, Kroesche fails to respond 
to the specific question, that being that certain language could have easily been inserted in the 
2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates just as it had been in the 1996 certificate. Quail Ridge 
moved to strike this response as non-responsive. Id at p. 35, LL. 10-11. PMC argues Kroesche 
was entitled to explain his reasons for not being able to answer "yes" or "no." The Court will 
SUSTAIN Quail Ridge's objection and find that Kroesche's answer was non-responsive and will 
strike the same. 5 
PMC also addresses an objection made by Quail Ridge during PMC's re-direct 
examination as being beyond the scope of Quail Ridge's cross-examination. This exchange 
centered on the following questions: 
First of all, there was a question about whether if there had been a modification 
to the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement, would it have been included in the estoppel 
certificate. Can you answer that? 
4PMC withdrew any of the objections to questions asked by Quail Ridge during Kroesche's deposition. PMC's Objections to 
Deposition Testimony, p. 3. Therefore, the Court will address only those issues raised by PMC in PMC's Objections to 
Deposition Testimony. 
5The Court has crossed through that portion ofKroesche's response which has been stricken by the Court. See original Kroesche 
deposition at p. 34, LL. I 5-25, p. 35, LL.l-6. The same question is re-asked on p. 37 of Kroesche's deposition when he is asked 
"you could have, when you prepared the "01 estoppel certificate and the '02 estoppel certificate, or when you were reviewing 
them, inserted language like that found in the 1996 estoppel certificate related to the rent adjustment provision, correct?" The 
response was "[y]es, I could have put many different words in this estoppel certificate ... including I could have written that 
[referring to the language from the 1996 estoppel certificate] in as well." This response will be ADMITTED over the objections 
of counsel as stated in the deposition. 
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Kroesche Depo., p. 38, LL.5-8. The Court will OVERRULE said objection and allow 
Kroesche' s answer to stand. 
Quail Ridge reasserts all of the objections made during the course of Kroesche's 
deposition. The only objection asserted by Quail Ridge that has not been addressed above is its 
objection, on the ground that it was leading and lack of foundation, to the following question: 
[A ]re you aware that the language referred to as the adjustment language or the 
1983 lease agreement was ever modified or adjusted in any way? 
Koersche Depo. p. 12, L. 25, p. 13, LL. 1-3. The Court will OVERRULE this objection on 
both leading and foundation grounds. 
3. Deposition Testimony of Everett N. Goodwin, Jr.6 
PMC submitted the deposition of Everett N. Goodwin, Jr. (Goodwin) as part of its case 
on rebuttal. The first disputed question addressed by PMC is as follows: 
Were you aware between 1983 and 2003 that Quail Ridge or Sterling were 
making payments to the hospital? 
Goodwin Depo. p. 14, LL.9-11. Quail Ridge objects on the basis that the question is compound 
and Quail Ridge "wasn't even in the picture at this point." The Court will OVERRULE the 
objection and allow the answer to stand. Although this is a compound question, the Court, in its 
discretion, will allow the same to stand. The answer of Goodwin is not of much evidentiary 
value because it is undisputed that a lease agreement was in place and all that Goodwin's 
testimony adds to the picture is that he "assumed that lease payments were being made." See 
Goodwin Depo. p. 15, LL.5-11. The other basis for the objection is OVERULED as well 
because it fails to assert a recognizable objection, i.e. relevance, foundation, speculation etc. 
6PMC withdrew any of the objections to questions asked by Quail Ridge during Goodwin's deposition. PMC's Objections to 
Deposition Testimony, p. 4. Therefore, the Court will address only those issues raised by PMC in PMC's Objections to 
Deposition Testimony. 
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PMC next argues that Quail Ridge's objection to the following question, on leading 
grounds, should be overruled because the question is not leading: 
[a]t any time did you ever promise or make a representation to a Quail Ridge 
representative, or representatives from the Pocatello Medical Investors that you 
would waive or limit the rights under the 1983 contract to limit or increase the 
rent provision the amount of rent under that agreement? 
Goodwin Depo. p. 18, LL.15-21. The Court will OVERULE this objection and allow the 
answer to stand. 7 The Court concludes that this question is not leading because it does not 
suggest the answer. 
Quail Ridge reasserts all of the objections made during the course of Goodwin's 
deposition. The only objection asserted by Quail Ridge that has not been addressed above is its 
objection, on the ground of lack of foundation, to the following question: 
What I want to know is if during the period from 1983 to 2003 you were aware of 
this adjustment provision in the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. 
Goodwin Depo., p. 15, LL.l8-21. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. The question 
asked if Goodwin was aware of the adjustment provision found in the Lease Agreement. He 
answers that he "was not specifically aware of this arrangement." The Court will allow this 
answer. Obviously Goodwin lacks foundation to answer any further questions about the so 
called "adjustment provision" of the Lease Agreement based upon his admission, but he certainly 
can testify to what he testified in response to this question. 
7Goodwin's answer to this question was "no, sir." However, Goodwin then adds this unsolicited response "In fact, in paragraph 5 
of that document, the last sentence of that paragraph says, 'Rent has been paid through and including February 28, 1996. Under 
Section 1.3(b) of the lease, the rent shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment date, March I, 1999- 1998."' This response is 
non-responsive and will be STRICKEN by the Court. PMC's question was limited in scope to whether Goodwin ever made any 
promises or representations to Sterling or Quail Ridge. The question called for a yes or no response. Goodwin's "no, sir" 
response will be allowed; the balance is non-responsive and will be struck. The Court has crossed through the stricken portion of 
the testimony in the original deposition of Goodwin. 
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4. Deposition Testimony of Christian Joseph Anton. 
PMC submitted the deposition of Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) as part of its case on 
rebuttal. There were no objections made during the course of this deposition. PMC has not 
raised any objections to any of the testimony of Anton as part of its Objections to Deposition 
Testimony. 
Quail Ridge has raised a number of objections to Anton's deposition testimony. The first 
two (2) objections deal with the following exchange: 
[Refering to the Lease Agreement Anton is asked] Is that your signature? 
A. I see the signature. I don't know if that's my signature. 
Q. What is it that makes you question that? 
A. It looks different than the way I would be signing things today. 
Anton Depo., p. 6, LL.3-8. Counsel for Quail Ridge then asks: 
Q. Let me ask this instead, then: Do you recognize this document as something 
that you would have seen in 1983? 
A. I'm sure I did see it in 1983. 
Jd at p. 6, LL.l2-15. It is to this question and answer that Quail Ridge objects, arguing that 
there is a lack of foundation for this testimony, that it is speculative and that it assumes facts not 
evidence. 
In order for the Court to effectively rule on this objection, it must evaluate the next series 
of questions. PMC next asks: 
Q. Okay. Why are you sure? 
A. Well, if I was the Chief Executive Officer at the time, I would have been 
involved in the Ground Lease. 
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Id at p. 6, LL.16-18. Again, Quail Ridge objects on the basis that the question assumes 
facts not in evidence, lack of foundation of the witness to answer, and speculation. 
The Court will OVERRULE both objections. The answers are really of no evidentiary 
value. Anton responds generally that he is sure that he would have seen the Lease Agreement 
and the reason he believes this is that he was the CEO of PMC from 1981 through 1984. Anton 
Depo., p. 5, LL.1 0-11. This is sufficient foundation to take the matter out of the realm of 
speculation. Further, the Lease Agreement is in evidence. The balance of Anton's deposition 
establishes that he has little or no recollection, surrounding the Lease Agreement or the facts or 
circumstances leading to its creation. 
Quail Ridge next objects to the following question and answer: 
Q. Do you know what involvement he [Gerald Olson] had, if any, in the drafting 
of this Agreement? 
A. I do not, but he may have drafted the Agreement. 
!d. at p. 7, LL.6-8. Quail Ridge objects to this response as being non-responsive. The Court will 
OVERRULE as it relates to Anton's response that he does not know what involvement Olson 
may have had in drafting the Lease Agreement. The balance of the answer and the objection 
based upon non-responsiveness will be SUSTAINED. The balance of this response is 
speculative and apparently beyond Anton's personal knowledge and/or recollection. Therefore, 
it will be STRICKEN.8 
Next, Quail Ridge objects to the following exchange on the basis of vagueness, lack of 
foundation, and assumes facts not in evidence: 
Q. Do you have any recollection of that language in this Agreement at all from 
1983? 
8The Court has crossed through the portion of this response that has been stricken in the original deposition on file with the 
Court. 
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A. I don't recall any of the details of the Agreement. I do recall that we did put 
together a land lease with a group to build their psychiatric hospital facility on 
that property. 
!d. at p. 9, LL.l-6. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. Once again, the subject of the 
question, the Lease Agreement, is in evidence. The question is obviously referring to the Lease 
Agreement. As stated earlier, the fact that Anton was the CEO of the hospital at the time of the 
creation of the Lease Agreement establishes sufficient foundation to allow him to testifY 
concerning his recollection of the Lease Agreement. Unfortunately, his recollection is very 
limited, but the Court will allow his testimony to stand despite its marginal evidentiary value. 
Finally, the last objection asserted by Quail Ridge involves the following exchange: 
Q. And I'll keep reading- "The determination shall take into account the parties' 
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to 
a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre 
" 
Do you have any information as to that language in the contract? 
Again, let me make it clear I'm not asking you to tell us what you think it means 
now. 
We're looking for information at or near the time of this Agreement or during or 
anything during your term as Administrator that would shed light on that 
language. 
A. Well, I think we had -the hospital was relatively new- like a year old or so -
something in that neighborhood. So at that time we would have had a pretty good 
idea of what the land value was or the cost involved in that land. 
Again, I would assume that the percentage equated to a value that seemed 
reasonable. 
!d. at p. 11, LL. 14-25, p. 12, LL.1-8. Quail Ridge objects to this question on the basis that it is 
leading, vague, and that necessary foundation has failed to be established for Anton to testify 
regarding this matter, and that it seeks speculative testimony. The Court will OVERRULE 
Quail Ridge's objection. Certainly the question is convoluted. However, the Court does not find 
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that the call of the question, seeking Anton's understanding as the CEO of what specific 
language meant, is suggestive of an answer. It is therefore, overruled on leading grounds. The 
Court has previously found that adequate foundation has been laid, establishing Anton's status as 
CEO at the time the Lease Agreement was entered and created, to allow him to testify regarding 
his recollection of this Lease Agreement and the circumstances surrounding its creation. 
Therefore, the objection is overruled on the foundation objection. Finally, the Court overrules on 
the speculation basis. Although Anton is being asked to recall matters that occurred nearly thirty 
(30) years ago, that will go to weight. To the extent he remembers the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the Lease Agreement, his testimony will stand. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of 
Law, they are incorporated in the Court's Conclusions of Law. 
(1) PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in the state 
ofldaho. PMC's principal place of business is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. Amended 
Complaint, p. 1, ~1, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. 1, ~1. 
(2) Quail Ridge is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in 
the state of Idaho. Quail Ridge's principal place ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland 
Tennessee. Amended Complaint, p. 2, ~2, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. 1, ~1. 
(3) Quail Ridge operates an assisted living center located in Pocatello, Idaho. The 
assisted living center is located on a 4.25 acre piece of real property which is currently owned by 
PM C. 
( 4) The building from which the assisted living center is run and operated is owned by 
Quail Ridge. 
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(5) PMC and Quail Ridge are successors in interest to a certain Ground Lease 
Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into on January 27, 1983. 
( 6) The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between IHC and Sterling whereby 
IHC leased 4.25 acres of real property, as Lessor, to Sterling, as Lessee. 
(7) PMC is the successor in interest to IHC and Bannock County as it relates to the Lease 
Agreement and occupies the role as lessor. Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to Sterling 
and occupies the role of lessee. 
(8) The Lease Agreement is for a thirty (30) year term of years commencing on February 
1, 1983 and concluding on January 31, 2013. However, the Lease Agreement provides for one 
( 1) ten ( 1 0) year option to extend the term of the lease. This option is to be exercised, if at all, by 
"giving Lessor written notice ... not later than 120 days prior to the expiration date of the 
Term."9 (Lease Agreement, p. 2, §1.2) 
(9) The Lease Agreement also provides that rent shall be paid on an annual basis as 
follows: 
An initial annual rental [sic] shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years 
from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the 
rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre. 10 
(Lease Agreement, pp. 2-3, § 1.3(a)). 
(1 0) The total acreage of leased land was 4.25 acres. Therefore, the annual rent for the 
first three (3) years of the Lease Agreement was $9,562.50. 
9The option appears to be personal to Sterling. However, this does not appear to be an issue between the parties, despite the fact 
that there was no evidence at trial concerning the personal nature of the option and the option having been exercised, the parties 
seem to agree that the option has been exercised, that it is assignable to Quail Ridge, and that the Lease Agreement is and will be 
in place through January 31, 2023. This state of affairs seems to be further confirmed by the Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certificate entered in 2001 where the parties state that the Lease Agreement has been extended through and including January 31, 
2023. Therefore, these issues will not be addressed or considered by the Court. 
10The Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement is defined as the I st day of February, 1983, or on or before thirty (30) days 
after a building permit is issued whichever is later. See Lease Agreement, p.2, § 1.2. No evidence has been introduced regarding 
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$15,000.00 
__ ....:,.:4.=2::::....5 (acres) 
$63,750.00 
x .15 (percent) 
$ 9,562.50 
( 11) The Lease Agreement also calls for periodic adjustments to the annual rent amount. 
This periodic adjustment is to occur every three (3) years from the Commencement Date of the 
Lease Agreement. See footnote 10. Therefore, the first date for adjustment of the annual rent 
was February 1, 1986. (Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b )). 
(12) The Lease Agreement contains a lengthy discussion concerning the rent adjustment. 
It begins as follows: 
The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable rent 
adjustment date shall be a conclusive determination between the parties of the fair 
market value for the period to which the adjustment applies. 
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §1.3(b)). 
(13) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever reached such a written agreement 
with respect to the first three (3) year rent adjustment period or any subsequent three (3) year 
rent adjustment period. Further, the parties freely admit that there has not been any such written 
agreement. 
( 14) The Lease Agreement next provides: 
If the parties have not so agreed by the applicable adjustment date, the 
determination shall be made as in the paragraph on Arbitration in Article 13. 
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §1.3(b)). [Bold Emphasis Supplied by the Court]. 
issuance of a building permit. Therefore, the Court, for purposes of discussion in these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Memorandum Decision and Order, will use February I, 1983 as the Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement. 
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(15) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever submitted this matter to arbitration 
as mandated in the Lease Agreement. Further, the parties freely admit that there has not been 
b. II any attempt to ar Itrate. 
( 16) The Lease Agreement next provides that in arriving at the adjusted rent every three 
(3) years, the parties should consider the following: 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent [sic] of the 
fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the 
premise. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the highest and 
best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the 
leasehold into account. The determination shall take into account the parties' 
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to 
a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre 
and shall also take into account any determinations of market value made under 
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent 
adjustment date. 
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §1.3(b)). 
( 17) The evidence at trial established that the parties have never followed the provisions 
contained in the Lease Agreement to effectuate an adjustment in the rent. 
(18) Finally, the Lease Agreement provides that "if the determination of adjusted rent is 
made after the applicable rent adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate 
applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined." (Lease Agreement, p. 3, 
§ 1.3(b)). 
(19) Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's designated representative at trial, testified that 
Quail Ridge has paid rent, annually, in the original and unadjusted amount of $9,562.50 and is 
current on its annual obligation. 
11 When the Court inquired of the parties concerning this matter they both advised the Court that they were waiving this 
requirement of the Lease Agreement. The Court relied upon what the Court determined to be a mandatory arbitration provision 
when it granted PMC's motion requesting that Quail Ridge be denied its jury demand. 
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(20) In 1996, an entity known as Pocatello Medical Investors (PMI) began to operate the 
facility located on the leasehold estate, having become a subtenant of Sterling. Richard Faulkner 
testified that Sterling, having decided that it no longer wished to operate a psychiatric hospital on 
the leasehold, invited PMI to covert the facility into an assisted living center. In doing so, PMI 
was created and entered into a sublease with Sterling as it related to the building located on the 
leasehold and owned by Sterling. 
(21) On February 27, 1996 IHC, PMC's predecessorin interest, signed a document titled 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate (1996 Estoppel Certificate). This 1996 Estoppel 
Certificate attached and incorporated the Lease Agreement. 12 The 1996 Estoppel Certificate also 
acknowledged IHC' s consent to the sublease of the leasehold from Sterling, tenant or lessee, to 
IHC as subtenant or sublessee. Apparently the 1996 Estoppel Certificate also made IHC aware 
of the fact that the sublease contained a purchase option on the building located on the 
leasehold. 13 (1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~1 ). 
(22) The 1996 Estoppel Certificate also acknowledges that Sterling has not been in 
default nor is it currently in default. (1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~4). 
(23) The 1996 Estoppel Certificate also articulates the current amount of the annual rent 
under the Lease Agreement as follows: 
Under the Lease [Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent currently at the 
rate of NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 
50/XX CENTS ($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and including 
February 28, 1996. Under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease [Agreement], the rent 
shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment date, March 1, 1998. 
(1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~5). [Bold Emphasis added by the Court]. 
12 Although the 1996 Estoppel Certificate references "any and all amendments and modifications," no modifications to the lease 
were attached to the 1996 Estoppel Certificate produced as an exhibit at trial nor was there any testimony concerning a 
modification or amendment to the Lease Agreement. 
13The 1996 Estoppel Certificate purports to attach as an exhibit the Sublease and Purchase Option. This exhibit was not part of 
the 1996 Estoppel Certificate introduced as an exhibit at trial. 
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(24) Finally, the 1996 Estoppel Certificate provides that the "Landlords consent to the 
Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord of Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or (b) excuse Tenant's 
performance of any term or condition of the Lease [Agreement]." (1996 Estoppel Certificate, 
,;1 0). 
(25) No evidence was introduced that IHC attempted to proceed with the three (3) year 
annual rent adjustment in 1998 as referenced by the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. 14 
(26) Between 1996 and 2001 the relationship between the parties and Lease Agreement 
remained static. IHC was the Lessor, Sterling was the Lessee, and PMI was the Sub-tenant or 
Sub-Lessee. In 2001, the relationships changed. 
(27) Sometime between 1996 and 2001, Sterling determined that it wanted to sell the 
building located on the leasehold and Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their 
personal guarantees associated with the financing of the building located on the leasehold. 
Likewise, PMI wanted to purchase this building. 
(28) Richard Faulkner testified that for a number of reasons, not particularly germane to 
this litigation, in order to facilitate the transaction between Sterling and PMI wherein PMI would 
purchase the building located on the leasehold, a new entity was created. This entity was Quail 
Ridge Medical Investors (Quail Ridge). Quail Ridge then purchased the building located on the 
leasehold from Sterling and PMI continued on as a subtenant of Quail Ridge. 
(29) Richard Faulkner testified that the transaction was complex and involved a number 
of parties (IHC, Sterling, Quail Ridge, PMI, and the Public Employee Retirement System of 
14The only evidence introduced at trial regarding a demand by IHC or any of its successors in interest was in October of 2009 
when PMC made a demand for a rent adjustment which led to the present controversy and litigation. 
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Idaho (PERSI), 15 as well as the negotiation and preparation of a number of legal documents. He 
testified that this process took the better part of one (1) year. Richard Faulkner testified that 
during the course of this year long process, no one generally, and specifically Guy Kroesche, the 
attorney representing IHC, brought up or discussed modifying the rent or the rent adjustment 
provision of the Lease Agreement. 
(30) On June 1, 2001, representatives of IHC, Sterling, Quail Ridge, PMI and PERSI all 
signed a document titled Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate (200 1 Estoppel Certificate). 
(31) Richard Faulkner, counsel for Quail Ridge, drafted the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. 
Guy Kroesche was involved in this process, representing IHC. He was sent drafts of all 
documents involving this transaction generally and specifically all drafts of the 2001 Estoppel 
Certificate. Guy Kroesche reviewed different versions of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and 
made suggestions for revisions to the same which were incorporated into the final version. 
(32) The 2001 Estoppel Certificate provides as follows: 
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in 
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. Except as otherwise 
referenced herein, the Lease [Agreement] constitutes the only agreement of any 
kind or nature between the Landlord [IHC] and the Tenant [Sterling] relating to 
the Demised Premises. The Landlord is the current holder of all of the lessor's 
right, title and interest under the Lease [Agreement]. 
(2001 Estoppel Certificate, ~2). [Bold Emphasis Supplied by the Court]. 
(33) The 2001 Estoppel Certificate also acknowledges that Sterling has not been in 
default nor is it currently in default. (2001 Estoppel Certificate, ~4). 
(34) The 2001 Estoppel Certificate also articulates the amount of the annual rent under 
the Lease Agreement as follows: 
15PERSI's involvement was that of lender. Sterling's original financing for the building situated on the leasehold was through 
PERSI. As part of the overall transaction between Sterling and Quail Ridge, Quail Ridge was going to assume the loan made to 
Sterling by PERSI. 
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Under the Lease [Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent at the rate of 
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 
FIFTY CENTS ($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and 
including FEBRUARY 28,2001. 
(200 1 Estoppel Certificate, ,5). This provision contains two (2) dramatic alterations from the 
1996 Estoppel Certificate. First the 1996 Estoppel Certificate states that Sterling (the Tenant) "is 
obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." The term "currently" has 
been deleted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and reads Sterling (the Tenant) "is obligated to 
pay rent at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." Further, while the 1996 Estoppel Certificate 
provides that "under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease [Agreement], the rent shall be adjusted on the 
next rent adjustment date"; this language is glaringly absent from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. 
(35) Richard Faulkner discusses, from his perspective and that of Quail Ridge, why the 
language of 2001 Estoppel Certificate differs from the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. At trial, the 
following dialogue occurred: 
Q. If you'lllook at exhibit 228 [2001 Estoppel Certificate] again, going back to 
paragraph five, it says that "under the lease tenant is obligated to pay rent at the 
current rate of $9,562.50 per annum. The rent has been paid through and 
including February 281h, 2001." 
Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that appears in the '96 estoppel 
certificate is not in this certificate here? 
A. That's correct. I did not include it in the first draft. 
Q. And why was that left out? 
A. Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for 
the five years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment 
mechanism had never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling 
Development Group and understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our 
involvement no one had ever raised the section of the rent adjustment in order to 
increase or change the rent. So I wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that 
that had been waived. 
Faulkner Trial Testimony, p. 165, LL.22-25, p. 166, LL.1-17. 
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(36) The 200 1 Estoppel Certificate also contained the language that was present in the 
1996 Estoppel Certificate that reads as follows: 
Landlord's consent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be 
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or 
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tenants performance of any 
term or condition of the Lease [Agreement], or (b) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord to any rights, under the Lease [Agreement], including without 
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement. 
2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,-r1 0. 
(37) One of the conditions attached to IHC's willingness to sign the 2001 Estoppel 
Certificate was that Forrest Preston, a principal of Quail Ridge, sign a personal guarantee of the 
"payment and performance of any and all obligations of ... [Quail Ridge] and/or ... [PMI], under 
the 'Ground Lease' and the 'Sublease' .... " (2001 Estoppel Certificate, p. 7). 
(38) Richard Faulkner testified that in reliance upon its perception that IHC had waived 
or modified the three (3) year adjustment provision of the Lease Agreement, it entered into the 
transaction, paid off several million dollars in debt associated with the building located on the 
leasehold and made significant improvements and renovations to the building located on the 
leasehold. 
(39) Not once during the term of the Lease Agreement from 1983 through 2009 did 
either party request that the rent be adjusted in accordance with section 1.3(b) of the Lease 
Agreement. Don Wadle, vice-president of clinical support at PMC, testified that while he was 
conducting a review of the Lease Agreement, he understood, attributing this understanding to a 
statement of Cal Northam, that the annual rent adjustments had been overlooked due to a mistake 
on the part of its predecessors in interest. 16 
16Mr. Northam was not called as a witness, but neither was this statement objected to by Quail Ridge on hearsay or evidentiary 
grounds. 
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(40) In 2009, shortly after PMC acquired and became successor in interest to the Lease 
Agreement, as part of its larger purchase of the hospital operated and known as Portneuf Medical 
Center, Don Wadle was asked to review the Lease Agreement. He was informed that a previous 
adjustment had not taken place and asked to determine the appropriateness of making an 
adjustment to the annual rent. 
( 41) Don Wadle determined that an adjustment to the annual rent would be appropriate 
and that there was a process in the Lease Agreement to obtain an adjustment. 
(42) In 2009, PMC began the process of having the 4.25 acre leasehold appraised and 
following the appraisal PMC made Quail Ridge aware of its intent to increase the annual rent in 
accordance with the Lease Agreement. 
(43) At trial Brad Janoush, a principal with Integra Realty Resources in Boise, Idaho 
testified regarding the market value of the 4.25 acres of property which is the subject of the 
Lease Agreement. 
(44) Mr. Janoush was admitted to testify at trial as an expert real estate appraiser and 
consultant. 
(45) Mr. Janoush opined, after discussing his methodology, that the 4.25 acres of 
property that are the subject of the leasehold had a value of$1,080,000 on January 27, 2007. He 
further testified that on January 27, 2010, the value of this 4.25 acre leasehold had declined in 
value from the January 27, 2007 date to $990,000Y 
( 46) Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) testified, by way of deposition introduced at trial, 
that he "assumed" that the $15,000 per acre figure utilized by the parties as the "fair market 
17PMC has argued that the applicable modification date is January 23. The Court is not sure where this date comes from. The 
copy of the Lease Agreement admitted into evidence at trial reflects a signature date of January 27, 1983. However, the Lease 
Agreement itself provides that the applicable date for the rent adjustment is February I. See Court's Findings of Fact Number 9 
and footnote I 0. 
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value" of the 4.25 acres was arrived at because IHC had "pretty good idea of what the land value 
was or the cost involved in the land, because the hospital was "relatively new -like a year old or 
so." 
( 4 7) Christison, former CEO/administrator at IHC from 1989 through 2000 testified that 
during his tenure he undertook an extensive review of the hospital's operation. He testified as 
follows: 
[I] went through all of our operational strategies and told everyone that we were 
going to re-evaluate how we did business. And in a two-hospital town and kind 
of breaking through everything that we did, we went through every existing 
contract and every operational way in which we did business, and we would have 
gone through every one of our contracts from top to bottom and either 
renegotiated them or re-evaluated how they existed, and I'm sure without a doubt 
that this contract would have been re-evaluated on a local level and on a corporate 
level. 
( 48) Christison also testified that he had no specific recollection of the Lease Agreement 
itself or any discussions regarding the Lease Agreement or decisions concerning whether or not 
to seek an adjustment. He did testified that he believes that the $15,000 per acre figure was 
initially high and that its "value never was at 15 [fifteen thousand dollars per acre] ... we always 
saw it as much less than what the original value was when we purchased it or used this as a base 
number." Christison Depo., p. 12, LL.l-4. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
To the extent that any of the Court's Conclusions of Law are deemed to be Findings of Fact, 
they are incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact. 
(I) Idaho Code §10-1201 provides as follows: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either 
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affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
(2) Idaho Code §I 0-1202 provides as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
[Bold Emphasis Added by the Court] 
(3) Finally, Idaho Code §10-1203 provides as follows: 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof. 
( 4) Pursuant to the foregoing, the Court has authority and jurisdiction to declare the rights 
of PMC and Quail Ridge as the successors in interest to the Lease Agreement. 
(5) In 1983, IHC and Sterling entered into a legally binding and valid Lease Agreement 
whereby Sterling leased 4.25 acres of property from IHC. 
(6) PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreement. PMC is 
the Lessor and Quail Ridge is the Lessee. 
(7) In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 
(2005), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed contract interpretation, in doing so it stated as follows: 
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent 
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found 
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject 
to conflicting interpretations. 
(8) This Court, upon review of the Lease Agreement concludes that section 1.3(b) of the 
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Lease Agreement is ambiguous, in part. The Court concludes that the balance section 1.3 is clear 
and unambiguous. Specifically, the Court concludes that sections 1.1, 1.2 and lJ(a) are clear and 
unambiguous. 
(9) As such, the unambiguous provisions of the Lease Agreement will be given their clear 
and plain meaning. Section 1.1 of the Lease Agreement creates a lease relative to the 4.25 acre 
leasehold: IHC as the lessor and Sterling as the lessee. 
(1 0) Section 1.2 of the Lease Agreement creates the term of the lease. The lease, by its 
initial terms, is a thirty (30) year lease, with an option, personal to Sterling, to extend the lease one 
(1) time for an additional ten (10) year period. The parties appear to have agreed to allow the 
personal option to be assigned to Quail Ridge and appear to agree that the option has been 
exercised. See footnote 9 to the Court's Findings of Fact. As such, the lease term runs through 
January 31, 2023. 
(11) The Court also concludes that section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement is clear and 
unambiguous. It provides rent shall be paid annually under the terms of the Lease Agreement. The 
annual rent is to be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent (15%) of the value of the lease hold. 
The parties expressly agreed that for the first three (3) years of the Lease Agreement, effective 
February 1, 1983, the agreed upon value of the property would be Fifteen Thousand Dollars 
($15,000.00) per acre. Therefore, the initial annual rent was $9,562.50. 
(12) The Court also concludes that first paragraph of section 1.3(b) is clear and 
unambiguous. This provision provides that the annual rent shall be adjusted every three (3) 
years, beginning on the Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement. This Court has 
determined that the Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement was February 1, 1983. See 
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footnote 10 to the Court's Findings of Fact. Therefore, the Lease Agreement called for 
adjustments to the annual rent on the following dates: 
February 1, 1986 
February 1, 1989 
February 1, 1992 
February 1, 1995 
February 1, 1998 
February 1, 2001 
February 1, 2004 
February I, 2007 
February 1, 2010 
It also calls for adjustments to the annual rent on the following prospective dates: 
February 1, 2013 
February 1, 2016 
February 1, 2019 
February 1, 2022 
(13) No adjustment to the annual rent under the Lease Agreement was effectuated pursuant 
to the terms of the Lease Agreement between 1986 and 2010. Further, no party to the Lease 
Agreement even attempted to adjust the annual rent until September and October of 2009 when 
PMC attempted to invoke section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement to effectuate a modification in the 
annual rent amount. 
(14) The Court concludes that the second paragraph of section 1.3(b) is clear and 
unambiguous. It provides the procedure whereby the rent adjustment process is implemented. It 
allows for the parties to negotiate and submit by way of ''written agreement" their agreement 
concerning the "fair market value" of the 4.25 acre leasehold for the upcoming three (3) year 
adjustment period. This period in which the parties are to negotiate and arrive at an agreed upon 
"fair market value" of the 4.25 acre leasehold is to occur within ninety (90) days of rent adjustment 
date. If the parties are successful in this endeavor, their agreed upon value is "a conclusive 
determination ... of fair market value for the period to which the adjustment applies." If the parties 
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are unable to arrive at an agreed fair market value of the leasehold, the parties are required to submit 
the matter to arbitration in accordance with the section of the Lease Agreement dealing with 
Arbitration, Article 13. 18 
(15) Finally, the first sentence of paragraph 3 of section 1.3(b) is clear and unambiguous. It 
provides that adjusted annual rent for the next three (3) year period will be fifteen percent (15%) of 
the fair market value of the lease hold, exclusive of improvements on the leasehold. As such, the 
same formula utilized in creating the original annual rent remained in place. The only variable was 
the determination of a fair market value to be determined either by an agreement of the parties or by 
the arbitration process. 
( 16) However, at this point the Court concludes that an ambiguity arises in the Lease 
Agreement. The Court concludes that the balance of the third paragraph of section 1.3(b) is 
ambiguous on its face. The Court, in reviewing this specific language and applying the plain and 
clear meaning of the verbiage, cannot determine what the parties' intent was at the time the contract 
was negotiated and entered in 1983. The ambiguous portion of section 1.3(b) paragraph 3 provides 
as follows: 
Determination of fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the 
land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into 
account. The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the 
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of 
Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also to take 
into account any determinations of market value made under this lease for the 
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. 
(I 7) When provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is 
a question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties. Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc. 
18This Court has previously held that despite the fact that arbitration under Article 13 appears to be optional, based upon the 
"shall" language in section l.3(b), arbitration is mandatory with respect to the rent adjustment provisions set forth in 1.3(b). 
Arbitration may be optional with respect to other disputes which arise under the Lease Agreement, but it is mandatory with 
respect to disputes arising out of the operation ofthe three (3) year rent adjustment. 
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v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 224 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2009). "The 
determination of a parties' intent with respect to a contract provision 'is to be determined by 
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstances under 
which it was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any construction 
placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus, 
151 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011). 
( 18) The Court concludes that "fair market value" is a term of art in the legal and real estate 
fields. Black's Law Dictionary defines fair market value as "the price that a seller is willing to 
accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." Black's 
Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition. In Logan v. Grand Junction Associates, 111 Idaho 670, 671, 726 
P.2d 782 783 (Ct.App.l986), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a case where the trial court 
applied a nearly identical definition of fair market value (the legal definition of fair market value is 
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller). Although the Idaho Court of Appeals did not 
rule on the correctness of this definition, neither did it indicate that this was not the correct 
definition. Rather, it reversed the trial judge on the basis that the methodology it applied in arriving 
at fair market value was in error. Brad Janoush, PMC's real estate appraiser expert, testified that 
fair market value is an antiquated term that was created and used back in the 1980's. He testified 
that the term now used is "market value." He defined market value as "the property's most 
probable sales price." He further testified that although the term "fair market value" "is hardly ever 
used currently, [it] ... may be thought of as being synonymous with market value." 
(19) The Court concludes that these two (2) definitions of market value and fair market 
value are consistent and appear to be manageable definitions for the rent adjustment provision of the 
Lease Agreement if standing alone. However, they are not left standing alone. 
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(20) The Lease Agreement goes on to complicate the analysis by including the qualifYing 
phrases: ( 1) "determination of fair market value shall be based on highest and best use of the land 
... without taking the leasehold into account"; (2) "the determination [of fair market value] shall 
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage 
applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre"; and 
(3) "and shall also take into account any previous determinations of market value made under this 
lease." 
(21) The Court determines that these qualifYing phrases make the process of arriving at 
market value or fair market value uncertain, vague and ambiguous. There is a scarcity of evidence 
concerning how the fifteen thousand dollar per acre figure was arrived at. The only evidence 
introduced at trial was Anton's testimony that he "assumed" the fifteen thousand dollar per acre 
figure was derived from the price per acre paid by the hospital when it purchased the property a few 
years previous. However, this is countered, to some extent, by Christison's testimony that IHC 
never believed the value of the property to be fifteen thousand per acre. As such, the Court is left to 
wonder whether the original determination of fifteen thousand dollars per acre was based upon a 
market value determination, or whether Sterling was being given a discount from fair market value 
as an incentive to lease a barren piece of property adjacent to the hospital, or whether Sterling paid a 
premium, more than fair market value, in order to get in on the ground floor, so to speak, on a 
location that would grow, develop, and appreciate around the hospital, but at present, did not 
possess the value of fifteen thousand dollars per acre. 
(22) There is also a paucity of evidence concerning a course of dealing between these 
parties or their predecessors in interest concerning their course of dealings. It appears to this Court 
that the Lease Agreement was poorly managed by IHC and its immediate predecessor, Bannock 
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County, and forgotten in its entirety except at times when ownership changed hands. It appears that 
there was no course of dealing between IHC and Sterling as well as their successors dealing directly 
with the three (3) year adjustment provision. Christison's testimony seems to intimate that IHC 
never sought a rent adjustment because it determined that the value of the leasehold acreage had not 
increased in value. Therefore, an adjustment process would have resulted in no change in the 
annual rent or a decrease. However, good management practices and compliance with the Lease 
Agreement would have required that they advise Sterling that they did not believe the value of the 
leasehold justified an increase in rent rather than just ignoring or forgetting about the rent 
adjustment provision. 
(23) As stated in Beus v. Beus, supra, under Idaho law the parties' intent is to be determined 
by the express language of the document and reviewing the document as a whole. This is an issue 
of law. If there are ambiguities, then it becomes a question of fact concerning the intent of the 
parties. In ascertaining that intent, the fact finder may consider extrinsic evidence touching upon the 
parties' intent. In this case, the Court is the finder of fact. In discerning the intent of the parties, by 
way of extrinsic or parol evidence, the Court can consider the circumstances under which the 
Lease Agreement was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any 
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings. 
Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011) (Beus). 
(24) As stated and discussed above, there is almost no credible or relevant evidence on 
these issues. The Court, in researching this issue, can find no controlling case law in Idaho that 
discusses how the Court should proceed when the record is entirely lacking extrinsic evidence of 
prior course of dealings and/or the parties' original intent. 
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(25) However, the Court will proceed on the limited record that exists. The first 
component of ambiguity deals with the fact that the parties expressed a desire that the value of 
the 4.25 acre leasehold and its corresponding rent be based upon the "highest and best use of the 
land on the applicable adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account." The Court 
interprets the "without taking the leasehold into account" to be a restatement of the provision that 
fair market value shall be determined based upon "the market value of the leased land without 
improvements." Janoush testified that the highest and best use of this 4.25 acres of property 
would be "a medical office" or a business with a "medically related special purpose." Janoush 
further testified in conducting his market value assessment, he did so taking into account the 
Lease Agreement's language that the valuation be "exclusive of improvements." 
(26) The Court will give no weight to the language contained in the Lease Agreement 
that when adjusting the rent "the determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that 
the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre." The reason the Court will give no weight 
to this language is that there has been no credible evidence which this Court accepts concerning 
whether this $15,000.00 dollar per acre figure was the result of a market analysis conducted by 
the parties in 1983, or whether it was a figure higher or lower than market value as discussed in 
the Court's Conclusion of Law number 21. 19 
(27) Likewise, the Court concludes that there is no course of dealings between the parties 
to assist the Court in determining what construction the parties placed upon this provision of the 
Lease Agreement by observing and construing their conduct or dealings. The crux of the matter 
19ln arriving at this conclusion, the Court is mindful of the fact that there was some evidence on this point Anton testified that he 
"assumed" that the $15,000 dollar per acre value was tied to IHC's recent purchase of property in which to operate the hospital. 
Christison testified that he thought the $15,000 dollar per acre value was high. The Court finds both of these individuals 
testimony on this issue to be lacking in credibility. Both testified that they had no specific recollection of the Lease Agreement, 
its creation, terms or execution. 
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is that there were no course of dealing for the following reasons: (1) Sterling, and later Quail 
Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of speaking if Sterling or Quail 
Ridge "rocked the boat" they had nothing to gain and only increased rent to lose if they initiated 
a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) IHC and Bannock County, through poor 
management and/or having forgotten about the rent adjustment provisions, never sought a rent 
d. 20 a JUstment. 
(28) Therefore: (1) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen 
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to establish a 
course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to the language 
related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions of the Lease 
Agreement. 21 
(29) The Court will apply the current market value to the 4.25 acres of property which 
make up the leasehold. The Court accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current market 
value ofthe 4.25 acres, exclusive of improvements, as ofFebruary 1, 2007 as being $1,080,000. 
The Court further accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current market value of the 4.25 
acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February 1, 2010 as being $990,000. 
(30) In 2009, when PMC attempted to invoke section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement for 
purposes of modifYing the annual rent, PMC had become the successor in interest to the original 
20 Again the Court recognizes that Christison testified that he reviewed all of IHC's executor contracts and that during his tenure 
no increase in rent was sought because he believed that the value in the property was not there to support a rent increase. While 
this may be an accurate state of affairs during Christison's tenure at IHC, 1989 through 2000; as Janoush 's testimony established, 
in recent years, this area, east of 1-15, has become a hot-bed of commercial development in Pocatello, Idaho. For these reasons, 
the Court concludes that there is no course of dealing with respect to IHC and Bannock County in their capacity as lessors due 
solely to mismanagement and the fact that the provisions of the Lease Agreement were forgotten on two (2) occasions in 1983 
after the Lease Agreement was created and in 1996 after IHC agreed to PM! becoming a subtenant. 
21 Certainly these factors may play a role in future rent adjustments under the Lease Agreement, but there is no evidence in the 
record to allow them to play a role in the adjustment process this Court is being asked to consider as part of the declaratory 
judgment proceeding. For example, if the parties were, by written agreement, able to agree to rent adjustment that was based on 
a value less than 15% of market value as that term was defined by Janoush or Black's Law Dictionary, that would certainly be a 
relevant course of dealing evidence going forward. 
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lessor, IHC. Similarly, Quail Ridge had become successor in interest to the original lessee, Sterling. 
Quail Ridge resisted these efforts and litigation ensued. 
(31) Pursuant to Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court concludes that the value of 
the 4.25 acres for purposes of the 2007 rent adjustment should have been calculated at $254,117.65 
per acre, the total value of the 4.25 acre leasehold being $1,080,000.00. Therefore, had the rent 
adjustment been properly invoked in 2007, the annual rent in calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009 
should have been $162,000.00. The total rent for this three (3) year period should have been 
$486,000.00. 
(32) Pursuant to Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court concludes that the value of 
the 4.25 acres for purposes of the 2010 rent adjustment should have been calculated at $232,941.18 
per acre, the total value of the 4.25 acre leasehold being $990,000.00. Therefore, had the rent 
adjustment been properly invoked in 2010, the annual rent in calendar years 2010, 2011, and 2012 
should have been $148,500.00. The total rent for this three (3) year period should have been 
$445,500.00. 
(3 3) Quail Ridge has argued that the Lease Agreement entered into in 1983 was modified in 
2001 as part of the restructure testified to by Faulkner and addressed in the Court's Findings ofFact 
numbers 27 through 38. 
(34) The Court rejects Quail Ridge's contention that the parties modified the terms of the 
Lease Agreement as it related to future adjustments. The issue of a modification to an existing 
contract was recently discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 152 
Idaho 531, _, 272 P.3d 503, 508 (2012) (Watkins). The Supreme Court stated as follows regarding 
modifications to existing contracts: 
[t]his Court has recognized that a contract may be modified by mutual consent. 
Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. v. Larsen, 38 Idaho 290, 293, 362 P.2d 384, 385 
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( 1961 ). As with all modifications, the terms of a contract cannot be altered by 
one party without the other party's approval. !d. at 296, 362 P.2d at 386. 
Additionally, the minds ofthe parties must meet as to the proposed modification. 
!d. "The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in 
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one 
party in accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other." !d. 
Whether an alleged modification is proven "is one for the trier of the facts to 
decide." Res. Eng'g, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935,938, 500 P.2d 836, 839 (1972). 
This Court, as the finder of fact, determines that the evidence at trial does not support a finding by 
this Court of a modification to the terms of the Lease Agreement. Both the 1996 Estoppel 
Certificate and the 2001 Estoppel Certificate recite as follows: 
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in 
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. The Lease constitutes the 
only agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord and the Tenant relating 
in any way to the Demised Premises. 
1996 Lease Agreement, ,2 and 2001 Lease Agreement, ,2. Both the 1996 Estoppel Certificate and 
the 2001 Estoppel Certificate also provided as follows: 
Landlord's consent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be 
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or 
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tenants performance of any 
term or condition of the Lease [Agreement], or (b) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord to any rights, under the Lease [Agreement], including without 
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement. 
1996 Estoppel Certificate, ,1 0, and 2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,1 0. 
(35) The only evidence in the record regarding the modification of the Lease Agreement is 
the subjective intent of Faulkner. Faulkner testified as the individual drafting the 2001 Estoppel 
Certificate that he purposefully left out certain language that existed in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate 
because he "wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that that had been waived." The Court 
would suggest that removing language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing 
the same or making the other party aware of its deletion does not establish "mutual assent." In fact, 
some might question the propriety of such conduct. The Court finds that this unilateral act of 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 32 
197 
Faulkner does not establish a modification. Rather as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Beus, 
supra, "a party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a contract." 
151 Idaho at 238. 
(36) The Court is aware that the Watkins case discusses the fact that a modification to a 
contract may be "implied from a course of conduct in accordance with its existence [a 
modification] and assent may be implied from the acts of one party in accordance with the terms 
of a change proposed by the other." However, this Court, as the finder of fact, has concluded 
that IHC and Bannock County as the lessor, acted in a manner that demonstrated poor 
management and oversight of the Lease Agreement. Furthermore, this Court finds that this poor 
management and oversight resulted in the lessor forgetting that the Lease Agreement contained a 
rent adjustment provision. However, the Court does not conclude that conduct or lack thereof by 
IHC and Bannock County amounted to a modification in the terms of the Lease Agreement and 
its rent adjustment provisions. 
(37) Quail Ridge also asserts that IHC and/or Bannock County effectively waived the 
rent adjustment provision contained in the Lease Agreement. The Court, for the same reasons 
addressed with respect to its conclusion that there was not a modification to the Lease 
Agreement, concludes that there was not a waiver by IHC or Bannock County of the right in the 
Lease Agreement to pursue adjustments in the rent every three (3) years. The Court further notes 
that the very document that Quail Ridge relies upon to support both its waiver and modification 
claims, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate, expressly states that Landlords consent to the sublease 
does not act as a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or obligations under the 
Lease Agreement or excuse Tenants performance of any term or condition of the Lease 
Agreement. 
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(38) The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the doctrine of waiver in Knipe Land 
Co. v. Robertsen, 151 Idaho 449, 457-58, 259 P.3d 595,603-04 (2011). In doing so, it stated as 
follows: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his 
detriment." Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006) 
(internal quotation omitted). "Waiver is foremost a question of intent." Seaport 
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736,739,735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.1987). 
A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established. 
Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 
(1993). "Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." /d. 
(39) As the Court previously ruled with respect to Quail Ridge's claim of contract 
modification, the Court, as the finder of fact, finds no facts to support the claim that IHC or 
Bannock County voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right. Rather, what the Court has 
found is that IHC and Bannock County, through poor management and oversight, neglected 
and/or forgot about the rent adjustment provision of the Lease Agreement. Such conduct does 
not establish the requisite intent to voluntarily waive the rent adjustment provision of the Lease 
Agreement. 
( 40) Finally, Quail Ridge asserts that the Court should apply the equitable doctrine of 
laches to the rent adjustment provisions and not allow PMC to modify the rent either 
retroactively or prospectively. The Court will accept Quail Ridge's laches defense in part and 
finds it to be inapplicable in part. 
(41) In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 
(2002), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the defense of laches. In addressing this affirmative 
defense, the Supreme Court noted that the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proving 
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the same and that the defense is a question of fact. The Court also set forth the elements of this 
defense: 
( 1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of 
knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury or 
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is 
not held to be barred. 
(42) The Court hereby determines that as it relates to any attempt by PMC to obtain an 
adjustment to the annual rent retroactive to February 1, 2007, the rent adjustment date under the 
Lease Agreement, that attempt is barred by the doctrine of laches as well as the express terms of 
the Lease Agreement. However, the Court feels the better basis to deny PMC's attempt to 
retroactively obtain a rent adjustment for 2007, 2008, and 2009 is the express terms of the Lease 
Agreement itself. The Lease Agreement contemplates a process to modify the Lease Agreement 
prospectively. It requires that the parties attempt to work out an adjustment in advance of the 
rent adjustment date, February 1 of every third year. This attempt must be made within ninety 
(90) days of the rent adjustment date. However, if a rent adjustment is not mutually agreed to 
within this ninety (90) day window, the parties are required to pursue arbitration. 
(43) First, PMC did not even request a rent adjustment during the ninety (90) day 
window required by the Lease Agreement. Therefore, the mandatory arbitration provision was 
never activated. Although there is no discussion of when the arbitration must be commenced, 
the Court concludes that it must be initiated in a reasonable period of time. Although the Court 
does not need to conclude what a reasonable time is in this context, a reasonable period of time 
would seem to be thirty (30) to sixty (60) days. Under no view of the facts is nearly three (3) 
years a reasonable period oftime. PMC did not initiate an appraisal until September of 2007 and 
did not notify Quail Ridge of its intent to invoke the rent adjustment provision of the Lease 
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Agreement until October of 2009. This was two (2) years and over seven (7) months into the 
current rent adjustment period. This was not reasonable, nor was it compliant with the express 
provisions of the Lease Agreement, nor was it reasonable to expect Quail Ridge to have its 
annual rent adjusted two (2) years and seven (7) plus months into the current period. 
(44) However, the Court does not find the same impediments to a prospective rent 
adjustment. In October of 2009, PMC notified Quail Ridge that it was seeking to adjust the rent 
in accordance with section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. The Court concludes that this was 
consistent with the intent of obtaining a written agreement within the ninety (90) window set by 
section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. These attempts were unsuccessful, and in June of 2010 
litigation was initiated. The Court does not believe the doctrine of laches applies to PMC's 
attempts to effectuate a rent adjustment for the 20 10 rent adjustment period as well as future rent 
adjustment periods. The Court concludes that although both parties failed to comply with the 
mandatory arbitration provision of the Lease Agreement, that PMC has complied with the 
provisions of the Lease Agreement sufficient to justifY an adjustment to the annual rent. 
(45) Therefore, the Court concludes that PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for 
the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the amount of $148,500.00 annually. Therefore, for the three 
(3) year period applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combined annual rent for these three (3) 
years is $445,500.00 by January 31,2013, assuming that Quail Ridge remains current on its annual 
rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 towards the annual rent for this three (3) year period. As such it is 
entitled to a credit in this amount against the $445,500.00. This credit results in Quail Ridge being 
obligated to PMC in the total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period of February 1, 2010 
through January 31,2013. 
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( 46) The Court concludes that the rent adjustment provision remains in full force and effect 
and the annual rent adjustment for 2013 shall proceed consistent with section 1.3(b) of the Lease 
Agreement 
( 4 7) The Court determines that there is no prevailing party in this litigation and that 
neither party is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Lease Agreement 
( 48) The Court, upon submission by PMC, will sign a Declaratory Judgment consistent 
with the Court's Conclusion of Law on this matter. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 16th day of October, 2012. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
On October 16, 2012, the Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Memorandum Decision and Order in Pocatello Hospital, LLC, dba Portneuf Medical Centers, 
LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates. 
On October 22, 2012, Plaintiff's filed a Motion to Correct Clerical Mistake in Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order. The Court, upon review of 
the motion and the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has determined that 
Plaintiff is correct that there is a mistake in the Court's Conclusion of Law No. 43. The Court 
inadvertently stated that "PMC did not initiate an appraisal until September of 2007 and did not 
notify Quail Ridge of its intent to invoke the rent adjustment provision of the Lease Agreement 
until October of 2009" [Italics added by the Court]. The italicized portion of this sentence is 
incorrect and inconsistent with the Court's Findings of Fact, specifically Fact No. 42. Finding of 
Fact No. 42 finds that PMC began the process of having the leasehold appraised in September of 
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2009. Conclusion of Law No. 43 should be consistent with Finding of Fact No. 42. Therefore, 
the sentence at issue in Conclusion of Law No. 43 should read: PMC did not initiate an appraisal 
until September of 2009 and did not notify Quail Ridge of its intent to invoke the rent adjustment 
provision of the Lease Agreement until October of2009. 
It is hereby ORDERED that Conclusion of Law No. 43 as set forth in the Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order is corrected as set 
forth herein. 
Dated this 22nd Day of October, 2012. 
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This action came before the Court for a two (2) day court trial conunencing on May 14, 
2012 and continuing through May 15, 2012. On October 17. 2012, the Court issued its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On October 22, 2012, the Court issued its Order Correcting 
Conclusions of Law. Pursuant to the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court Ordered that the Plaintiff prepare a Declaratory Judgment consistent with the Court's 
ConclUsions ofLaw. 
Consistent with the Court's order, Plaintiff submitted a proposed Judgment. The 
proposed Judgment was in a different fonn than anticipated by the Court. Plaintiff's proposed 
Judgment was in the form of a money judgment against Defendant~ Quail Ridge, in the sum of 
OnDER ON FORM OF JUDGMENT- 1 
HOV/~2/2012/MON 01:34PM FAX No. P. 002 
$416,812.50 and a declaration that the rent adjustment. provision relative to the parties' Ground 
Lease Agreement remains in full force and effect and is subject to adjustment in 2013.1 
Due to concerns that the Court had regarding whether a money judgment was 
appropriate, the Court scheduled a conference call with counsel for both parties. The Court 
expressed its concerns and advised the parties that they should submit briefing in support of their 
respective positions on the nature and form of judgment the Court should enter in this matter. 
Consistent with the Court's request, the parties filed simultaneous briefs on this issue. The Court 
has considered the submissions and now enters its Order. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff's initial Complaint was couched in terms of a complamt for breach of contract. 
During the course of pre-trial motion practice, the Court· advised that it was not certain relief 
could be granted to the Plaintiff on a breach of contract theory and opined that perhaps the relief 
Plaintiff was seeking was a declaration of the parties' rights pursuant to I.C. §§10-1201 through 
10-1203. 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to assert a claim for 
declaratory relief. The motion was granted, without objection from Quail Ridge. Therefore, this 
matter proceeded to trial on two (2) separate claims: (1) Breach of Contract, and (2) Declaratory 
Relief. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case-in-chief, Quail Ridge moved for a directed verdict 
on Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Plaintiff did not oppose Quail Ridge's motion and the 
Court granted the same. 
However, had Plaintiff opposed Quail Ridge Motion for Directed Verdict on Plaintiffs 
Breach of Contract Claim. the Court would have been constrained to grant the motion because 
1Plainti:ff stated the date for adjustment to be January 27, 2013. Howe-ver, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of taw 
establish that the effective date for the rent adjustment date is rebru!U)' 1, 2013 not Januaxy 27.2013. 
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there was no evidence in the trial record to support a claim that Quail Ridge was in breach of 
contract. Rather, Quail Ridge had paid rent each month in the original amount of$9,562.50. See 
Court's Findings of Fact No. 18 and.l9, Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Mem~ 
Decision ~d Order, p. 14,1118-19. 
As such, there was no evidence that Quail Ridge was in violation or had breached the 
terms of the Ground Lease Agreement. Similarly, the Court would also have concluded, had the 
Court been asked to make fmdings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue, that Quail Ridge 
had not violated the Ground Lease Agreement in failing to cooperate in the rent adjustment 
provisions. 
For th.ese reasons, the Court concludes that there are absolutely no facts in the record that 
would justify this Court entering a money judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. All the Court's 
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision can properly be utilized for is 
to declare the parties • respective rights in relation to the Ground Lease Agreement. There has 
been no breach established to the Court as of the time of trial in this matter. 
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party indebted shall, promptly 
after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment." Ground 
Lease Agreement, p.3, §1.3(b). Now that the determination has.been made as contemplated 
under the Ground Lease Agreement. the Ground Lease Agreement requires "prompt,, payment of 
the balance due under the Ground Lease Agreement.:z Although the Ground Lease Agreement 
. . 
does not define the term prompt for purposes of the parties' agreement, a failure to pay this 
amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach of contract 
2It should be noted that the parties' Ground Lease Agreement contemplated this determination being made by rsrbiiration. 
However, both parties clearly and expressly waived this requirement, instoad opting to proceed in this forum. 
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Therefore, because there has been no breach and the breach of contract claim was 
disi:nissed at . trial, the Court will decline Plaintiffs request for en1ry of a money judgment. 
· Certafui~ if "prompt'' payment is not made consistent with this Court's detennination, Plaintiff is 
entitled to avail itself of the courts in order to seek redress for this breach. However, this Court 
will limit its judgment to one of declaring the respective rights and obligations under the Ground 
Lease Agreement 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 12th day ofNovember, 2012. 
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MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
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